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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Model and World: Generalizing the Ontic Conception of Scientific Explanation
by
Mark Adam Povich
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology
Washington University in St. Louis, 2017
Professor Carl F. Craver, Chair
Model and World defends a theory of scientific explanation that I call the “Generalized
Ontic Conception” (GOC), according to which a model explains when and only when it provides
(approximately) veridical information about the ontic structures on which the explanandum
phenomenon depends. Causal and mechanistic explanations are species of GOC in which the
ontic structures on which the explanandum phenomenon depends are causes and mechanisms,
respectively, and the kinds of dependence involved are causal and constitutive/mechanistic,
respectively. The kind of dependence relation about which information is provided determines
the species of the explanation. This provides an intuitive typology of explanations and opens the
possibility for non-causal, non-mechanistic explanations that provide information about noncausal, non-mechanistic kinds of dependence (Pincock 2015; Povich forthcoming a). What unites
all these forms of explanation is that, by providing information about the ontic structures on
which the explanandum phenomenon depends, they all can answer what-if-things-had-beendifferent questions (w-questions) about the explanandum phenomenon. This is what makes
causal explanations, mechanistic explanations, and non-causal, non-mechanistic explanations all
explanations.
iv

Furthermore, GOC is a generalized ontic conception of scientific explanation (Salmon
1984, 1989; Craver 2014). It is consistent with Craver's claim that (2014), according to the ontic
conception, commitments to ontic structures (like causes or mechanisms) are required to
demarcate explanation from other scientific achievements. GOC demarcates explanatory from
non-explanatory models in terms of ontic structures. For example, the distinction between
explanatory and phenomenal models is cashed out in terms of the ontic structures about which
information is conveyed: A phenomenal model provides information about the explanandum
phenomenon, but not the ontic structures on which it depends. GOC is generalized because it
says that commitments to more of the ontic than just the causal-mechanical – the traditional
focus of the ontic conception – are required adequately to achieve this demarcation; attention to
all ontic structures on which the explanandum depends is required.
The relation between model and world required for explanation is elaborated in terms of
information rather than mapping, reference, description, or similarity (Craver and Kaplan 2011;
Kaplan 2011; Weisberg 2013). The latter concepts prove too strong, so will not count models as
explanatory that in fact are. Take Kaplan and Craver's (2011) model-to-mechanism-mapping
(3M) principle. According to 3M, the variables in a mechanistic explanatory model must map to
specific structural components and causal interactions of the explanandum phenomenon's
mechanism. However, you can mechanistically explain without referring to the explanandum's
mechanism or its components and their activities, for example, by describing what the
mechanism is not like. This is a way of constraining or conveying information about a
mechanism without actually mapping to, referring to, describing, representing, or being similar
to it.

v

Chapter 1. Introduction: Brief Historical Positioning
Salmon (1989) began his authoritative history of scientific explanation with Hempel and
Oppenheim's “Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” published in 1948. If we follow Salmon in
so dating the birth of the philosophical study of scientific explanation, then we are now nearing
the end of its seventh decade. What lessons can we draw from the intervening three decades
between Salmon's study and today? The central idea of this dissertation is that a wrong turn was
made during the third decade, solidified in the fourth, and down which we have traveled to this
day. In this introductory chapter, I will explain why this turn was made and how to get back on
the right path, which, it turns out, is not so far away.
According to Hempel and Oppenheim's (1948) account, which was to become known as
the deductive-nomological (DN) model, an explanation is an argument with descriptions of at
least one law of nature and antecedent conditions as premises and a description of the
explanandum phenomenon, the thing to be explained, as the conclusion. On this view, to explain
is to show that the explanandum phenomenon is predictable on the basis of at least one law of
nature and certain specific antecedent and boundary conditions.
The DN model soon became the received theory of scientific explanation, one of two
“grand traditions” (Salmon 1990), although it always had critics. An early critic was Scriven
(1958), who was to start the second “grand tradition,” according to which explaining a
phenomenon is identifying its cause(s). The first tradition, according to Salmon (1989; 1990),
lives on in unificationism (Friedman, 1974; Kitcher 1989). The basic idea behind unificationism
is that explaining an event is deriving a description of it from an argument pattern that can be
used to derive descriptions of many different phenomena. This unifies the explanandum
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phenomenon with the other phenomena that are derivable by the same argument pattern, thereby
showing it to be part of a more general pattern of phenomena. The second tradition lives on in
mechanistic approaches (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Craver 2006; Glennan 2002; Kaplan
2011; Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000) and causal/difference-making approaches (Strevens
2008; Woodward 2003; Woodward and Hitchcock 2003) to explanation.
In the intervening three decades since Salmon published Four Decades of Scientific
Explanation, I think it is safe to say that more philosophers have signed on to causal-mechanical
accounts of explanation than to unificationist or DN accounts (though see Sansom and Shields
[2016] and Schweder [2005]). One consequence of this is that causal-mechanical accounts have
become the new main targets of philosophical critique (Batterman 2002a; 2002b; Bokulich 2011;
Huneman 2010; Reutlinger 2014; 2016; Rice 2012; 2013; Saatsi and Pexton 2013; Woodward
2013). I think there is something right in these philosophers' critiques, but what exactly are
causal-mechanical accounts leaving out? To address this question, I want to briefly consider the
historical motivations for causal-mechanical accounts of explanation.
According to Salmon (1989, 116), growing realization of the central role of causation in
explanation came during the third decade, and was further developed in the fourth decade. The
following are two of the influential counterexamples to the DN model that motivated this
growing realization (Salmon 1989, 46).
The length of a flag pole's shadow can be derived from the height of the pole and the
angle of elevation of the sun (Bromberger 1966). Therefore, according to the DN model, the
length of a flag pole's shadow is explained by the height of the pole and the angle of elevation of
the sun. But this derivation is symmetric. That is, one can also derive the height of the flag pole
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from the length of its shadow and the angle of elevation of the sun. Therefore, according to the
DN model, the height of the flag pole is explained by the length of its shadow and the angle of
elevation of the sun. But that does not seem right. Here it is plausible that the real explanatory
work is done by causation: the derivation of the length of the pole's shadow counts as
explanatory because that derivation, but not the reverse derivation, tracks causes.
Another counterexample concerns common causes. A drop in atmospheric pressure
causes the oncoming storm and the barometer to dip (Salmon 1989, 47). We can use the dipping
barometer to predict an oncoming storm. Since the DN model ties explanation to prediction, the
dipping barometer, therefore, explains the oncoming storm. Again, that does not seem right. The
drop in atmospheric pressure explains both the oncoming storm and the dip in the barometer.
Causation, again, does the explanatory work.
The lesson that was drawn by many philosophers from these counterexamples to the DN
model was that explanation in general is a matter of identifying causes. We can now see in
hindsight, I argue, that this was the wrong general lesson to draw. It is correct that explanation in
these cases is a matter of identifying causes. There is a lesson that can be drawn about
explanation in general, but it can only be seen in hindsight: explanation in general is a matter of
identifying ontic relations of dependence. This lesson is actually a version of Salmon's ontic
conception of scientific explanation.
Salmon (1984; 1989) distinguished between epistemic, modal, and ontic conceptions of
explanation. These are conceptions of what a scientific explanation aims to show of the
explanandum phenomenon: that it is expected to occur, that it had to occur, that it fits “into a
discernible pattern,” respectively (1984, 121). For Salmon, the “discernible pattern” into which
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the explanandum phenomenon is fit is structured by causal processes, causal interactions, and
causal laws (Ibid., 132). “[W]e explain,” wrote Salmon, “by providing information about these
patterns that reveals how the explanandum-events fit in” (1989, 121).
The right lesson to be drawn from the DN counterexamples for the theory of explanation
in general is that explanation is not about nomic expectability, but about fitting the explanandum
into “discernible patterns,” “relationships that exist in the world” (1984, 121). But, I argue, this
should not be construed solely in term of causation. It is a mistake to equate the ontic conception
with the causal-mechanical account of explanation, as both critics and advocates of Salmon
assume. Salmon actually did not think causation was essential to the ontic conception:
It could fairly be said, I believe, that mechanistic explanations tell us how the world
works. These explanations are local in the sense that they show us how particular
occurrences come about; they explain particular phenomena in terms of collections of
particular causal processes and interactions – or, perhaps, in terms of noncausal
mechanisms, if there are such things. (1989, 184; my emphasis)
For Salmon, what was essential to the ontic conception was that, “the explanation of events
consists of fitting them into the patterns that exist in the objective world” (1989, 121). We can
and should hold on to the ontic conception while accepting many of the criticisms and limitations
of causal explanation provided in the three decades since Four Decades. There are noncausal
dependence relations in which an explanandum phenomenon can stand to other worldly items
(examples are discussed in Chapter 4). I call the resulting view the Generalized Ontic
Conception (GOC) of scientific explanation.
According to the GOC, a model explains when and only when it provides
(approximately)1 veridical information about the ontic structures2 on which the explanandum
1
2

Idealization will be dealt with in Chapter 4.
The term “structure” can have technical senses, e.g., in the philosophy of mathematics. Here I use it as a catch-all
for worldly properties, relations, events, objects, and so forth, possibly even structures in the mathematical sense
(see Chapter 8).
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phenomenon depends. (Note that Salmon said there were two ways to formulate an ontic
conception: explanations are certain ontic structures or explanations are descriptions of them
[1989, 86].) Causal and mechanistic explanations are species of GOC in which the ontic
structures on which the explanandum phenomenon depends are causes and mechanisms,
respectively, and the kinds of dependence involved are causal and constitutive/mechanistic,
respectively. The kind of dependence relation about which information is provided determines
the species of the explanation. This provides an intuitive typology of explanations and opens the
possibility for non-causal, non-mechanistic explanations that provide information about noncausal, non-mechanistic kinds of dependence (Pincock 2015; Povich forthcoming a; see also
Lowe [2013] on kinds of metaphysical dependence). What unites all these forms of explanation
is that, by providing information about the ontic structures on which the explanandum
phenomenon depends, they all can answer what-if-things-had-been-different questions (wquestions) about the explanandum phenomenon. This is what makes causal explanations,
mechanistic explanations, and non-causal, non-mechanistic explanations all explanations.
GOC is also consistent with Craver's (2014) formulation of the ontic conception,
according to which commitments to ontic structures (like causes or mechanisms) are required to
demarcate explanation from other scientific achievements. GOC demarcates explanatory from
non-explanatory models in terms of ontic structures. For example, the distinction between
explanatory and phenomenal models is cashed out in terms of the ontic structures about which
information is conveyed: A phenomenal model provides information about the explanandum
phenomenon, but not the ontic structures on which it depends. GOC is generalized because it
says that commitments to more of the ontic than just the causal-mechanical – the traditional
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focus of the ontic conception – are required adequately to achieve this demarcation; attention to
all ontic structures on which the explanandum depends is required.
I elaborate the relation between model and world required for explanation in terms of
information rather than mapping, reference, description, or similarity (Craver and Kaplan 2011;
Kaplan 2011; Weisberg 2013). The latter concepts prove too strong, so will not count models as
explanatory that in fact are. Take Kaplan and Craver's (2011) model-to-mechanism-mapping
(3M) principle. According to 3M, the variables in a mechanistic explanatory model must map to
specific structural components and causal interactions of the explanandum phenomenon's
mechanism. However, you can mechanistically explain without referring to the explanandum's
mechanism or its components and their activities, for example, by describing what the
mechanism is not like. This is a way of constraining or conveying information about a
mechanism without actually mapping to, referring to, describing, representing, or being similar
to it.
Each of the critiques of causal-mechanical accounts of explanation I mentioned earlier
(Batterman 2002a; 2002b; Bokulich 2011; Huneman 2010; Reutlinger 2014; 2016; Rice 2012;
2013; Saatsi and Pexton 2013; Woodward 2013) begins to point towards the GOC by
emphasizing an explanation's ability to answer counterfactual w-questions. However, none of
these critiques grapples with the question of what distinguishes explanatorily relevant from
irrelevant counterfactuals. It is the ontic component of GOC that supplies the asymmetry of
explanatory relevance.
Alongside the history of the philosophical study of scientific explanation, philosophers of
science became increasingly interested in scientific models (Morgan and Morrison 1999): what
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they are (Godfrey-Smith 2009; Weisberg 2013), how we learn about them and use them to learn
about the world (Morgan 1999; Weisberg 2013), and how they represent (Contessa 2007; Giere
2004; Suárez 2004). One source of this interest begins with the philosophical analysis of
theories (for discussion of the structure of scientific theories, see Craver 2002; Halvorson 2016).
On the axiomatic/syntactic view of theories (Hempel 1965; Nagel 1961), which was developed
in parallel the DN model of scientific explanation, scientific theories are systems of formal
logical structures that are partially interpreted to make empirical claims. According to the
semantic view of theories, in contrast, scientific theories are (sets of) models in which the claims
made by the theories are true (Suppe 1977; Suppes 1961; 1967; van Fraassen 1980). Critiques of
the semantic view of theories have continued to emphasize the importance of models (Craver
2002; Morrison 1999).
However, philosophers primarily interested in the semantics, epistemology, and ontology
of models have not usually been interested in what makes models explanatory. Two prominent
exceptions are van Fraassen (1980) and Cartwright (1983). According to van Fraassen's (1980)
pragmatic theory of explanation, an explanation is an answer to a why-question that consists of
an ordered triple of explanandum phenomenon, contrast class, and relevance relation. However,
van Fraassen places so few constraints on the relevance relation that in some contexts astral
influence can count as a relevance relation, thereby permitting astrological explanations (Kitcher
and Salmon 1987; Salmon 1989). According to Cartwright's (1983) simulacrum account of
explanation, “to explain a phenomenon is to construct a model which fits the phenomenon into a
theory” (17). However, while the simulacrum account appears to have affinities with both the
DN model and unificationism, Cartwright provides little guidance on how exactly the account
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works. Without more constraints on what a model must do to be explanatory, it seems that any
theoretical model that matches the phenomenological behavior of the explanandum is an
explanation (161). Cartwright is forthright that her account sheds little light on how causal
explanations work (162). GOC describes what a model must do to be explanatory and provides a
clear taxonomy of kinds of explanation.
In conclusion, Salmon (1990) identified two “grand traditions” in the philosophy of
explanation. The first tradition begins with Hempel's DN model and runs through unificationism.
The second tradition begins with Scriven and runs through causal-mechanical accounts of
explanation. The first tradition adheres to an epistemic conception of explanation while the
second adheres to an ontic conception. I argue that it is a mistake to equate the ontic conception
with a causal-mechanical account of explanation. My hope is that the GOC can provide the
material for a new consensus in scientific explanation's eighth decade.
In the following chapters, I explore the explanatory status of models in psychology
(Chapters 2 and 3). Finding no non-causal, non-mechanistic explanations there, I turn to models
in biology and physics (Chapter 4), where I explicate a new theory of explanation that can
accommodate non-causal, non-mechanistic explanation: the GOC. I then work on the details of
that theory (Chapters 5 and 6) and, with Prof. Carl F. Craver, critique a prominent opposing
account (Chapter 7).
In Chapter 2, I consider the question of which psychological models, if any, are
mechanistic explanations. That this is a heavily debated question should seem a little strange
given that there is rough consensus on the following two claims: 1) A mechanism is an organized
collection of entities and activities that produces, underlies, or maintains a phenomenon. 2) A
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mechanistic explanation describes or otherwise represents the mechanism producing, underlying,
or maintaining the phenomenon to be explained (i.e. the explanandum phenomenon) (Bechtel
and Abrahamsen 2005; Craver 2007). If there is a rough consensus on what mechanisms are and
that mechanistic explanations represent them, then how is there no consensus on which
psychological models are mechanistic explanations? Surely the psychological models that are
mechanistic explanations are the models that represent mechanisms. That is true, of course; the
trouble arises when determining what exactly that involves. Philosophical disagreement over
which psychological models are mechanistic explanations is often disagreement about what it
means to represent a mechanism, among other things (Hochstein 2016; Levy 2013). In addition
to what it means to represent a mechanism, one's position in this debate arguably depends on a
host of other seemingly arcane metaphysical issues, such as the nature of computational and
functional properties (Piccinini 2016) and realization (Piccinini and Maley 2014), as well as the
relation between models, methodologies, and explanations (Craver 2014; Levy 2013; Zednik
2015). Although I inevitably advocate a position, my primary aim in this chapter is to spell all of
these relationships out and canvas the positions that have been taken (or one could take) with
respect to mechanistic explanation in psychology, using dynamical systems models and cognitive
models (or functional analyses) as examples. This chapter is forthcoming in The SAGE
Handbook of Theoretical Psychology (Povich forthcoming b).
In Chapter 3, I examine the explanatory status of three specific psychological models.
Weiskopf (2011) argues that the models of object recognition and categorization, JIM,
SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE, are not mechanistic, yet satisfy the norms of explanation. The norms
in question are the ability to manipulate and answer counterfactual questions about the
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explanandum phenomenon. In this chapter, I argue that these models are mechanism-sketches.
My argument applies recent research using model-based fMRI, a novel neuroimaging method
whose significance for current debates on psychological models and mechanistic explanation has
yet to be explored. This chapter was published in Povich (2015).
In Chapter 4, I present GOC and argue that it better accounts for the explanatoriness of
so-called “minimal models” than Batterman and Rice's (2014) account. They argue that minimal
models possess explanatory power that cannot be captured by what they call “common features”
approaches to explanation, of which GOC is a species. Minimal models are explanatory,
according to Batterman and Rice, not in virtue of accurately representing relevant features, but in
virtue of answering three questions that provide a “story about why large classes of features are
irrelevant to the explanandum phenomenon” (356). In this chapter, I argue, first, that a method
(the renormalization group) they propose that answers the three questions cannot answer them, at
least by itself. Second, I argue that answers to the three questions are unnecessary to account for
the explanatoriness of their minimal models. Finally, I argue that a common features account,
what I call GOC or the generalized ontic conception of explanation, can capture the
explanatoriness of minimal models. This chapter is forthcoming in The British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science (Povich forthcoming a).
In Chapter 5, I examine a potentially threatening implication of GOC. I identify an
inconsistent triad between any informational theory of explanation like GOC, the agent-relativity
of information, and a kind of objectivity of explanation. I also note how an informational theory
of explanation is implicit in core arguments of mechanists (Piccinini and Craver 2011; Zednik
2015). However, informational theories seem to conflict with some lay and scientific
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commonsense judgments and goals of the theory of explanation, because information is relative
to the background knowledge of agents (Dretske 1981). Sometimes a model is an explanation
simpliciter, not just an explanation relative to some particular agent. We would also like a
philosophical theory to tell us when a model is an explanation simpliciter, not just when a model
is an explanation relative to some particular agent. I sketch a solution by distinguishing
explanation simpliciter from explanation-to and relativizing the former to what I call “total
scientific background knowledge” (TBSK). This chapter was presented in poster form at the
Philosophy of Science Association conference in Atlanta in November 2016 and is currently
under review.
In Chapter 6, I discuss an epistemological issue that was gestured at in the previous
chapter: the determination of the content of TBSK. Specifically, I defend Bird's (2010; 2014)
account of social knowledge (SK). SK denies that scientific social knowledge supervenes solely
on the mental states of individuals. Lackey (2014) objects that SK cannot accommodate 1) a
knowledge-action principle and 2) the role of group defeaters. I argue that Lackey's knowledgeaction principle is ambiguous. On one disambiguation, it is false; on the other, it is true but poses
no threat to SK. Regarding group defeaters, I argue that there are at least two options available to
the defender of SK, both taken from literature on individual defeaters and applied to group
defeaters. Finally, I argue that Lackey's description of the case of Dr. N. – as a case in which the
scientific community does not know but is merely in a position to know – is mistaken. It assumes
that Dr. N.'s publication is not scientific knowledge. An analogy to the individual case shows that
it is plausible that the scientific community is not merely in a position to know, although its
members are. This leaves intact a conception of social knowledge on which it does not supervene
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on the mental states of individuals. This chapter has been revised and resubmitted to Erkenntnis.
In Chapter 7, co-authored in equal parts research and writing with Carl F. Craver, we
critique Lange's account of distinctively mathematical explanation from an ontic perspective.
Lange (2013b) uses several compelling examples to argue that certain explanations for natural
phenomena appeal primarily to mathematical, rather than natural, facts. In such explanations, the
core explanatory facts are modally stronger than facts about causation, regularity, and other
natural relations. We show that Lange's account of distinctively mathematical explanation is
flawed in that it fails to account for the implicit directionality in each of his examples. This
inadequacy is remediable in each case by appeal to ontic facts that account for why the
explanation is acceptable in one direction and unacceptable in the other direction. The
mathematics involved in these examples cannot play this crucial normative role. While Lange's
examples fail to demonstrate the existence of distinctively mathematical explanations, they help
to emphasize that many superficially natural scientific explanations rely for their explanatory
force on relations of stronger-than-natural necessity. These are not opposing kinds of scientific
explanations; they are different aspects of scientific explanation. This chapter has been revised
and resubmitted to Studies in History and Philosophy of Science.
In Chapter 8, I conclude and discuss future work. There are at least three areas where
Model and World needs to be further developed. The first is on the explanation/model distinction.
I make this distinction in Chapter 2 and Kaplan and Craver (unpublished) make it in their
account of norms of explanatory completeness. The second is on model semantics. Although
GOC does not use terms like “reference” or “mapping,” this does not imply that model
semantics has no place in the theory of explanation. The third is on whether the explanatory
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power of distinctively mathematical explanations can be accommodated by GOC.
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Chapter 2. Mechanistic Explanation in Psychology
2.1. Introduction
Among philosophers it is heavily debated which psychological models, if any, are
mechanistic explanations. This should seem a little strange given that there is rough3 consensus
on the following two claims: 1) A mechanism is an organized collection of entities and activities
that produces, underlies, or maintains a phenomenon. 2) A mechanistic explanation describes or
otherwise represents the mechanism producing, underlying, or maintaining the phenomenon to
be explained (i.e. the explanandum phenomenon) (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Craver 2007).
If there is a rough consensus on what mechanisms are and that mechanistic explanations
represent them, then how is there no consensus on which psychological models are mechanistic
explanations? Surely the psychological models that are mechanistic explanations are the models
that represent mechanisms. That is true, of course; the trouble arises when determining what
exactly that involves. Philosophical disagreement over which psychological models are
mechanistic explanations is often disagreement about what it means to represent a mechanism,
among other things (Hochstein 2016; Levy 2013). In addition to what it means to represent a
mechanism, one's position in this debate arguably depends on a host of other seemingly arcane
metaphysical issues, such as the nature of computational and functional properties (Piccinini
2016) and realization (Maley and Piccinini 2014), as well as the relation between models,
methodologies, and explanations (Craver 2014; Levy 2013; Zednik 2015). Although I inevitably
advocate a position, my primary aim in this chapter is to spell all of these relationships out and
canvas the positions that have been taken (or one could take) with respect to mechanistic
explanation in psychology, using dynamical systems models and cognitive models (or functional
3

See Section 2.2.1 below.
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analyses4) as examples.
In Section 2.2, I lay out the basic conceptual toolkit of and motivation for a mechanistic
account of explanation, including only recent historical development (for a more extensive
history of mechanistic philosophy, see Chapters 2 and 3 of Glennan and Illari [forthcoming]). In
Section 2.3, I analyze more closely the question of what it takes for an explanation to be
mechanistic. Taking center stage is an increasingly common distinction between mechanistic
explanations, on the one hand, and their representational form (including the methodologies used
to construct those representations), on the other (Craver 2014; Hochstein 2016; Levy 2013;
Zednik 2011, 2015). I illustrate the way this distinction is used with regards to dynamical
systems models, which dynamicists have claimed to be non-mechanistic explanations. A similar
dialectic occurs with respect to the mechanistic status of functional analyses. I take this up in
Section 2.4, where I examine the issue of the autonomy of psychology and the relation between
functionalism and mechanistic explanation. In Section 2.5, I compare the previous concepts and
distinctions with the long-standing, though changing, distinction between ontic and epistemic
conceptions of scientific explanation.
2.2. Mechanisms and Mechanistic Explanation
I first briefly gesture at an ontology of mechanisms, laying out only the bare
commitments required to establish a broad concept of mechanisms and mechanistic levels. Then,
I motivate a mechanistic account of explanation, and make two normative distinctions: between
mechanism schemata and mechanism sketches and between how-possibly and how-actually
models. I also contrast both of those distinctions with phenomenal models.

4

Not all functional analyses are cognitive models, but all cognitive models are functional analyses, at least as I
will use those terms here. See Section 2.4.
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2.2.1 Mechanisms
While it is true that there is rough consensus that mechanisms contain entities and
activities, or simply active entities, spatiotemporally organized to give rise to a behavior or
property of the whole mechanism5, there is disagreement over the specific metaphysics of
mechanisms (see Illari and Williamson [2012] for a discussion of this disagreement and a
recommendation of a broad construal of mechanisms, similar to mine, that applies across
sciences). I do not wish to get involved in this debate here. I will assume a permissive6 concept
of mechanism as any collection of entities, also broadly construed, whose collective, organized
activity gives rise to the behavior or property of a whole in context (also see Levy [2014, 9] on
what he calls the 'narrow picture' and the 'broad picture' of mechanisms). The entities in a
mechanism need not be neatly localizable or contained within well-defined boundaries. An entity
could be any set of structural properties that is robustly detectable (Piccinini and Craver 2011,
296).
Though permissive, this concept of mechanism is not trivial because it does not make
every system – not even every causal system – a mechanism. Mechanisms contrast with
aggregates, which lack the requisite organization. The parts of mechanisms have spatiotemporal
properties, and stand in organizational and causal relations to one another, that are explanatorily
relevant to the behavior of the mechanism as a whole. As such, mechanisms are more than the
sums of their parts: their behavior depends on the spatial, temporal, and causal organization of
5

6

I will speak of the “behavior” or “property” of a whole mechanism as that for which the mechanism is
responsible, but there is also disagreement about how metaphysically to characterize the phenomenon produced
by a mechanism (Kaiser and Krickel forthcoming).
The more restrictive one makes the concept of mechanism (for example, by requiring modularity and stability
[Woodward 2013] or localizability [Weiskopf 2011]), the correspondingly rarer mechanistic explanations will be.
When presented with a putatively non-mechanistic explanation, one should always ask what concept of
mechanism is in the background.
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their parts. Aggregates, in contrast, are systems – even causal systems – whose behavior does not
depend on the spatial, temporal, and causal organization of their parts. As such, a property of an
aggregate is literally a sum of the properties of its parts. The concentration of a fluid, for
example, is an aggregation of particles. Aggregates have properties that do not change when their
parts are reorganized, because in true aggregates, spatial, temporal, and causal organization is
irrelevant (Wimsatt 1997; Povich and Craver forthcoming).
Mechanisms are often organized hierarchically into levels (Craver 2015; Povich and
Craver forthcoming). The components of mechanisms can themselves be composed of organized
components that are responsible for their activity. Similarly, a mechanism may compose an
active entity that is itself a component in a larger mechanism. The term 'mechanistic levels' refers
to this embedded, hierarchical organization of mechanisms.
Mechanistic levels contrast with another prominent use of the term “levels” in
psychology: Marr's levels (Marr 1982). Marr's levels are best understood as levels of description,
abstraction, or realization. The computational level, algorithmic level, and implementational
level arguably do not stand in causal or componency relations with one another (Craver 2015;
Craver and Bechtel 2007) (I briefly return to this in Section 2.4).
Mechanistic levels are necessarily local, in contrast to the more monolithic levels of
Oppenheim and Putnam (1958), who divided nature into levels of atoms, molecules, cells,
organs, organisms, and societies. For mechanistic levels, an entity is at a lower mechanistic level
than another if and only if it is a component in the mechanism of the latter. From this a weak
notion of sameness of level is derived: two entities are at the same level only if they are
components in the same mechanism, and neither is a component of the other.7
7

Eronen (2015) argues that this is so weak that it is tantamount to abandoning the idea of levels altogether.
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A component of a mechanism is more than just a mereological part; it is a part that
contributes to the behavior of the mechanism – it is a constitutively relevant part. There is some
debate over how to cash out this notion of constitutive relevance. Craver (2007) characterizes it
in terms of mutual manipulability of part and whole: A part is a component of (or is
constitutively relevant to) a mechanism's behavior if one can manipulate that behavior by
manipulating the part, and one can manipulate the part by manipulating the behavior of the
mechanism. This account is not without problems8, but I will not examine those here. Instead, I
will assume that the notion of constitutive relevance as contribution to the behavior of a
mechanism is clear enough for our purposes.
2.2.2 Mechanistic Explanation
The contemporary account of mechanistic explanation has its origin primarily in the work
of Salmon (1984, 1989), among others (see, for example, Scriven [1959, 1975]). He developed a
causal account of explanation in response to problems that arose for the deductive-nomological
account (DN; also known as the covering-law model). According to DN, an explanation is an
argument with descriptions of at least one law of nature and antecedent conditions as premises
and a description of the explanandum phenomenon as the conclusion (Hempel and Oppenheim
1948). To explain is to show that the explanandum phenomenon is predictable given the truth of
the premises. However, tying explanation this closely to prediction generates some nowinfamous problems (Salmon 1989). For example, on such an account, many mere correlations
come out as explanatory, which intuitively is not true. A falling barometer reliably predicts the
weather, but the falling barometer does not explain the weather (Salmon 1989, 47).
8

For example, Craver's account requires that the interventions used to establish constitutive relevance are 'ideal,'
which seems conceptually impossible (Baumgartner and Gebharter 2015; Couch 2011; Harinen 2014; Leuridan
2012; Romero 2015).
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According to Salmon's (1984) causal-mechanical view, in contrast, explanation involves
situating the explanandum phenomenon in the causal structure of the world. (Salmon called this
an 'ontic conception' of scientific explanation, contrasting it with the 'epistemic conception' of the
deductive-nomological account. I return to this still-relevant distinction in Section 1.5.) There are
several ways of so situating an explanandum phenomenon. An etiological causal explanation is
“backward-looking;” it describes the explanandum phenomenon's past causal history (its
immediately prior causes, the causes of those causes, and so on). A constitutive mechanistic
explanation is “downward-looking;” it involves describing the entities, activities, and
organization of the mechanism that produces, underlies, or maintains the explanandum
phenomenon. It is the kind of explanation that most readily comes to mind when one hears the
phrase “mechanistic explanation.” However, there is also the neglected contextual mechanistic
explanation, which is “upward-looking” (though see Craver [2001] and Bechtel [2011], from
which I have borrowed the “looking” metaphor). It describes the broader mechanism of which
the explanandum phenomenon is an active component9. This chapter will be concerned with the
latter two kinds of explanation, constitutive and contextual mechanistic explanation (though I
briefly return to etiological causal explanation in Section 2.3).
There are two important normative distinctions (or continua) in the mechanist's
conceptual framework: mechanism schemata versus mechanism sketches, and how-possibly
versus how-actually models (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000; Craver 2007). A mechanism
schema is an abstract description of a type of mechanism, rather than a specific token instance.
Details will inevitably be omitted, but, ideally, only details that are irrelevant to the mechanism

9

Bechtel (2011) also includes what he calls “looking around,” which involves determining how the components of
a mechanism are organized. I have subsumed this under constitutive mechanistic explanation.
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type. Details that are specific to tokens of the type can be added as the schema is applied to
instances (Machamer et al. 2000, 15). Mechanism sketches, on the other hand, are incomplete
descriptions of (type or token) mechanisms that contain black boxes and filler terms (Craver
2007, 113). They are still partially explanatory, but they are lacking in relevant detail. More
details can be added to the model to fill in the gaps, though no model is ever fully complete, just
complete enough for practical purposes (Craver and Darden 2013). Idealized models qualify as
mechanism schemata, rather than sketches, to the extent that they capture relevant aspects of
mechanisms.
A how-possibly model describes a merely possible mechanism, whereas a how-actually
model describes the mechanism that (we have the most evidence to believe) actually produces,
maintains, or underlies the explanandum phenomenon. This distinction is epistemic: turning a
how-possibly model into a how-actually model does not require modifying the model itself in
any way; it requires testing the model (Weiskopf 2011). The greater the evidential support for the
model, the more how-actually it is. Between how-possibly and how-actually is a range of howplausibly models. Turning a mechanism sketch into a more complete mechanism schema, in
contrast, requires modifying the model by filling in missing details (Craver and Darded 2013).
These details may be at the same mechanistic level as the rest of the details in the model, or they
may be at a lower mechanistic level.
In contrast to how-possibly and how-actually models, or mechanism sketches and
schemata, which more or less completely describe possible or actual mechanisms responsible for
some explanandum phenomenon, a merely descriptive, or phenomenal, model describes an
explanandum phenomenon, usually in a general, concise way. Snell's law is a common example
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of a phenomenal model (Craver and Darden 2013). It accurately and compactly describes the
relationship between the angle of incidence and the angle of refraction when light passes
between two media, but it does not explain refraction.
Mechanistic explanations satisfy what are widely considered, by mechanists and nonmechanists (e.g., Chirimuuta 2014; Rice 2015; Weiskopf 2011) alike, the normative constraints
on explanation: the ability to answer counterfactual questions about the explanandum
phenomenon ('what-if-things-had-been-different' questions or, more compactly, w-questions),
and the ability to manipulate and control10 the explanandum phenomenon (Craver 2007). These
norms capture what is distinctive about the scientific achievement of explanation, as opposed to
other achievements like prediction, description, or categorization. As the barometer example
above shows, a model can be predictive without being explanatory. They also provide a basis for
explanatory power. A model is more explanatorily powerful, according to mechanists, when and
only when it can answer more w-questions and afford more opportunities for control (Ylikoski
and Kuorikoski 2010).
2.3. Models, Strategies, and Explanations
I have briefly described what mechanisms and mechanistic explanations are, but I have
not yet given any examples of models that are mechanistic explanations. Canonical examples of
mechanistic explanation have given the impression that a mechanistic explanation should look a
certain way, or be constructed using certain methods, but some mechanists deny this (Craver
2014; Piccinini and Craver 2011; Zednik 2011; 2015).
In some of the most seminal work on mechanistic explanation (e.g., Bechtel and
Richardson 1993; Glennan 1996; Machamer et al. 2000), the examples and diagrams used were
10

These are related, of course. The latter ability is a practical analogue of the former.
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very machine-like: biological oxidation, voltage-gated ion channels, the action potential, protein
synthesis. This arguably led to the impression that a mechanistic explanation was a particular,
machine-like kind of model or representation (Hochstein 2016; Zednik 2015).11 With this
impression in place, counterexamples from psychology (and elsewhere) have come in the form
of explanatory models that look nothing like the mechanists' canonical examples. Implicit or
explicit in many mechanists' responses to these counterexamples is a distinction between
mechanistic explanations and mechanistic models.12 Let us examine in some detail the dialectic
in one prominent case from psychology – dynamical systems models – with that distinction in
mind.
2.3.1 Dynamical Systems Models
Dynamical systems models are models that employ the mathematical (and geometric)
concepts of dynamical systems theory, such as differential or difference equations (Chemero
2009; Izhikevich 2007; Zednik 2011). This allows the modeling of the time evolution of relevant
variables, which can be represented geometrically (and graphically) as a trajectory through a
phase or state space. The state space of a system represents all its possible states (i.e. all possible
values of the system's variables). A trajectory through state space is then a graphical
representation of how the system's variables change over time. Graphical representations have
11

12

Although not all representations are models, in this context I will use the terms “representation” and “model”
synonymously to mean some kind of structure (e.g., a concrete replica, a mathematical equation, a diagram, or a
linguistic description) that is interpreted to represent a target system (Weisberg 2013). This terminological choice
runs roughshod over Weisberg's distinction between models and model descriptions, but this should not affect the
points that follow.
I do not mean to imply that all mechanists make this distinction or that no mechanist has meant a certain kind of
model by “mechanistic explanation,” just that, of those mechanists who dispute putative examples of nonmechanistic explanation, many of them have appealed to this distinction, or something like it. Kaplan's (2011)
model-to-mechanism-mapping (3M) requirement might preclude him from making this distinction, or at least
from saying that models that fail 3M, but still provide information about mechanisms, are mechanistic
explanations. For example, you can provide information about mechanisms by saying what is not responsible for
an explanandum (cf. Lewis 1986: 220), but this would violate 3M. This comes down to Kaplan's intended scope
of 3M, something about which I will refrain from speculating here.
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the benefit of allowing careful and intuitive analysis of state space topology, revealing abstract,
dynamical features such as the presence of attractors (i.e. states into which the system tends from
surrounding states) (Izhikevich 2007). In dynamical models in psychology, the relevant variables
often span brain, body, and environment (van Gelder 1998; van Gelder and Port 1995; Zednik
2011). I briefly describe two dynamical models: the HKB model and Beer's model of categorical
perception.13
One of the first dynamical models that was presented as a challenge to mechanistic
explanation was the Haken-Kelso-Bunz (HKB; Haken, Kelso, and Bunz 1985) model (Chemero
2009; Chemero and Silberstein 2011; Stepp, Chemero, and Turvey 2011; Walmsley 2008).
Although the explanandum of this model is not an especially cognitive phenomenon, it will be
helpful to review it and mechanists' responses.
HKB is a model of bimanual coordination, specifically simultaneous, side-to-side
movement of the index fingers (and hands). The behavioral data were obtained by asking
participants to move horizontally both index fingers either in-phase (pointing toward the midline,
then away) or out-of-phase (both pointing left, then both right). Participants were asked to keep
pace with a metronome so that experimenters could manipulate the rate of finger movement
(Kelso 1981). By increasing the rate, experimenters found that only in-phase movement is
possible beyond a certain critical rate. Participants who began out-of-phase involuntarily
switched to in-phase once the critical rate was crossed. The same phenomenon occurs during
other forms of bimanual coordination, such as hand movements at the wrist (Kelso 1984).
To model this phenomenon with dynamical systems theory, the fingers are represented as
13

Since my theme is psychology, I leave aside dynamical models in neuroscience, though they too have been
presented as counterexamples to mechanistic explanation. For example, see Ross (2015), which relies on
Batterman and Rice's (2014) notion of a “minimal model explanation.” The response to Batterman and Rice in
Povich (forthcoming a) applies to Ross's argument as well.
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coupled oscillators and the stable in-phase and out-of-phase movements as attractors. The
dynamics are described by the following differential equation:
dϕ/dt = –dV/dϕ = −a sin ϕ – 2b sin 2ϕ,
where V is the so-called potential function, V(ϕ) = −a cos ϕ − b cos 2ϕ, and the ratio b/a is a
control parameter that varies inversely with finger oscillation frequency, and determines the
topology of the phase space (i.e. the landscape of attractors). At a low oscillation frequency, there
are two attractors, corresponding to stable in-phase and out-of-phase movement. At a high
frequency, past the critical value, the landscape shifts to include only one attractor, corresponding
to stable in-phase movement. This accurately describes the observed behavioral data.
Beer's (1996; 2003) dynamical model of perceptual categorization (or categorical
perception) is more cognitively interesting (Zednik [2011] provides a detailed analysis of this
model). The model is a simulated system consisting of a 14-neuron continuous-time recurrent
neural network (CTRNN) brain, inside an evolved model agent (meaning its network
architecture was constructed with an evolutionary algorithm14), inside a two-dimensional
environment. The agent moves horizontally as circles or diamonds fall from above. It
'categorizes' these objects by catching the former and avoiding the latter. The agent perceives
with an eye consisting of seven rays, each connected to a corresponding sensory input neuron.
When a ray hits an object, its input neuron receives a signal inversely proportional to the distance
from the object – the closer the object when 'seen' by a ray, the greater its input signal.
The agent with the best performance evolved a strategy of active scanning (Beer 2003).
First, the agent centers the object in its field of view, then it moves back and forth, scanning the

14

Specifically, the connection weights, biases, time constants, and gain were evolved, but not the number of nodes
(Beer 2003, 214).
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object. The scan narrows to hone in on circles, while breaking to avoid diamonds. Beer (2003,
228–9) explains this active scanning as follows. First, he decomposes the agent-environment
dynamics into the effect of the relative positions of agent and object on the agent's motion, and
vice versa. Then, for both circle and diamond trials, he superimposes the motion trajectory of the
object through the agent's field of view onto a steady-state velocity field, which represents, for
each point in the agent’s field of view, the agent's steady-state horizontal velocity in response to
an object at that point (228). Finally, he notices from an examination of the agent's motion
trajectories that it consistently overshoots the midline of its visual field, due to the lag in time for
the neural network to respond to sudden changes in sensory input. Therefore, according to Beer,
active scanning is explained by the dynamic interaction of the steady-state velocity fields and the
neural network's lag.15
Dynamicists have argued that dynamical models such as the above are non-mechanistic
because they abstract from low-level neural details and capture high-level qualitative behavior,
yet still explanatory because they yield accurate predictions and accurately describe, thereby
unifying, diverse systems (Chemero 2009; Chemero and Silberstein 2011; Stepp, Chemero, and
Turvey 2011; van Gelder and Port 1995; Walmsley 2008). HKB, for example, does not include
any specification of the neural mechanisms responsible for finger movements, but it does
accurately describe diverse systems (including the coordinated limb movements of two separate
people [Schmidt, Carello and Turvey 1990]) and accurately predicts the amount of time it takes
for the relative phase to stabilize following selective interference (Walmsley 2008).
2.3.2 Mechanist Responses
15

Beer (2003) also analyzes the neural network, including individual neurons, and how it changes over the course
of active scanning, thus providing a multilevel mechanistic explanation of categorical perception via active
scanning. For brevity's sake, and due to the fact that this part of Beer's analysis is more clearly consistent with
mechanistic explanation, I omit further discussion of this; see Zednik (2011) for more.
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The responses of mechanists to dynamical models have invoked the distinction laid out in
Section 1.2.2 between predictive, phenomenal models and mechanism-schemata. Although a
dynamical model's predictive power is a virtue, it is not enough to make it explanatory (as the
barometer example above shows). Similarly, Kaplan and Craver (2011) argue that a dynamical
model's ability to apply to a wide range of diverse systems is insufficient for explanation.
Instead, a model like HKB, insofar as any internal causal structure is omitted16, is a phenomenal
model that merely describes an interesting, widespread pattern, but does not explain that pattern.
In light of these concerns, Kaplan and Craver (2011) argue that dynamicists have not yet
provided a satisfactory account of what makes dynamical models explanatory, if they do not
refer in any way to mechanisms or their organization (see also Kaplan 2015; Kaplan and Bechtel
2011).
Beer (2003) seems not to have explicitly taken his dynamical explanation to be nonmechanistic (see fn. 15). As Zednik (2011) argues, Beer's explanation should be seen as
describing interactive components in a mechanism that spans brain, body, and environment. The
explanandum is the behavior of one component in this mechanism, the agent's active scanning.
The model shows how interactions with the environment, along with the time lag in responding
to stimuli, result in active scanning.17 While this explanation does not describe any internal
mechanisms, so is not a constitutive mechanistic explanation, it does qualify as a contextual
mechanistic explanation. Therefore, there appear to be some dynamical models that are also
mechanistic explanations.18
16

17

18

Kaplan and Craver (2011) note that Kelso and colleagues have not neglected to investigate the neural
mechanisms that generate the dynamics HKB describes.
Questions like, “Why is the lag such and such amount of time?” require looking at the neural mechanisms of the
agent. This does not detract from the contextual mechanistic explanation of active scanning – the lag time is
simply a different explanandum. See Zednik (2011: 254).
Chemero (2009: xi, 85) argues that Gibson's ecological psychology (Gibson 1979) provides a background theory

26

Zednik (2011) makes an increasingly common distinction between mechanistic
explanations, on the one hand, and the tools used for constructing and representing them, on the
other. He reiterates that dynamical systems theory is a mathematical and conceptual framework
that, as such, can be used to represent anything to which its concepts apply. If that includes the
components, activities, and organization of mechanisms, then dynamical systems theory can
provide mechanistic explanations.19 Zednik (2015) has since extended this point, using examples
from evolutionary robotics and network science to show how new tools for mechanism
description and discovery go beyond the traditional strategies of decomposition and localization
(Bechtel and Richardson 1993).
2.3.3 More on Models and Strategies
Hochstein (2016) hits on a distinction similar to Zednik's (2015) in his diagnosis of the
disagreement over which models are mechanistic explanations. He locates two opposing
assumptions concerning the role of representation in mechanistic explanation. He calls these
assumptions the “representation-of” and “representation-as” accounts of mechanistic
explanation. According to the representation-of account, for an explanation to be mechanistic, it
must be a representation of a mechanism, where this requires only the provision of information
about a mechanism. According to the representation-as account, for a explanation to be
mechanistic, it must not only provide information about a mechanism, but also represent the
mechanism mechanistically, that is, as a mechanism. That is, not only must the represented thing
in the world be a mechanism, it must be represented in a particular way, mechanistically; the

19

unifying all dynamical modeling in psychology. Bechtel (2011) argues that Gibson's ecological psychology
provides contextual mechanistic explanations.
Similar arguments have been made with respect to network and graph theory: they can be used to provide
mechanistic explanations when they capture the organizational features of a mechanism that are relevant to an
explanandum (Levy and Bechtel 2013; Craver forthcoming).
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model or representation itself must have the particular form of depictions of neatly localized
entities interacting to produce the explanandum.20
On the representation-of account, the general relation between mechanistic explanations
and models is as follows. In the world there is a target mechanism, that produces, maintains, or
underlies an explanandum phenomenon. There are many, conceptually distinct ways of
describing this mechanism. To the extent that a model accurately picks out the ontic structures
relevant to the explanandum phenomenon, the model explains the explanandum phenomenon,
regardless of how it is represented (and regardless of which concepts are deployed, if the
representation is linguistic). The form of representation (and concepts deployed) become much
more important when we are concerned with the understanding it provides to cognitive agents.
Explanation and understanding should be kept relatively distinct; the concepts deployed in an
explanatory text are more important for the latter than the former.
The representation-of account places no requirements on the form of the representation.
Since the representation-as account requires more of a model for it to be a mechanistic
explanation, fewer psychological models will be counted as mechanistic explanations according
to it than according to the representation-of account. Here we see, then, how the two opposing
assumptions lead to disagreement about which psychological models are mechanistic and why.
Hochstein (2016) argues that the representation-of account trivializes the claim that
neuroscience provides mechanistic explanations. Since the brain is a collection of mechanisms
and neuroscientists model the brain, they therefore provide mechanistic explanations. However,
showing how neuroscientists provide mechanistic explanations requires showing how their

20

One could also put this by saying there is a distinction between mechanistic models and models of mechanisms
(Craver, personal commmunication).
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concepts provide information about mechanisms, which is a controversial and nontrivial
philosophical task, especially for computational and systems neuroscience (Piccinini and Craver
2011; Kaplan 2011; Povich 2015; Zednik 2015; I return to this in the next section). The same is
true of etiological causal explanation. For example, Skow (2014) holds an account of causal
explanation somewhat analogous to the representation-of account: roughly, an explanation is
causal if and only if it provides information about the explanandum's causal history.21 Skow
responds to some prominent putative counterexamples to causal explanation (e.g., explanations
that cite causally inert entities) by showing in detail how they provide causal information (e.g.,
how such explanations rule out possible causal histories).
The representation-of account is therefore not without some precedent. An account like
Skow's (2014) has long been widely recognized as legitimate in the literature on causal
explanation, where, to be a causal explanation, a representation need only provide information
about an explanandum's causes or causal history, not identify any of its actual causes (Jackson
and Pettit 1990; Lange 2013; Lewis 1986; Skow 2014). Furthermore, causal explanations do not
have to have a particular form. Proponents of the representation-of account can be seen as
extending this idea to mechanistic explanation.
A somewhat similar distinction is made by Levy (2013), who distinguishes between what
he calls “causal mechanism,” “explanatory mechanism,” and “strategic mechanism.” Only the
latter two concern us here. According to Levy, explanatory mechanism is the thesis that “to
explain a phenomenon, one must cite mechanistic information” (100). This appears to be what
Hochstein (2016) would call a representation-of account. On the other hand, strategic mechanism
“articulates a way of doing science, a framework for representing and reasoning about complex
21

Skow's (2014) account is more complicated than this, and it is limited to explanations of particular events.
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systems,” using modeling methods such as decomposition and localization (104–5). Unlike the
representation-as account, strategic mechanism does not explicitly say that mechanistic
explanations must have a certain representational form, but such strategies do constrain the
representational form of models. Adherence to strategic mechanism might therefore lead to
adherence to the representation-as account.
2.4. Abstraction, Functionalism, and Realization
In addition to dynamical models, functional analyses are prominent putative
counterexamples to mechanistic explanation in psychology (Fodor 1965; 1968; see Piccinini and
Craver [2011] for response). A functional analysis of a psychological capacity explains it in
terms of the functional properties, either of the whole cognitive system, or of its parts. Functional
analysis is thought, by non-mechanists, to proceed relatively independently of consideration of
the structural components that realize the functional properties, or play the functional roles.
Mechanists have argued that functional analyses are mechanism-sketches (Piccinini and Craver
2011; Piccinini 2015; Povich 2015; call this the “sketch thesis”), while functionalists deny this
(Weiskopf 2011; forthcoming). Let us examine more closely the reasons for and against the
mechanistic status of functional analyses, which will bring out how realization and abstraction
relate to mechanistic explanation.
2.4.1 Functional Analyses and Mechanism Sketches
The primary reason that Piccinini and Craver (2011) give for the sketch thesis is that
functional analyses put constraints on the possible mechanisms that implement the functions
identified in the analysis. Similarly, structure constrains function: not just any structural
component can perform any function. For example, to perform the functions of belief and desire
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boxes, a mechanism(s) must be able to distinguish between those two types of representation and
transform them in relevant ways (Piccinini and Craver 2011, 303). This puts some constraints on
what could possibly implement belief and desire boxes. This argument appears to rely on a
representation-of account of mechanistic explanation (Hochstein 2016): functional analyses are
mechanism sketches because they provide some information about mechanisms.
The neural mechanisms that play the functional roles of belief and desire boxes (or
attentional filters or whatever), are likely vague, widely distributed, and multi-functional. For
this reason, Piccinini and Craver (2011) also emphasize a permissive concept of mechanism like
the one given in Section 2.2.1, according to which the components that play the functional roles
need not be neatly localizable or contained within well defined boundaries (Piccinini and Craver
2011, 296).
Weiskopf (2011; forthcoming) objects to the sketch thesis and the claim, required for that
argument, that mechanism components can be widely distributed. Against the latter claim, he
argues that it results in “greater difficulty in locating the boundaries of mechanisms” (Weiskopf
2011, 315) and gives up “any requirement that parts be describable in a way that our modeling
techniques can capture” (forthcoming, 22). I do not have space to respond in detail here, but I
have argued in depth elsewhere that model-based fMRI can ameliorate these worries (Povich
2015).22
In response to the sketch thesis, Weiskopf (forthcoming) argues as follows. If functional
analyses are mechanism-sketches, then they are amenable to two kinds of elaboration (24–5).
Intralevel elaboration involves adding details, discharging filler terms, and so on, while staying
22

Model-based fMRI is a neuroimaging method that combines psychological models with fMRI data, allowing
cognitive neuroscientists to explore how the components of psychological models map onto distributed brain
regions.
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at the same mechanistic level. Interlevel elaboration involves going down mechanistic levels in
order to explain their component entities and activities. He argues that it cannot be the case that
functional analyses need interlevel elaboration in order to completely describe the causal
structure relevant to a psychological phenomenon, because that would lead to a downward
regress. In order to provide a complete model at any mechanistic level, one would have to give a
complete model at every lower mechanistic level (26–7). He argues that if functional analyses
need intralevel elaboration, this can be accomplished with more specific functional analyses of
subsystems – there is no reason to think functional concepts can never fully accurately capture
the psychological properties of a system (25).
The mechanist can make several moves in response to this argument. First, it could be
argued that even if a functional analysis fully captures that psychological properties of a system,
its explanatory incompleteness is shown by the fact that adding implementation details increases
the explanatory power of the model (i.e. its ability to answer w-questions and afford
opportunities of intervention and control). Adding implementation details need not always be a
kind of interlevel elaboration either: to simply identify the occupant of a functional role is not to
explain how that occupant plays its role. Endicott (2011) helpfully distinguishes between the
“what” and the “how” of functional realization; only the latter requires descending mechanistic
levels.
Second, the mechanist could accept that functional analyses can be complete mechanism
schemata, rather than mere sketches. This seems a natural move for a proponent of the
representation-of account, according to which the concepts deployed in an explanation do not
affect its mechanistic status. The mechanist could argue that as long as the functional concepts
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pick out features of mechanisms, functional analyses count as mechanistic explanations. This is
just to deny the representation-as account that is presupposed in Weiskopf's argument, for
example, when he claims that, “The question is whether remedying this sketchiness requires
stepping out of the explanatory framework of psychology” (24) or that, “An ideally complete
cognitive model will still be one that is couched in the autonomous theoretical vocabulary of
psychology” (26). The argument that functional analyses are mechanism-sketches was not meant
to imply that functional or computational analyses are never true or explanatory (Piccinini and
Craver 2011). The argument was that functional analyses are true to the extent that they
accurately describe mechanisms, and it is in virtue of being accurate descriptions of mechanisms
that they explain. A central part of that argument was showing that different kinds of functional
analysis are “elliptical” descriptions of mechanisms. However, if this is right, then it seems that
Piccinini and Craver (2011; Piccinini 2015) were wrong that all functional analyses are
mechanism-sketches. They seem to have the conceptual resources to say that sometimes
functional analyses can be complete(-enough) mechanism schemata. Here again the key
disagreement seems to be over the representation-of/representation-as account.
2.5. Ontic and Epistemic Conceptions of Explanation
The previous distinctions set out in this chapter are related to another that is prominent in
contemporary philosophy of explanation: Salmon's (1984; 1989) distinction between epistemic,
modal, and ontic conceptions of scientific explanation. These conceptions were different
accounts of what a scientific explanation aims to show of its explanandum phenomenon: that it is
expected to occur, that it had to occur, that it fits “into a discernible pattern” (1984, 121).
According to Salmon, the “discernible pattern” into which an explanandum phenomenon is fit is
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structured by causal processes, interactions, and laws (1984, 132). Explaining is “providing
information about these patterns that reveals how the explanandum-events fit in” (1989, 121).
Explanation, for Salmon, is not about nomic expectability or nomic necessity, but about fitting
the explanandum into “discernible patterns” and “relationships that exist in the world” (1984,
121) (Povich forthcoming a).23
The ontic-epistemic debate has shifted twice since Salmon (Illari 2013)24. Salmon framed
the debate in terms of what explanations do. After Salmon, the debate was framed
metaphysically, as a debate about what explanations are: The ontic conception became the claim
that scientific explanations are (almost always causal) dependence relations in the world; the
epistemic conception became the claim that scientific explanations are epistemic states or
representations (Povich forthcoming a).
The distinction has also shifted from a metaphysical distinction to one that focuses on
explanatory demarcation and normative constraints on explanation (Craver 2014; Povich
forthcoming a). Craver writes that according to the ontic conception, “in order to satisfy these
two objectives [of explanatory demarcation and explanatory normativity], one must look beyond
representational structures to the ontic structures in the world” (2014, 28). The idea is that
attention to ontic structures, rather than representational form, is required to demarcate
explanation from other scientific achievements, like prediction, and to distinguish good from bad
explanations, how-possibly from how-actually explanations, and explanatorily relevant from
irrelevant features (2014, 51). This formulation of the ontic conception has affinities with the
representation-of account; in fact, it appears to just be the representation-of account.
23
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This need not be construed solely causally and Salmon did not think causation was essential to the ontic
conception (See Chapter 4).
The modal conception has fallen out of favor and was not included in later debates (but see Lange [2013] for a
recent defense).
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2.6. Conclusion
Which psychological models are mechanistic explanations? The conciliatory answer is,
“It depends.” It depends on whether one adopts a representation-of account or representation-as
account (Hochstein 2016). I prefer making a distinction between mechanistic explanations and
mechanistic models. Mechanistic explanations can be provided by non-mechanistic models,
since non-mechanistic models can provide explanatory information about mechanisms. If you
conceive the mechanistic project as “explanatory mechanists” (Levy 2013) tend to, as
articulating a “downward” way of causally situating an explanandum phenomenon that was
neglected by Salmon and others who focused on “backward” (etiological) causal explanation
(Craver 2007, 8), then it becomes clearer why one might hold the representation-of account. A
categorization of the diverse kinds of representation or model used in scientific explanatory
practices might be useful for some purposes, but does not seem to advance the classical project
of a philosophical theory of scientific explanation, which is to provide conditions of explanatory
demarcation and explanatory normativity (Craver 2014).
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Chapter 3. Mechanisms and Model-Based fMRI
Mechanistic explanations satisfy widely held norms of explanation: the ability to
manipulate and answer counterfactual questions about the explanandum phenomenon. A
currently debated issue is whether any non-mechanistic explanations can satisfy these
explanatory norms. Weiskopf (2011) argues that the models of object recognition and
categorization, JIM, SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE, are not mechanistic, yet satisfy these norms of
explanation. In this paper, I argue that these models are mechanism-sketches. My argument
applies recent research using model-based fMRI, a novel neuroimaging method whose
significance for current debates on psychological models and mechanistic explanation has yet to
be explored.
3.1. Introduction
A mechanistic explanation of a phenomenon describes the entities, activities, and
organization of the mechanism that produces, underlies, or maintains that phenomenon (Bechtel
and Abrahamsen 2005; Craver 2007). Mechanistic explanations satisfy what are widely
considered the normative constraints on explanation: the ability to answer a range of
counterfactual questions regarding the explanandum phenomenon and the ability to manipulate
and control the explanandum phenomenon (Craver 2007). These norms capture what is
distinctive about the scientific achievement of explanation as opposed to prediction, description,
or categorization. A currently debated issue is whether any non-mechanistic forms of explanation
can satisfy these explanatory norms.25 Weiskopf (2011) argues that the models of object
recognition and categorization, JIM, SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE, are not mechanistic explanations
and nonetheless satisfy these normative constraints.
25

Batterman and Rice (2014) is a provocative recent paper arguing affirmatively.
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I argue that JIM, SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE are in fact, and are intended by their creators
to be, mechanism-sketches, i.e. incomplete mechanistic explanations. My argument applies
recent research using model-based fMRI. Model-based fMRI allows cognitive neuroscientists to
locate even widely distributed neural components in psychological models. These novel
neuroimaging methods have developed only recently (Glascher and O'Doherty 2010), and
philosophers have yet to discuss their significance for current debates on psychological models
and mechanistic explanation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I motivate the mechanistic account of
explanation and introduce two important distinctions in that account: complete models vs.
mechanism-sketches, and how-possibly vs. how-actually models. In Section 3.3, I introduce the
three models of object recognition and categorization that Weiskopf takes as the scientific
grounds for his philosophical thesis. In Section 3.4, I present Weiskopf’s arguments for thinking
these models are non-mechanistic, yet explanatory. I also begin to respond to these arguments. I
show precisely why JIM should be seen as a mechanism-sketch. In Section 3.5, I show how the
inventors of SUSTAIN and ALCOVE have subsequently used model-based fMRI to decide
between these mechanism-sketches on the basis of information about widely distributed parts.
3.2. Mechanistic Explanation
The mechanistic account of explanation developed out of Salmon's (1984) insight into the
problems that arise when an account of explanation is tied too closely to prediction. Salmon's
principal target was the deductive-nomological account. According to the deductive-nomological
account (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948), an explanation is an argument with descriptions of at
least one law of nature and antecedent conditions as premises and a description of the
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explanandum phenomenon as the conclusion. On this view, to explain is to show that the
explanandum phenomenon is predictable on the basis of at least one law of nature and certain
specific antecedent and boundary conditions. However, tying explanation this closely to
prediction generates some famous problems (Salmon 1989). On such a view, many mere
correlations come out as explanatory. For example, a falling barometer reliably predicts the
weather but the falling barometer does not explain the weather. In contrast, on the causalmechanical view, explanation involves situating the explanandum phenomenon in the causal
structure of the world. There is more than one way of situating a phenomenon in the causal
structure of the world, and in this paper I am solely concerned with explanations that identify the
mechanism that produces, underlies, or maintains the explanandum phenomenon.26
If one ties explanation so closely to prediction, one risks missing what makes explanation
a distinctive scientific achievement. Weiskopf (2011) and I in fact agree on what makes
explanation distinctive: explanations provide the ability to answer a range of counterfactual
questions regarding the explanandum phenomenon and the ability to manipulate and control the
explanandum phenomenon. Weiskopf and I disagree about what kinds of explanation or model
can satisfy these norms.
Within the mechanistic framework there are two important distinctions that will be
necessary in the arguments that follow: complete models vs. mechanism-sketches, and howpossibly vs. how-actually models (Craver 2007). Mechanism-sketches are incomplete
descriptions of mechanisms that contain black boxes and filler terms (Ibid., 113). They are still
partially explanatory. More details can be added to the model to fill in the gaps, though no model

26

See Bechtel (2009) for a discussion of some other ways of causally situating a phenomenon. What Bechtel calls
“looking down,” I am here calling “mechanistic explanation.”
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is ever fully complete, just complete enough for practical purposes. There can certainly be too
many details for the purposes of the modeler and the details that are included should be
relevant.27 Idealized models can be mechanistic explanations even if they are in some sense
incomplete; they can exclude irrelevant detail.
A how-possibly model describes a merely possible mechanism, whereas a how-actually
model describes the mechanism that (we have the most evidence to believe) actually produces,
maintains, or underlies the explanandum phenomenon. As Weiskopf (315) rightly points out, this
distinction is epistemic. Turning a how-possibly model into a how-actually model does not
require modifying the model itself in any way; it requires testing the model. The greater the
evidential support for the model, the more how-actually it is. In contrast, turning a mechanismsketch into a more complete mechanistic explanation requires modifying the model by filling in
missing details.
3.3. JIM, SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE
In this section, I introduce the models of object recognition and categorization on which
Weiskopf builds his case for the existence of non-mechanistic yet explanatory models. In Section
3.4, I present Weiskopf’s arguments for thinking these models are non-mechanistic, yet
explanatory.
According to JIM (John and Irv’s Model), in perception objects are broken down into
viewpoint-invariant primitives called “geons”. Geons are simple three-dimensional shapes such
as cones, bricks, and cylinders. The properties of geons are intended to be non-accidental
properties (NAPs), largely unaffected by rotation in depth (Biederman 2000). Objects are
represented as spatially arranged collections of geons. The geon structure of perceived objects is
27

See Craver (2007, 139-60) for one account of constitutive (i.e. mechanistic) relevance.
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extracted and stored in memory for later use in comparison and classification.
The importance of NAPs is shown by the fact that sequential matching tasks are
extremely easy when stimuli differ only in NAPs. If you are first shown a stimulus, then a series
of rotated stimuli, each of which differs from the first only in NAPs, it is a simple matter to judge
which stimuli are the same as or different from the first. Sequential matching tasks with objects
that differ in properties that are affected by rotation in depth are much harder.
In JIM, this object recognition and categorization process is modeled by a seven layer
neural network (Biederman, Cooper, and Fiser 1993). Layer 1 extracts image edges from an
input of a line drawing that represents the orientation and depth of an object (182). Layer 2 has
three components that represent vertices, axes, and blobs. Layer 3 represents geon attributes such
as size, orientation, and aspect ratio. Layers 4 and 5 both derive invariant relations from the
extracted geon attributes. Layer 6 receives inputs from layers 3 and 5 and assembles geon
features, e.g., “slightly elongated, vertical cone above, perpendicular to and smaller than
something” (184). Layer 7 integrates successive outputs from layer 6 and produces an object
judgment.
ALCOVE (Attention Learning Covering map), like JIM, is a neural network model of
object categorization (Kruschke 1992). It has 3 layers. The perceived stimulus is represented as a
point in a multidimensional psychological space with each input node representing a single,
continuous psychological dimension. For example, a node may represent perceived size, in
which case the greater the perceived size of the stimulus, the greater the activation of that node.
Each node is modulated by an attentional gate whose strength reflects the relevance of that
dimension for the categorization task. Each hidden node represents an exemplar and is activated
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in proportion to the psychological similarity of the input stimulus to the exemplar. Output nodes
represent category responses and are activated by summing hidden nodes and multiplying by the
corresponding weights.
SUSTAIN (Supervised and Unsupervised Stratified Adaptive Incremental Network) is a
neural network model similar to ALCOVE (Love, Medin, and Gureckis 2004). Its input nodes
also represent a multidimensional psychological space, but they can take continuous and discrete
values. Like ALCOVE, inputs are modulated by an attentional gate. Unlike ALCOVE, which
stores all items individually in memory in exemplar nodes, the next layer of SUSTAIN consists
of a set of clusters (bundles of features) associated with a category. Each cluster activates in
proportion to its proximity to the input in multidimensional psychological space; the more
similar a cluster is to the input, the more it activates. There are inhibitory connections between
each cluster, so that the cluster most similar to the input inhibits all others. This winning cluster
activates the output unit generating the category label.
3.4. Weiskopf’s Arguments
Weiskopf argues that the previous models are able to satisfy the norms of explanation but
are not mechanistic models. How do these models provide the ability to answer counterfactual
questions about the explanandum phenomenon, and the ability to manipulate and control the
explanandum phenomenon? According to Weiskopf, they satisfy these explanatory norms
“because these models depict one aspect of the causal structure of the system” (334). This claim
is prima facie in tension with Weiskopf's claim that these models are not mechanistic. He argues,
“[T]here may be an underlying mechanistic neural system, but this mechanistic structure is not
what cognitive models capture.” (333).
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One way of reconciling the above claims is to argue that these models are explanatory
because they depict causal structure, but they are not mechanistic because the causal structure
that they depict is not a mechanism. This is the line Weiskopf takes. Why, according to Weiskopf,
are these causal structures not mechanisms? He argues,
If parts [of mechanisms] are allowed to be smeared-out processes or distributed systemlevel properties, the spatial organization of mechanisms becomes much more difficult to
discern. … Weakening the spatial organization constraint by allowing distributed,
nonlocalized parts incurs costs, in the form of greater difficulty in locating the boundaries
of mechanisms and stating their individuation conditions. (334)
The causal structures depicted by JIM, SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE should not be thought of as
mechanisms, according to Weiskopf, because the structures that putatively implement them are
highly distributed. If mechanisms are allowed to contain distributed, non-localized parts, this will
make it difficult to locate them. Call this the practical problem of non-localization. Weiskopf
does not provide any reason to think that the philosophical (rather than practical) problem of
mechanism individuation is made more difficult by allowing distributed parts or that existing
accounts28 of mechanism individuation cannot handle distributed parts.29 Yet numerous
neuroimaging methods, especially model-based fMRI, ameliorate this practical problem. Modelbased fMRI is well-suited to mechanistically discriminate between competing, equally
behaviorally confirmed30 psychological models.
In addition to Weiskopf's practical problem, there is what I will call the triviality problem

28
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30

See fn. 27 for an account of mechanism individuation.
Weiskopf (331) also cites the phenomenon of neural reuse as inconsistent with mechanistic explanation, but the
fact that a part of one mechanism can also be a part of a different mechanism constitutes only a practical
problem for mechanism individuation.
Weiskopf (335–6) is right that evidence for psychological models can come from many places. Although
psychological models can be supported and constrained behaviorally, this degree of “evidential autonomy” does
not establish the explanatory autonomy Weiskopf requires. It does not affect the mechanist’s point that the parts
of a psychological model must correspond to brain regions that implement the relevant computations for the
model to be explanatory.
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of non-localization. Weiskopf argues that if these kinds of distributed part are allowed, then “it is
far from clear what content the notion of a mechanism has anymore” (334). First, as I have said,
there has been no argument that existing accounts of mechanism individuation cannot
accommodate distributed parts. If these accounts are workable while allowing distributed parts,
then the notion of a mechanism remains contentful. Second, this objection misunderstands the
mechanistic project, or at least a plausible way of conceiving that project. If you conceive the
mechanistic project as articulating a “downward” way of causally situating an explanandum
phenomenon that was neglected by Salmon and others who focused on “backward” (etiological)
causal explanation (Craver 2007, 8), then a “liberalization” of the notion of mechanism that
permits distributed parts is perfectly in line with that project and should not be seen as any kind
of concession or retreat. Although such a “liberalization” may make mechanisms even more
ubiquitous than they already were, it does not make every physical system a mechanism. For
example, mere aggregates lack the organization necessary to be mechanisms (Ibid., 135–39).
Next I will present some of the neuroimaging studies conducted with JIM and argue that
JIM is a mechanism-sketch. JIM was built, not merely to produce the same behavior as human
beings in object recognition tasks, but to model something that might really be happening in
human brains (Biederman, Cooper, Hummel, and Fiser 1993, 176). Accordingly, Irving
Biederman, one of the co-creators of JIM, and others have conducted various neuroimaging
studies to investigate the neural underpinnings of the model.
If JIM is a mechanism-sketch, the systems and processes in the model required for the
extraction, storage, and comparison of geon structures must to some extent correspond to
(perhaps distributed) components in the brain’s actual object recognition system. For example, if
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JIM is a mechanism-sketch, there is an area or a configuration of areas in the brain where simple
parts and non-accidental properties are represented. In one study investigating this (Hayworth
and Biederman 2006), participants were shown line drawings that were either local feature
deleted (LFD), in which every other vertex and line was deleted from each part, removing half
the contour, or part deleted (PD) in which half of the parts were deleted. On each trial,
participants saw either LFD or PD stimuli presented as a sequential pair and had to report
whether the exemplar depicted by the second stimulus was the same as or different than that
depicted by the first. The second stimulus was always mirror-reversed with respect to the first.
Each experimental run was comprised of an equal number of three conditions: Identical,
Complementary, and Different Exemplar. In the Identical condition, the second stimulus was
identical to the first stimulus (though mirror-reversed). In the Complementary condition, the
second stimulus depicted the same exemplar as the first, but the second stimulus was a
“complement” of the first stimulus. An LFD-complement is composed of the deleted contour of
the first stimulus and a PD-complement is composed of the deleted parts of the first stimulus. In
the Different Exemplar condition, the second stimulus depicts a different exemplar than the first.
This study used an fMRI-adaptation design that relies on the assumption that when two
successive stimuli activate the same brain region, neural activity reduces (Krekelberg, Boynton,
van Wezel 2006, 250). The results of the study showed adaptation between LFD complements
and lack of adaptation between PD complements in lateral occipital complex, especially the
posterior fusiform area, an area known to be involved in object recognition. These results imply
that this area is “representing the parts of an object, rather than local features, templates, or
object concepts” (Hayworth and Biederman 2006, 4029). Biederman has conducted many other
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fMRI experiments, including some that “suggest that LO [lateral occipital cortex] is the locus of
the neural correlate for the greater detectability for nonaccidental relations” (Kim and Biederman
1824).
Though these experiments suggest that JIM should be seen as a mechanism-sketch,
Weiskopf has another argument for why it should not: JIM has properties that do not and could
not correspond to anything in the brain. Weiskopf (331) refers to JIM’s “Fast Enabling Links”
(FELs), which allow the model to bind representations and have infinite propagation speed.
Weiskopf calls FELs an example of, “fictionalization,” or, “putting components into a model that
are known not to correspond to any element of the modeled system, but which serve an essential
role in getting the model to operate correctly” (Ibid.). The FELs, Weiskopf argues, undermine the
claim that JIM is a mechanism-sketch.
Weiskopf is right that FELs are an essential fictionalization. However, playing an
essential role in getting a model to operate is not the same as explaining; these parts of the model
carry no explanatory information and render the model, or at least part of it, how-possibly (where
the possibility involved is not physical possibility, since FELs are physically impossible). FELs
play the black box role of whatever-it-is-that-accounts-for-binding. In addition to playing a black
box role, they serve practical and epistemic purposes such as suggesting, constraining, and
sharpening questions about mechanisms (Bogen 2005). Let me explain how by comparing FELs
to Bogen’s example of the Goldman, Hodgkin, and Katz (GHK) equations.
The GHK voltage and current equations are used to determine the reversal potential
across a cell’s membrane and the current across the membrane carried by an ion. These equations
rely on the incorrect assumptions that each ion channel is homogeneous and that interactions
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among ions do not influence their flow rate (Bogen 409). Bogen highlights the effects on
research of these incorrect assumptions,
Investigators used these and other GHK equation failures as problems to be solved by
finding out more about how ion channels work. Fine-grained descriptions of exceptions
to the GHK equations and the conditions under which they occur sharpened the problems
and provided hints about how to approach them. (410)
The GHK equations provide a case of “using incorrect generalizations to articulate and develop
mechanistic explanations” (409). Something similar can be said about FELs. Not only do FELs
play an essential black box role, FELs suggest new questions about mechanisms, new problems
to be solved. For example, Hummel and Biederman (1992) write,
[FELs allow] JIM to treat the constraints on feature linking (by synchrony) separately
from the constraints on property inference (by excitation and inhibition). That is, cells can
phase lock without influencing one another’s level of activity and vice versa. Although it
remains an open question whether a neuroanatomical analog of FELs will be found to
exist, we suggest that the distinction between feature linking and property inference is
likely to remain an important one. (510)
Like the GHK equations, FELs suggest new lines of investigation, in this case regarding the
relation between feature linking, property inference, and their neural mechanisms. Specifically,
FELs suggest research questions such as, “Can biological neurons phase lock without
influencing one another’s activity?” and “Are there other ways biological neurons could
implement feature linking and property inference independently?”
In the next section, I will explain model-based fMRI and demonstrate how recent modelbased fMRI research shows that, like JIM, SUSTAIN and ALCOVE are mechanism-sketches.
3.5. Model-Based fMRI
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is a neuroimaging method that provides
an indirect measure of neuronal activity. More specifcally, fMRI measures a physiological
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indicator of oxygen consumption that correlates with changes in neuronal activity (Huettel, Song,
and McCarthy 159–160).
Model-based fMRI is a neuroimaging method that combines psychological models with
fMRI data. It “provides insight into 'how' a particular cognitive function might be implemented
in the brain, not only 'where' it is implemented” (O' Doherty, Hampton, and Kim 39). In this way,
model-based fMRI provides a way of discriminating between competing, equally behaviorally
confirmed cognitive models (Glascher and O’Doherty 502). Furthermore, “the more complex the
model (and hence the more associated free parameters), the more unconstrained the behavioral
fitting becomes,” in which case the additional constraints imposed by neurophysiological and
neuroimaging data become “even more critical” (O’ Doherty, Hampton, and Kim 37; White and
Poldrack 2013).
To conduct a model-based fMRI analysis, one starts with a psychological model that
postulates internal variables between stimulus input and behavioral output. While research
participants perform a model-relevant task, researchers obtain fMRI data from which they can
locate neural correlates of the internal variables (O' Doherty, Hampton, and Kim 36). The modelpredicted values of internal variables across trials are convolved (mathematically combined) with
a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) (Glascher and O’Doherty 505). This is done
to account for the usual lag in the hemodynamic response (O' Doherty, Hampton, and Kim 37).
This yields a new, model-predicted HRF that can be regressed against the obtained fMRI data.
This allows researchers to identify brain areas where the model-predicted HRF significantly
correlates with the observed HRF across trials.31
31

Batterman and Rice (2014) object that the notion of correspondence between model and world is never
explained by mechanists. I have no general theory of correspondence, but the sense in which (parts of) a
psychological model correspond(s) to (parts of) the brain should be clear in each case. Here, for example,
correspondence is significant correlation between model-predicted and observed HRF.
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I should make clear that model-based fMRI inherits the limitations of fMRI, such as poor
spatiotemporal resolution, and does not obviate the need for other neuroimaging methods (e.g.,
PET, EEG, or MEG), to which the model-based approach can also be applied.
Now that we have a basic understanding of how model-based fMRI works and what it
can accomplish, let me return to SUSTAIN and ALCOVE and show how they are mechanismsketches by drawing on recent model-based fMRI research.
Both models were investigated in a model-based fMRI study in which participants
completed a rule-plus-exception category learning task (Davis, Love, and Preston 2012). During
the task, a schematic beetle was presented and participants were asked to classify it as living in
Hole A or Hole B. Participants then received feedback on the correctness of their classification.
The beetles varied on four of the following five attributes, with the fifth held constant: eyes
(green or red), tail (oval or triangular), legs (thin or thick), antennae (spindly or fuzzy), and fangs
(pointy or round). Six of the eight beetles presented could be correctly categorized on the basis
of a single attribute. For example, three out of four Hole A beetles had thick legs and three out of
four Hole B beetles had thin legs. These were the rule-following beetles. The other beetles were
exceptions to the rule, having legs that appeared to match the other category.
Two predictions from SUSTAIN and ALCOVE were tested. First, each model predicts
specific changes in recognition strength across trials. During stimulus presentation SUSTAIN
predicts a recognition advantage for exceptions; ALCOVE predicts no recognition advantage.
This difference in recognition strength predictions arises because in ALCOVE, but not in
SUSTAIN, all items are stored individually in memory regardless of whether they are exceptions
or rule-following items. Second, each model predicts specific changes in error correction across
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trials. The amount of error is given by the difference between the model’s category response and
the correct response. Both SUSTAIN and ALCOVE predict that exceptions will always produce
more error than rule-following items, although both will produce less error as learning progresses
(Ibid., 266).
The results revealed that both the recognition strength and error correction measures
predicted by SUSTAIN found significant correlations in medial temporal lobe (MTL) regions
including bilateral hippocampus, parahippocampal cortex, and perirhinal cortex. ALCOVE's
predicted recognition strength measure did not find any significant correlations in MTL,
although its predicted error correction measure found significant correlations in MTL regions
(Ibid., 266–67). These results “suggest that, like SUSTAIN, the MTL contributes to category
learning by forming specialized category representations appropriate for the learning context”
(Ibid., 269).
SUSTAIN is more how-actually (evidentially supported) than ALCOVE because both of
SUSTAIN’s prediction measures (recognition strength and error correction) were significantly
correlated with observed HRF, whereas only one of ALCOVE’s prediction measures (error
correction) was significantly correlated. These experiments also show that cognitive
neuroscientists are currently advancing the ability to map the entities and activities in
psychological models to distributed neural systems, such as MTL regions spanning bilateral
hippocampus, parahippocampal cortex, and perirhinal cortex.
Davis, Love (a creator of SUSTAIN), and Preston (2012) are at times quite explicit that
they are treating the models as mechanism-sketches. For instance, they write, “We use a modelbased functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) approach to test the proposed mapping
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between MTL function and SUSTAIN’s representational properties” (261). Given their emphasis
on mapping models to the brain, it is clear that they intend these models to be mechanistic, as
Biederman intends JIM to be. They are interested in more than the behavioral accuracy of these
models; after all, SUSTAIN and ALCOVE are already behaviorally well-confirmed. The main
difference between the two is in their hidden layers, where SUSTAIN has clusters and ALCOVE
stores items individually. Model-based fMRI allowed Davis et al. to gather evidence relevant to
assessing which of these models was more mechanistically accurate.
3.6. Conclusion
Weiskopf (2011) presents three models of object recognition and categorization, JIM,
ALCOVE, and SUSTAIN, that he claims are non-mechanistic, yet explanatory. He argues that
they are not mechanistic because their parts cannot be neatly localized and because they contain
some components that cannot correspond to anything in the brain, such as Fast Enabling Links,
but are nevertheless essential for the proper working of the model. I argue, on the contrary, that
in addition to playing a black box role, FELs play useful, non-explanatory roles such as
suggesting new lines of investigation regarding feature linking and property inference.
My argument for the claim that SUSTAIN and ALCOVE are mechanism-sketches relies
partly on model-based fMRI research. Model-based fMRI and other model-based neuroimaging
methods allow cognitive neuroscientists to explore how psychological models map onto the
brain. This helps cognitive neuroscientists discriminate between equally behaviorally confirmed
psychological models.
Biederman, Love, et al. treat JIM, SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE as mechanism-sketches, and
they should. They should because by locating mechanisms one opens a new range of
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opportunities for manipulating the mechanism and one obtains answers to counterfactual
questions that were not available before. For example: What kinds of deficit in categorization
performance would result from a lesion in bilateral hippocampus? If someone has a specific
deficit in categorization performance, how might we fix it? Where might the problem lie? This
increases the explanatory power of these models.
The development of these model-based approaches has broader implications, beyond the
narrow dispute over JIM, SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE, for the debate over the explanatory and
mechanistic status of psychological models. As cognitive neuroscientists continue to test
competing models against neuroimaging data using model-based techniques, it is likely that they
will, as they should, retain those models that are mechanistically accurate and discard those that
are not, and in so doing reveal that explanatory progress in cognitive neuroscience consists in the
development of increasingly mechanistic models.
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Chapter 4. Minimal Models and the Generalized Ontic Conception of Scientific
Explanation
Batterman and Rice (2014) argue that minimal models possess explanatory power that
cannot be captured by what they call “common features” approaches to explanation. Minimal
models are explanatory, according to Batterman and Rice, not in virtue of accurately representing
relevant features, but in virtue of answering three questions that provide a “story about why large
classes of features are irrelevant to the explanandum phenomenon” (356). In this chapter, I argue,
first, that a method (the renormalization group) they propose that answers the three questions
cannot answer them, at least by itself. Second, I argue that answers to the three questions are
unnecessary to account for the explanatoriness of their minimal models. Finally, I argue that a
common features account, what I call the generalized ontic conception of explanation, can
capture the explanatoriness of minimal models.
4.1. Introduction
While acknowledging the widespread use of causal explanation in science, a number of
prominent philosophers of science have recently begun exploring its limits (see Batterman
2002a; 2002b; Huneman 2010; Rice 2012; 2013; Woodward 2013). Batterman has been
investigating the ways in which neglect of causes contributes to explanatory power in physics,
particularly in statistical mechanics. Rice has been engaged in similar investigations of the
neglect of causes in optimality modeling in biology. Recently, Batterman and Rice (2014;
henceforth “B&R”) have combined their efforts in an articulation of their common project. Their
work brings important and successful modeling techniques to bear on the philosophy of scientific
explanation. Nevertheless, there are significant limitations to their project. It is my aim here to
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spell out these limitations and provide an alternative proposal.
B&R focus on minimal models, which are “used to explain patterns of macroscopic
behavior across systems that are heterogeneous at smaller scales” (349). This widespread class of
models, they argue, has explanatory power that cannot be captured by what they call “common
features” approaches to explanation. According to common features approaches, 1) explanations
accurately represent all and only32 the features relevant to their explananda and 2) the
explanatoriness of a representation consists in its representing relevant features (351).33 Common
features approaches include not only mechanistic approaches (Craver 2006; Glennan 2002;
Kaplan 2011) and causal and difference-making approaches (Salmon 1984; 1989; Strevens 2008;
Woodward 2003), but also Pincock's (2012) structuralist or mapping account, which explicates
the explanatory role of mathematics in terms of its ability to mirror certain ontic structures. Any
philosophical theory of explanation according to which accurate representation is responsible for
explanatory power is a common features approach, whether or not the features represented are
causes (B&R, 351).
B&R argue that common features approaches fail to capture the explanatoriness of
minimal models because, even when a minimal model is minimally accurate, it is not its
accuracy that accounts for its explanatoriness. Rather, minimal models are explanatory in virtue
of “there being a story about why large classes of features are irrelevant to the explanandum
phenomenon” (356).
32

33

Depending on the explanatory representation used, some irrelevant features must be represented. For example, if
our explanatory representation is pictorial, it must be colored some way, even if color is not relevant to the
explanandum phenomenon. Ideally the modeler will flag any potential confusions. See Weisberg (2013, §3.3) for
a related discussion of the role of modelers' intentions in determining what he calls 'representational fidelity
criteria', standards for evaluating a model's representational accuracy.
1) is not just a restatement of 2). One could hold that accurate representation is necessary but not sufficient for
explanation. This appears to be close to B&R's view (351, 356).
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In this paper, I argue for a negative and a positive thesis. My negative thesis is that B&R's
account of the explanatoriness of minimal models fails. They require that three questions be
answered in order to provide the above-mentioned story about why large classes of features are
irrelevant. I will henceforth refer to these as the 'Three Questions':
Q1. Why are these common features necessary for the phenomenon to occur?
Q2. Why are the remaining heterogeneous details (those left out of or misrepresented by
the model) irrelevant for the occurrence of the phenomenon?
Q3. Why do very different [fluids and populations] have features...in common?34 (361)
My negative thesis consists of two parts. First, the method they propose to answer the Three
Questions is unable to answer them, at least by itself. Second, answers to the Three Questions are
unnecessary to account for the explanatoriness of minimal models. I argue for this second claim
in two ways. First, I analogize their strategy to an exactly similar strategy in a more
commonplace case of multiple realizability. In the case I present, it is evident that answering
analogues of the Three Questions is unnecessary to explain multiple realizability. Second, I argue
that if answers to the Three Questions were necessary, a regress would loom. B&R need to
explain why, if the Three Questions are necessary, we should stop asking where they say we
should. Of course, according to B&R, the Three Questions are not further questions, in addition
to the question of what makes minimal models explanatory; the Three Questions just are those
that need to be answered in order to account for the explanatoriness of minimal models. My
analogy is intended to show that that is not the case.
My positive thesis is that a common features approach can account for the

34

I have slightly altered the wording of Q3 to capture both models, thereby avoiding unnecessary repetition.
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explanatoriness of minimal models.3536 B&R are (probably37) right that mechanistic and
difference-making accounts cannot do the job, but an account much like the one proposed by
Bokulich (2011), Rice himself (2013), and Saatsi and Pexton (2013) can. They follow Woodward
(2003) in requiring that an explanation represent counterfactual dependence relations between
the explanandum phenomenon and the features on which it depends, but they drop the
requirement that these counterfactual dependence relations be construed causally. The reason for
this is that the counterfactual dependence relations represented by some models, such as B&R's
minimal models, cannot very plausibly be given a causal interpretation.
On this view, explanatory power consists in the ability to answer what-if-things-hadbeen-different questions (“w-questions”). I argue that this requires commitment to an ontic
conception of scientific explanation (Salmon 1984) and that philosophers of science have been
mistaken in equating the ontic conception with the causal-mechanical account of explanation. As
we will see, Salmon seems not to have equated them.
My proposal is consistent with many things B&R have themselves written in the past.38 It
seems that their desire to avoid anything like a common features approach has driven them too
far, apparently past things they have said before. In the present atmosphere in philosophy of
science, it is a significant enough achievement to have brought to philosophical focus important
modeling methods in physics and biology that emphasize the systematic neglect of causal detail.
35

36

37
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While I was finishing this manuscript, Lange (2015) also made this point, although he does not develop the
positive proposal I do. He also made an objection to B&R similar to one of mine about regress. These and any
other commonalities were arrived at independently.
I also think that the common features that are shared between minimal models and real world systems are what
justifies scientists' applications of the former to the later, though I do not have space to argue for this here.
It is somewhat plausible that at least some of the common features in B&R's minimal models can be given a
causal interpretation. On the account proposed here, though, this not what makes these features explanatory. I
briefly expand on this at the end of Section 4.4.
For examples, see fn. 56, Batterman's remarks on pain below, and Rice (2013): 'in some cases counterfactual
information can be explanatory without tracking any relationships of causal dependence' (20; original
emphasis).
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B&R have rightly stressed the importance of this neglect, but this importance need not
drastically change our account of scientific explanation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, I present the minimal models
whose explanatoriness B&R argue cannot be accounted for by a common features approach.
These are the Lattice Gas Automaton (LGA) model of fluid dynamics and Fisher's model of 1:1
sex ratios. In Section 4.3, I present and critique B&R's account of the explanatoriness of these
minimal models. According to B&R, any such account must answer the Three Questions, and
answers are provided by the renormalization group (RG) and universality classes39. I argue that
the Three Questions cannot in fact be answered by RG alone. I then argue that regardless of
whether RG answers the Three Questions, they do not need to be answered in order to give an
account of the explanatoriness of LGA and Fisher's model. I give two arguments for this. First, I
show that answers to analogues of the Three Questions are unnecessary in an analogous case of
multiple realizability. Batterman (2000) has argued that RG explains multiple realizability
generally, so I take it that my analogy is apt and generalizable to B&R's models. Second, I argue
that if answering the Three Questions were necessary for an account of the explanatoriness of
B&R's minimal models, a regress would loom.
In Section 4.4, I provide my own common features account of the explanatoriness of
B&R's minimal models: the generalized ontic conception. I argue that they are explanatory
because they accurately represent the relevant dependence relations, that is, the objective features
of the world on which the explanandum phenomenon counterfactually depends. My account is an
ontic conception, in Craver's (2014) sense (to be explained more fully below). I argue, for
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Of course, in biological contexts some mathematical method(s) other than RG must be employed, though B&R
are silent on what these methods might be.
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reasons different than Wright (2012), that it is a mistake to equate the ontic conception of
scientific explanation with the causal-mechanical account of explanation (Craver [2014] gestures
at this idea in his defense of the ontic conception). A viable general theory of scientific
explanation can be constructed by combining insights from Salmon (1984; 1989) and Woodward
(2003), while realizing that there are noncausal kinds of ontic dependence.
Nevertheless, I do briefly consider the idea that some of the dependence relations in
B&R's minimal models can be given a causal interpretation. I do this simply because I do not
think a causal interpretation is as obviously wrong as B&R imply. A causal interpretation is more
plausible for some common features than others, though I do not commit myself here to a causal
interpretation of any of them.
On my account, RG plays a central role in discovering explanatorily relevant features and
demonstrating that they are relevant (Section 4.3 shows how). This makes RG not a kind of
explanation distinct from common features explanation, but an essential method scientists use to
construct common features explanations.
4.2. B&R's Minimal Models
B&R present two minimal models whose explanatoriness they argue cannot be captured
by a common features approach. These are the Lattice Gas Automaton (LGA) model of fluid
dynamics and Fisher's optimality model of 1:1 sex ratios.
LGA accurately predicts macroscopic fluid behavior that is described by the NavierStokes equations (“Navier-Stokes behavior,” for short). The model consists of a hexagonal lattice
on which each particle has a lattice position and one of six directions of motion (momentum
vectors). Each particle moves one step in its direction of motion and if some “collide”, so that
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their total momentum adds to zero, then those particles' directions of motion rotate 60°. With
thousands of particles and steps, and some smoothing out of the data, an overall pattern of
motion emerges that is incredibly similar to real fluid motion (Goldenfeld and Kadanoff 1999,
87).
The second model presented by B&R is Fisher's model of the 1:1 sex ratio. The
biological question that Fisher's (1930, 141–3) model was designed to answer is why population
sex ratios are often 1:1. Hamilton (1967) provides a succinct summary of Fisher's argument. If
males are less common than females in a population, then a newborn male has better mating
prospects than a newborn female. In this situation, parents genetically disposed to have male
offspring will tend to have more than the average number of grandchildren. This will cause the
genes for the tendency to have male offspring to spread. As male births become more common
and a 1:1 sex ratio nears, the advantage of the tendency to produce males disappears. Since the
same reasoning holds if females are the more common sex, 1:1 is the equilibrium sex ratio
(Hamilton 1967, 477).
If, then, male and female offspring cost the same amount of resources on average, a 1:1
sex ratio will result. More generally, any sex ratio can be calculated as CM / (CM + CF), where CM
is the average resource cost of one male offspring and CF is the average resource cost of one
female offspring (B&R, 367).
4.3. B&R's Account of the Explanatoriness of Minimal Models
B&R's account of the explanatoriness of their minimal models makes use of the concepts
of the renormalization group (RG) and universality classes. Here I explain these concepts and
how they fit into B&R's account.
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RG is a method of coarse-graining, reducing degrees of freedom or the number of details.
B&R (362) discuss one such procedure: Kadanoff's block spin transformation. Consider a lattice
of particles, each with an up or down spin. Group the spins into blocks of, for example, four
spins and average over each block. One averaging procedure is called 'majority rule', in which a
block of four spins is replaced by the most common spin in the block. If there is no most
common spin, choose one randomly (see McComb 2004). This reduces the number of spins in
the lattice by a factor of four. The length between spins, or the lattice constant, is greater after
averaging, so it is then rescaled to the old lattice constant. Near a critical point, the length across
which spins are correlated, or the correlation length, increases and eventually diverges to infinity.
When this is the case, averaging over correlated blocks of spins and then rescaling the lattice
preserves the macroscopic behavior of the lattice with fewer degrees of freedom (microscropic
details) (Huang 1987, 441–2). The irrelevant details are thereby eliminated.
With the concept of RG in hand, we can define a universality class. After repeated
application of RG, certain systems will reach the same fixed point, a state at which RG no longer
has an effect. The class of all systems that will reach the same fixed point after repeated
application of RG is a universality class.
Using RG, it can be discovered that all systems exhibiting Navier-Stokes behavior,
including LGA, form a universality class that shares the following three features:
1. Locality: A fluid contains many particles in motion, each of which is influenced only
by other particles in its immediate neighborhood.
2. Conservation: The number of particles and the total momentum of the fluid is
conserved over time.
3. Symmetry: A fluid is isotropic and rotationally invariant. (B&R 360; from Goldenfeld
and Kadanoff [1999], 87)
Similarly, an RG-type story would show that all populations exhibiting a 1:1 sex ratio, including
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Fisher's model, form a universality class and share the feature of linear substitution cost, that is,
the average resource cost of male offspring is equal to the average resource cost of female
offspring.
According to B&R, although RG demonstrates that diverse systems share features with
their minimal models, it is not this fact that accounts for the explanatoriness of their minimal
models. An account of why minimal models are explanatory must, according to them, answer the
Three Questions presented above. B&R argue that RG answers Q2, for both LGA and Fisher's
model, because the RG transformation eliminates details that are irrelevant. They write, “By
performing this [RG] operation repeatedly, one can answer question Q2 because the
transformation in effect eliminates details or degrees of freedom that are irrelevant” (362).
However, RG alone does not answer this. Q2 asks why the heterogeneous details are irrelevant
and RG only shows us that the details are irrelevant. The answer appears to be, “The details are
irrelevant because, as RG shows, the same macro-behavior results no matter the details.” But this
is uninformative.40
RG is also supposed to answer Q3 by demonstrating that all the fluids within LGA's
universality class share the common features of locality, conservation, and symmetry, and that all
populations in Fisher's model's universality class share linear substitution cost (363, 372). B&R
write that,
A derivative, or by-product, of this [RG] analysis is the identification of the shared
features of the class of systems. In this case, the by-product is a realization that all the
systems within the universality class share the common features locality, conservation,
40

An anonymous referee suggests the possibility that in this case there is no clear distinction between showing why
and showing that the details are irrelevant. I agree that in the LGA case the distinction seems blurry. However,
there are clear cases. For example, the entire cerebellum appears to be irrelevant to consciousness, even though it
contains more neurons than the cerebral cortex. Knowing this does not tell one why the cerebellum is irrelevant –
according to one popular theory, it has to do with the cerebellum's lack of informational integration (Tononi and
Koch 2015).
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and symmetry. Thus, we get an explanation of why these are the common features as a
by-product of the mathematical delimitation of the universality class. (363; their
emphasis)
The by-product is merely the identification of the shared features, not why they are shared.
Again, RG merely shows that these features are shared across diverse systems, not why they are
shared. Perhaps B&R's suggestion is that the fact that RG demonstrates that the details are
irrelevant explains why the common features are shared. But this boils down to, “These features
are shared across diverse systems because no other features are shared.” This is also
uninformative. RG alone does not explain why locality, symmetry, and conservation are present
in, for example, water and LGA, but not anisotropic liquid crystals. Answering that question
requires investigation of specific fluids. One reason why liquid crystals are not in the same
universality class as LGA and water is that their often rod-shaped particles result in directional
preference and lack of symmetry (Priestley et al. 1975). Liquid crystals therefore cannot be
accurately modeled using the unmodified Navier-Stokes equations. The addition of a stress
tensor or coupling with a Q-tensor system is required to take into account the anisotropy of liquid
crystals (Badia et al. 2011; Paicu and Zarnescu 2012). Similarly for Fisher's model: RG alone
does not explain why the average resource cost of male and female offspring is equal in, for
example, sheep, mule deer, and so on, but not in, for example, bees.
Finally, the answer to Q1 follows from the answers to Q2 and Q3. Obviously, if B&R are
mistaken about their answers to Q2 and Q3, then they are also mistaken about Q1.
Perhaps I have interpreted B&R too narrowly, and they do not mean that RG alone can
answer their Three Questions. If I am right about RG, B&R are wrong merely about how to go
about answering the Three Questions, not that answers are required. Next, then, I present two
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arguments that such a story is not required, that answering their Three Questions is unnecessary
for an account of the explanatoriness of LGA and Fisher's model.
The first argument rests on an analogy with a commonplace case of multiple realizability.
Batterman (2000; 2002b, §5.5) has plausibly argued that universality just is multiple
realizability:
That microstructurally different systems fall in the same universality or equivalence class,
is the physicists' way of saying that the upper level universal behavior is multiply
realized. And so, the explanation of the universality of the behavior is an explanation of
the behavior's multiple realizability. (2000, 129)
The diverse systems in a universality class multiply realize some universal behavior. Therefore,
Batterman argues, RG or similar methods can explain cases of multiple realizability. The
following analogy, then, is apt, and the lessons derived therefrom should generalize to B&R's
account of LGA and Fisher's model. If the lessons do not generalize, B&R need to explain why.
Diverse fluids exhibit similar behavior (for example, critical behavior) under certain
conditions (for example, near critical points). Similarly, diverse objects, such as apples,
tomatoes, and bowling balls, exhibit similar behavior (for example, rolling) under certain
conditions (for example, on an incline plane41). Rolling under these conditions is universal, or
multiply realizable, in apples, tomatoes, and bowling balls; apples, tomatoes, and bowling balls
are in the same universality class with respect to rolling. We would like to know why this is; why
apples, tomatoes, and bowling balls all roll on an incline plane. These diverse objects behave
similarly in certain conditions in virtue of possessing a similar property, (approximate)
sphericity. It is their (approximate) sphericity that disposes them all to roll when placed on an
incline plane. That fact could be discovered by some RG-like method. That they all share the
41

And in a suitable gravitational environment and so on.
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relevant property of sphericity and that all of their other properties, such as size42 and color, are
irrelevant to rolling on an incline plane is what explains this similar behavior and allows us to
answer w-questions about it. A minimal model of spherical objects would be in the same
universality class as apples, tomatoes, and bowling balls, and would explain their similar
behavior in certain conditions in virtue of accurately representing the relevant property,
(approximate) sphericity. Why should our account of the explanatoriness of B&R's minimal
models differ from this one?
The further question – Why are the remaining heterogeneous details, such as the size,
material, and color of these objects, irrelevant for the disposition to roll? – which is analogous to
B&R's Q2, is unnecessary for an account of the explanatoriness of our minimal model of
spherical objects. Why, for example, the color of an object does not matter to its rolling on an
incline plane is a question that can only be answered by a physical investigation into the
dispositions bestowed by color. An investigation in color physics would reveal why the
disposition to roll on an incline plane is not one of the dispositions bestowed by color. Such an
investigation would be unnecessary for knowing or showing that color is irrelevant to the
disposition to roll and, therefore, unnecessary for an account of the explanatoriness of our
minimal model of rolling.
The question analogous to B&R's Q3 is, “Why do very different objects, such as apples,
tomatoes, and bowling balls, all have sphericity in common?” Intuitively, an answer to this
question is beside the point to answering the question of why these objects behave similarly in
certain conditions, why they all roll when placed on an incline plane. Furthermore, this question
42

Obviously there are limits in the example as described. For example, if the size of the bowling ball (or apple or
tomato) were too large, it would crush the incline plane, unless the plane is sufficiently strong. Assume all these
deviant cases are excluded.
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seems to have no good answer. Yet the absence of an answer does not suggest that there is no
explanation of these diverse objects' disposition to roll on an incline plane. Similarly, there may
be no good answer to the question of why some diverse fluids share locality, conservation, and
symmetry, or why some diverse populations share linear substitution cost. The story about why
large classes of features are irrelevant that is required by B&R may not be available. This
analogy should motivate the claim that such a story is unnecessary to answer the question of
what makes LGA and Fisher's model explanatory. B&R need to say why answers to the Three
Questions are necessary in the cases of LGA and Fisher's model, but not in my rolling case or
similar cases of multiple realizability.
The above analogy is entirely consistent with Batterman's own remarks on the multiple
realizability of pain:
Suppose that physics tells us that the physical parameters α and γ are the (only) relevant
physical parameters for the pain universality class. That is, that Nh, Nr, and Nm have these
features in common when certain generalizations or regularities about pain are the
manifest behaviors of interest observed in each of humans, reptiles, and martians.
Equivalently, physics has told us that all the other micro-details that legitimately let us
think of Nh, Nr, and Nm as heterogeneous are irrelevant. We then have our explanation of
pain's realizability by wildly diverse realizers. (2000, 133; see also 2002b, §5.5)
This appears to be a common features explanation of exactly the type given above for the
multiple realizability of rolling on an incline plane. Nh, Nr, and Nm are the realizers of pain in
humans, reptiles, and martians, respectively. They are all in the pain universality class. An RGtype procedure might discover that α and γ are the only relevant common features shared by
these realizers. This would be enough to explain the multiple realizability of pain in humans,
reptiles, and martians. Further questions such as why humans, reptiles, martians, sentient robots,
and everything else in the pain universality class have the pain-conferring features α and γ in
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common may have no good answer. Answers to the Three Questions are therefore unnecessary
for an explanation of the multiple realizability of pain.
There is another reason why answering the Three Questions is unnecessary. Were answers
necessary for an account of the explanatoriness of LGA and Fisher's model, a regress would
loom. They write, “Simply to cite locality, conservation, and symmetry as being explanatorily
relevant actually raises the question of why those features are the common features among
fluids” (361). Similarly,
Common features accounts would likely cite the fact that the different fluids have
locality, conservation, and symmetry in common as explanatorily relevant and maybe
even as explanatorily sufficient. However, as we emphasized in section 3.3, this is a
mistake. The fact that the different fluids all possess these common features is also
something that requires explanation. (374)
Common features are insufficient to explain macroscopic fluid behavior because, B&R argue,
they do not answer the further question of why these features are common. With respect to 1:1
sex ratios, B&R write,
Were we simply to cite the fact that all these populations have the common feature of
linear substitution cost, we would fail to explain this universal behavior. The reason for
this is that we can equally well ask why the populations of different species distinguished
by different mating strategies, and so on, all exhibit a linear substitution cost and why
they display the 1:1 sex ratio. (374)
This appears to be an injunction against explanations that appeal to things that also require
explanation.43 But if it is a mistake to explain something by appeal to something else that
requires explanation, then nearly all explanations are mistaken. B&R need to explain why the
chain of explanation should stop where they say it should.
To conclude this section, I have found two problems with B&R's account of the
explanatoriness of their minimal models. First, it does not appear that RG alone can answer the
43

This point is also made by Lange (2015, 303–4).
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Three Questions. Perhaps they did not mean to imply as much. The second problem is that
answering the Three Questions is unnecessary. I gave two arguments for this. First, it is plausible
that answers to analogous questions in similar cases of multiple realizability are unnecessary
(and potentially unavailable, without thereby threatening explanation), and, second, were
answers to the Three Questions necessary, a regress would loom. Having argued against B&R's
account, I now present my own common features account.44
4.4. Generalizing the Ontic Conception
The account I propose is similar to the accounts proposed by Bokulich (2011), Rice
himself (2013), and Saatsi and Pexton (2013), though I give my account an ontic spin45. These
authors follow Woodward (2003) in requiring that an explanation answer what-if-things-hadbeen-different questions (“w-questions”). According to Woodward, an explanation “must enable
us to see what sort of difference it would have made for the explanandum if the factors cited in
the explanans had been different in various possible ways” (2003, 11). This requires the accurate
representation of the objective relations of dependence between the explanandum phenomenon
and the features on which it depends.
Woodward is explicit that it is in virtue of conveying counterfactual information that
causal claims are explanatory (2003, 210–220). Since noncausal dependence relations can also
convey counterfactual information, they can, therefore, also be explanatory46. For example,
44
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Perhaps it will be said that I have missed the distinctive feature of Fisher's model: that it is an equilibrium
explanation. According to Sober (1983), “Where causal explanation shows how the event to be explained was in
fact produced, equilibrium explanation shows how the event would have occurred regardless of which of a
variety of causal scenarios actually transpired” (202). Equilibrium explanations show how many of the causal
details are irrelevant to the explanandum. This presents no challenges I have not already discussed here at length.
The common features account given here is much like Rice's (2013) own account of equilibrium explanation.
See also Ruben's (1990) 'realist' account of explanation that emphasizes determinative and dependency relations
and Thalos' (2002) discussion of causal dependence as only one form of explanatory dependence.
Woodward (2003, §5.9) himself suggests dropping the causal requirement in certain cases where an
interventionist interpretation is implausible. See also Strevens (2008, 177–80).
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Saatsi and Pexton (2013) present an explanation of Kleiber's law, an allometric scaling law that
relates an organism's body mass to a biological observable (West et al. 1999). The precise details
of the explanation are irrelevant for our purposes. What matters here is that there is a feature, the
scaling exponent, that counterfactually depends on the dimensionality of the organism. It is
plausible that this counterfactual dependence relation contributes explanatory power, yet it is
implausible that the dimensionality of organisms is a causal variable that can, in practice or in
theory, be intervened upon (Saatsi and Pexton 2013, 620).
Salmon (1984, 1989) distinguished between epistemic, modal, and ontic conceptions of
explanation. These are conceptions of what a scientific explanation aims to show of the
explanandum phenomenon: that it is expected to occur, that it had to occur, and that it fits “into a
discernible pattern,” respectively (1984, 121). For Salmon, the “discernible pattern” into which
the explanandum phenomenon is fit is structured by causal processes, causal interactions, and
causal laws (1984, 132). “[W]e explain,” wrote Salmon, “by providing information about these
patterns that reveals how the explanandum-events fit in” (1989, 121). Explanation is not about
nomic expectability or nomic necessity, but about fitting the explanandum into “discernible
patterns,” “relationships that exist in the world” (1984, 121). This need not be construed solely
causally – it is a mistake to equate the ontic conception with the causal-mechanical account of
explanation. Salmon actually did not think causation was essential to the ontic conception:
It could fairly be said, I believe, that mechanistic explanations tell us how the world
works. These explanations are local in the sense that they show us how particular
occurrences come about; they explain particular phenomena in terms of collections of
particular causal processes and interactions – or, perhaps, in terms of noncausal
mechanisms, if there are such things. (1989, 184)47
47

See also, for example, “[T]he ontic conception focuses upon the fitting of events into natural regularities. Those
regularities are sometimes, if not always, causal” (1989, 120; my emphasis) and, “explanations reveal the
mechanisms, causal or other, that produce the facts we are trying to explain” (1989, 121; my emphasis). Salmon
then says that Railton's (1978; 1981) account is an ontic conception even though, “His view is more lenient than
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For Salmon, what was essential to the ontic conception was that, “the explanation of events
consists of fitting them into the patterns that exist in the objective world” (1989, 121). We can
and should hold on to the ontic conception while accepting many of the criticisms and limitations
of causal explanation, including those provided by B&R. There are noncausal dependence
relations in which an explanandum phenomenon can stand to other worldly items. Explanation
remains, then, a matter of fitting the explanandum phenomenon into “discernible patterns” and
“relationships that exist in the world,” all while acknowledging that these worldly patterns and
relationships can be noncausal.
The ontic-epistemic debate has shifted twice since Salmon (Illari 2013). Salmon framed
the debate in terms of what explanations do. After Salmon, the debate was framed
metaphysically, as a debate about what explanations are. The ontic conception was associated
with the claim that scientific explanations are (almost always causal) dependence relations in the
world; the epistemic conception was associated with the claim that scientific explanations are
epistemic states or representations. Craver's (2014) most recent formulation of the ontic
conception backs away from the metaphysical claim that explanations are ontic structures in the
world and focuses on demarcatory and normative constraints on explanation.48 Craver (2014)
writes that according to the ontic conception, “in order to satisfy these two objectives [of
explanatory demarcation and explanatory normativity], one must look beyond representational
structures to the ontic structures in the world” (28). That is, attention to ontic structures, rather

48

mine with regard to noncausal explanation” (1989, 121). Salmon also clearly thought that laws, construed as
ontic regularities, can be explanatory (see, for example, 1984, 17–8, 121; 1989, 120). See especially (1989, 120,
129) for explicit claims that focus on the laws themselves, rather than law-statements, leads to the ontic
conception.
According to Illari (2013, 241), Craver (in personal communication with Illari) holds that this has always been
the debate.
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than epistemic or representational form, is required in order to demarcate explanation from other
scientific achievements, like prediction, and to distinguish good from bad explanations, howpossibly from how-actually explanations, and explanatorily relevant from irrelevant features
(2014, 51).49
The generalized ontic conception, then, is an ontic conception because it embraces
Craver's claim that achieving the objectives of explanatory demarcation and normativity requires
attention to the ontic. It is generalized because it says that attention to more of the ontic than just
the causal-mechanical is required to achieve those objectives – attention to all ontic structures on
which the explanandum depends is required50.
The ontic conception, unhindered by a strictly causal-mechanical interpretation, retains
the ability to demarcate explanation from description and prediction. Explanations provide
information about relations of ontic dependence, causal and noncausal, which can be used to
answer w-questions about the explanandum phenomenon. Understanding is possessing this
information, and, therefore, knowing answers to w-questions51. Norms of explanation
immediately fall out of this account: The more relevant dependencies that are represented for a
given phenomenon and the more irrelevant dependencies that are not, the more w-questions can
be answered, the better the explanation of that phenomenon.
Let me clarify the relation between the aspect of my account that emphasizes dependence
relations and the counterfactual aspect that emphasizes the ability to answer w-questions. These
aspects are tightly intertwined, but relations of dependence are not “analyzed” in terms of
49

50
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Under this framing of the debate, Wright (2012) overemphasizes the role that lexical ambiguity plays in the case
for the ontic conception. The argument, which I do not have space here to defend, for Craver's claims about
explanatory demarcation and normativity does not require any lexical ambiguity of the term 'explanation'.
I thank an anonymous referee for pressing me to clarify the ontic conception and my account's relation to it.
More needs to be said about understanding than I am able to say here. See, for example, Strevens (2013) for the
kind of view to which I am sympathetic.
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counterfactuals or 'reduced' to counterfactuals. Analysis and reduction apply to terms, concepts,
or theories, not the things to which they refer. Rather, relations of counterfactual dependence
hold in virtue of, or are grounded in, relations of ontic dependence. Like supervenience,
counterfactual dependence is a modal concept (Heil 2003, 37). Different relations of ontic
dependence could ground supervenience, including, among others, identity, constitution, and
causal sufficiency (2003, 67). Supposing that what grounds counterfactual dependence relations
also makes (descriptions of) them true, we can put this in terms of truthmakers: relations of ontic
dependence provide truthmakers for counterfactuals.52
It is only with information about dependence that one can answer w-questions. This is
why the ontic aspect of my account is inseparable from the counterfactual aspect. This is why
one cannot say that explanation is a matter of answering w-questions, but not a matter of
accurately representing dependencies. Bokulich (2011), Rice (2013), Saatsi and Pexton (2013)
emphasize the importance for explanation of the ability to answer w-questions and are silent
about ontic relations, but these issues cannot be separated. Consider the counterfactual, “If
population P had lacked linear substitution cost, it would not have a 1:1 sex ratio.” What grounds
this counterfactual is the (perhaps causal) dependence between the population's linear
substitution cost and its 1:1 sex ratio. Those who think of explanation in terms of the ability to
answer w-questions should therefore embrace the account presented here.
The ontic aspect of my account also allows one to distinguish explanatorily relevant from
irrelevant counterfactuals. The length of a flagpole's shadow can be derived from the height of
the pole and the angle of elevation of the sun (Bromberger 1966). This derivation is symmetric.
52

Though I think this way of putting it is illuminating, it is controversial both in light of possible-world semantics
for counterfactuals and in light of disagreement about the relation between grounding and truthmaking. For a
survey of possible relations between grounding and truthmaking, see Griffith (2014).
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That is, one can also derive the height of the flagpole from the length of a flagpole's shadow and
the angle of elevation of the sun. It seems, then, that if the shadow had been longer and the sun in
the same position, then the flagpole would have been higher. Yet it does not seem true that this
explains the height of the flagpole. Here it is plausible that the explanatory asymmetry is
provided by causal asymmetry: the derivation of the length of the pole's shadow counts as
explanatory because that derivation, but not the reverse derivation, tracks causes (Hausman
1998; Woodward 2003). This lesson can be generalized to cases of noncausal dependence: in
general, when there are explanatory asymmetries, these are due to asymmetries in ontic
dependence.
Symmetry provides a nice example of something on which fluid behavior noncausally
depends. As I mentioned above, there are fluids, like anisotropic liquid crystals, that have a
preferential alignment due to their banana- and rod-shaped molecules and therefore cannot be
accurately modeled using the unmodified Navier-Stokes equations. The dependence of the
macro-behavior of liquid crystals on the shape of their particles is plausibly not a causal
dependence or mechanistic dependence. A feature or disposition of the whole liquid, its macrobehavior, depends on the features of its mereological parts, so construing this dependence
causally is inappropriate (assuming, plausibly, that parts and wholes cannot stand in causal
relations to each other; see Craver and Bechtel 2007). Yet, it is also plausible that the particles
are not a mechanism that produces, underlies, or maintains the fluid's macro-behavior.
Mechanisms are organized in a way mere aggregates are not (Craver 2001), and, while I
recognize that there is something of a continuum here, fluid particles do not appear to have the
requisite organization to constitute a mechanism. Here, then, is an instance of ontic dependence
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that is neither causal nor mechanistic, but is asymmetric and can be used to answer w-questions
about fluid behavior.53
B&R remark only in passing that it “stretches the imagination” to think of locality,
symmetry, conservation as causally relevant (360)54. I agree, but I do think it is plausible that
linear substitution cost can be given a causal interpretation, though I do not think a causal
interpretation is required for that feature to be explanatory. Woodard (2003) has given the most
influential account of causal relevance. Very briefly, according to Woodward, x is causally
relevant to y if and only if a sufficiently surgical manipulation (or “intervention”) of x would
change y. Here, 'sufficiently surgical' means that a manipulation of x that would change y would
do so only via the pathway from x to y.
It is important to note that on Woodward's view, the manipulation need not be physically
possible. All that is necessary is that relevant scientific theory be able to answer what would
happen under the imagined intervention. For example, considering the counterfactual claim that
changes in the position of the moon cause changes in the motion of the tides, Woodward writes,
Newtonian theory and familiar rules about the composition of forces tell us how to
subtract out any direct influence from such a process so that we can calculate just what
the effect of, say, doubling of the moon's orbit (and no other changes) would be on the
tides, even though it also may be true that there is no way of actually realizing this effect
alone. In other words, Newtonian theory itself delivers a determinate answer to questions
about what would happen to the tides under an intervention that doubles the moon's orbit,
and this is enough for counterfactual claims about what would happen under such
interventions to be legitimate and to allow us to assess their truth. (2003, 131)
If physical theories and biological theories can tell us what would happen under hypothetical
interventions, then causal relevance can be established.
53

54

I suspect that many explanations of dispositions in terms of their micro-bases will have this noncausal, nonmechanistic structure.
Lange (2015, 300) points out that this is plausible if it means that locality, symmetry, and conservation are not
causes, but implausible if it means that they cannot figure in causal explanations. See also fn. 55 below.
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A causal interpretation of linear substitution cost is plausible on a manipulationist
account. Recall that linear substitution cost is equality between the average resource costs of
male and female offspring. Here is a hypothetical intervention on average resource cost: inject all
and only the males of a population with a fluid that has the only effect of raising their
metabolism and increasing their average resource cost. Do this over many generations in a
population that initially had a 1:1 sex ratio and you will eventually see a deviation from a 1:1 sex
ratio.
One might object that this hypothetical intervention does not show that linear substitution
cost is causally relevant to 1:1 sex ratios, only that metabolism is causally relevant, since this is
what was manipulated. This objection is conceptually confused. In the case at hand,
manipulating metabolism just is manipulating average resource cost. It does not matter if
manipulating metabolism were but one way among many of manipulating average resource cost.
There are usually many different ways to manipulate a variable. Although, according to the
generalized ontic conception, linear substitution cost need not be causally relevant to be
explanatorily relevant, it plausibly is causally relevant on the manipulationist account.
It is much less plausible that conservation and locality are causally relevant to the
macro-behavior of fluids. Conservation is a paradigm law of nature. It is hard to imagine any
hypothetical interventions that would alter this regularity. One can imagine “local miracles,”
local speedings up, slowings down, and poppings into and out of existence of a fluid's particles,
and this would certainly change the macro-behavior of the fluid. Physical theory might even be
able tell us what would happen in such a contranomic or counterlegal scenario, but it is highly
implausible to construe laws as causally relevant in the interventionist sense because laws are not
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events or objects and particles are mereological parts of the fluid.55
According to the generalized ontic conception, then, LGA explains Navier-Stokes
behavior and Fisher's model explains 1:1 sex ratios in virtue of accurately representing all and
only the relevant features: symmetry, locality, and conservation for fluid behavior, and linear
substitution cost for 1:1 sex ratios. Knowing that these features alone are the relevant ones allows
one to answer w-questions about fluid behavior and 1:1 sex ratios. The essential role RG plays is
in discovering and demonstrating that these are the relevant features. RG and universality classes
do not provide a kind of explanation distinct from common features explanations. Rather, RG
and similar procedures are necessary methods used in the construction of common features
explanations.5657
55

56
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This is not to deny that conservation laws are causally relevant in the sense that they govern or constrain all
causal interactions, in Salmon's (1984, 169–70) sense of that term. Nor am I denying that citing a law can
provide information about a phenomenon's causal history (Skow 2014). I am only denying that conservation
laws are causally relevant in the interventionist sense. See Lange (2007; 2011) for valuable discussions of the
nature and explanatory status of conservation laws.
Cf. Batterman (2000): “The RG type analysis illuminates those physical features that are relevant for the upper
level universal behavior, and at the same time demonstrates that all of the other details which distinguish the
systems from one another are irrelevant” (128; original emphasis). More compactly, “[RG] is a method for
extracting structures that are, with respect to the behavior of interest, detail independent” (2000, 128; added
emphasis). Also, B&R: “[T]here are a number of techniques for demonstrating that a large class of details of
particular systems is irrelevant to their macroscale behavior” (371; added emphasis). These quotations are
consistent with my account of the role of RG.
Reutlinger (2014) has argued that RG explanations are noncausal because they are a kind of “distinctively
mathematical explanation,” although they do not exploit mathematical necessity, in contrast to Lange's (2013)
account of distinctively mathematical explanation. Rather, the mathematical operations involved in RG account
for RG's explanatory power. Reutlinger writes,
The mathematical explanatory power is derived from... the [RG] transformations and flow of Hamiltonians
[to a fixed point]. […] Both the transformations and the 'flow' are mathematical operations, which,
ultimately, serve the purpose to reveal something that two fluids have in common despite the fact that their
“real physical” Hamiltonians (or “initial physical manifolds”) are strikingly different. (1166, 1168; my
emphasis)
I agree that the mathematical operations of RG reveal common features, but I do not agree that those operations
are the sole contributors of explanatory power. If that were true, we would seem to have a case where
representing the things on which an explanandum depends does not contribute explanatory power, but the
method(s) used to reveal, discover, or demonstrate the relevance of those things does. This seems false in my
multiple realizability of rolling example, in which case it cannot be true of explanations of multiple realizability
in general. That is, it seems false that representing their shared (approximate) sphericity does not contribute
explanatory power to the explanation of the multiple realizability of rolling by apples, tomatoes, and bowling
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4.5. Conclusion
Batterman and Rice are at the forefront of a philosophical exploration of the limits of
causal explanation. They have argued forcefully and plausibly that certain models in physics and
biology are not explanatory in virtue of accurately representing causes (for example, Batterman
2002a; 2002b; Rice 2012; 2013). In their recent paper (Batterman an Rice 2014), they use the
minimal models to critique the explanatory requirement of accurate representation, regardless of
whether the features accurately represented are causal.
According to B&R, the explanatoriness of LGA and Fisher's model is captured by a story
about why heterogeneous details are irrelevant, a story that answers the Three Questions. I
identified two problems with this account. First, RG alone cannot answer the Three Questions.
Perhaps RG in conjunction with other methods can. Even so, the second problem is that answers
to these questions are in fact unnecessary. I argued for this by showing 1) that answers to
analogous questions in an analogous case of multiple realizability are unnecessary, and 2) that if
answers to the Three Questions were necessary, a regress would loom.
B&R have rightly stressed the significance of RG explanation, but have misplaced where
that significance lies. These methods do not provide novel kinds of explanation. RG is a unique
method that is necessary to extract the relevant features of the world that explain the phenomena
in which physicists are often interested. The explanatoriness of the minimal models they present,
balls, but that the method(s) used to reveal, discover, or demonstrate that (approximate) sphericity is the only
relevant, common property does contribute. Similarly for the multiple realizability of pain, briefly discussed
above. Rather, representing the only relevant common features on which our explanandum depends is what
contributes explanatory power, by allowing us to answer w-questions about it. The methods, mathematical or
not, that we use to discover that (approximate) sphericity is the only relevant property do not contribute any
explanatory power in themselves; they are simply tools used in the construction of the “common features”
explanation. This is how I see the role of RG. Note that if Reutlinger's distinctively mathematical account is to be
extended to other minimal models, some analogues of the mathematical operations of RG must be specified,
since those are the operations that he argues contribute explanatory power. In, for example, biological contexts, it
is unclear what such operations could be.
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LGA and Fisher's model, can be adequately captured by a common features approach, the
generalized ontic conception. These minimal models explain by accurately representing the
features on which their explananda depend, causally or noncausally. These accurate
representations can then be used to answer w-questions about the explananda, which contributes
to their explanatory power.
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Chapter 5. Information and Explanation: A Dilemma
I identify a dilemma for anyone who holds a theory according to which explanation is the
conveyance of some kind of information (e.g., Lewis 1986; Railton 1981). I also show how an
informational theory of explanation is implicit in core arguments of mechanists (Piccinini and
Craver 2011; Zednik 2015). However, informational theories seem to conflict with some lay and
scientific commonsense judgments and a goal of the theory of explanation, because information
is relative to the background knowledge of agents (Dretske 1981). Sometimes a model is an
explanation simpliciter, not just an explanation relative to some particular agent. We would also
like a philosophical theory to tell us when a model is an explanation simpliciter, not just when a
model is an explanation relative to some particular agent. I sketch a solution by distinguishing
explanation simpliciter from explanation-to and relativizing the former to what I call “total
scientific background knowledge”.
5.1. Introduction
Venerable philosophical theories of explanation have identified explanation with
conveying information of some kind (e.g., Jackson and Pettit 1990; Lewis 1986; Railton 1981;
Skow 2014). I will call these informational theories of explanation. Usually informational
theories are causal, according to which explanations provide information about the explanandum
phenomenon's causal history, but they need not be. There have been innumerable critiques of
such causal theories (e.g., Batterman and Rice 2014; Sober 1983; for responses see Povich
forthcoming a and Skow 2014), but none, as far as I know, targets the apparent counterintuitive
consequences of their reliance on information.
Informational theories seem to conflict with some commonsense lay and scientific
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judgments and goals of the theory of explanation, because information is relative58 to the
background knowledge of agents (Dretske 1981). For example, it seems that sometimes a model
is an explanation simpliciter, not just an explanation relative to some particular agent. We would
also like a philosophical theory to tell us when a model is an explanation simpliciter, not just
when a model is an explanation relative to some particular agent. However, relying on
information seems to give us only the latter. I sketch a solution to this dilemma59 by
distinguishing scientific explanation simpliciter from explanation-to and relativizing information
in scientific explanations simpliciter to what I call “total scientific background knowledge”
(TSBK).
In Section 5.2, I sketch a typical informational theory of explanation, so that we have a
clear example of such a theory, and provide textual evidence that such a theory has actually been
held by prominent philosophers.
In Section 5.3, I show how an informational theory of mechanistic explanation is implicit
in core arguments of the mechanistic research program. Specifically, an informational theory is
implied by Piccinini and Craver's (2011) argument that functional analyses are mechanism
sketches and at least implies the crucial premise in Zednik's (2011, 2015) argument that

58

59

An obvious way out of the dilemma is to deny the relativity of information. At least one account of information
denies this relativity, but that account is controversial (Cohen and Meskin 2006; for objections, see Demir 2008
and Scarantino 2008; for a reply, see Meskin and Cohen 2008). For the purposes of this paper I will assume that
information is relative.
I have decided to structure this article as a dilemma for informational theorists of explanation because I do not
present much of an argument for an informational theory here (see Lewis 1986; Povich forthcoming a; Skow
2014). Of course, the article could be seen as gesturing towards a general inconsistent triad between an
informational theory of explanation, the agent-relativity of information, and a kind of objectivity of explanation
(as demonstrated by lay and scientific commonsense judgments of explanatoriness). One point in favor of an
informational theory is that information about causal, mechanistic or other kinds of dependence is all that is
needed to answer what-if-things-had-been-different questions about the explanandum phenomenon, which many
otherwise different philosophers think is essential to explanation (e.g., Chirimuuta 2014; Craver 2007; Povich
forthcoming a; Rice 2015; Woodward 2003).
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dynamical systems models can be mechanistic explanations60. This makes a solution to the
dilemma even more pressing.
In Section 5.4, I explain why information is relative to background knowledge and
illustrate this with Dretske's (1981, 78) example of the shell game. I can then spell out more
clearly why informational theories of explanation have the counterintuitive consequences they
do.
In Section 5.5, I argue that informational theories can avoid the counterintuitive
consequences by distinguishing scientific explanation simpliciter from explanation-to (so-called
because it is an explanation to a particular agent). Information in scientific explanation
simpliciter is relativized to what I call “total scientific background knowledge” (TSBK), the
current total store of propositions that are known by scientists61. Information in explanation-to is
relativized to the background knowledge of the particular agent to whom the explanation is
given.
5.2. An informational theory of explanation
In this section, I sketch a typical informational theory of explanation (inspired by Lewis
1986), so that we have something concrete with which to work.
The Informational Theory of Explanation (ITE): A model is an explanation when and
only when it provides information about the explanandum phenomenon's causal history.
This is a causal version of an informational theory since the kind of information that is deemed
explanatory is information about causes. Other versions are certainly available, to which my
dilemma and solution will apply. For example, a mechanistic version would say that a model is
60

61

Hochstein (2016) makes a somewhat similar argument, though he is not concerned with information. He argues
that implicit in mechanists' arguments is the idea that any representation of a mechanism is a mechanistic
explanation, regardless of the form of the representation.
Anti-realists can replace “knowledge” with their preferred substitute. Ditto for “veridical information” in Section
2.
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an explanation when and only when it provides information about the explanandum
phenomenon's mechanism. Here I use the causal version as a typical example; I return to the
mechanistic version in the next section. All the points that follow apply, mutatis mutandis, to all
versions of ITE. For my purposes, I need not commit to any particular theory of causation.
To provide information, in the intended sense, about an explanandum phenomenon's
causal history is to reduce uncertainty about its causal history or to reduce the space of possible
causal histories responsible for it (Dretske 1981; Skow 2014). A causal history is merely the
explanandum phenomenon's entire causal chain or network (Lewis 1986). To provide
information about an explanandum phenomenon's causal history, it is not necessary to reduce the
space of possible causal histories to one, which would be to provide “complete” information, in
an intuitive sense. Also, to provide complete information in this sense is not necessarily the same
as providing a complete explanation. Due to the (often pragmatic) norms governing
completeness of explanation, a complete explanation could be provided without complete
information. I have made ITE non-comparative so that I will not have to address norms of
completeness (Kaplan and Craver unpublished). I take explanatory information to be veridical.62
I include “model” in ITE because when we make judgments about explanations, these
explanations are usually embodied in models. Similarly, we would like a philosophical theory to
tell us when something is an explanation, and that something is usually a model.63 By “model” or
“representation,” which I use synonymously, I mean a structure (e.g., a concrete replica, a
mathematical equation, a diagram, or a linguistic description) that is interpreted to represent a
62

63

I do not take much to hang on this (cf. Lewis 1986, 226) and I will not address idealization here (see Craver
2014; Weisberg 2013). This should not affect my argument or solution, for information is still relative to
background knowledge, whether or not it is veridical.
Even proponents of the ontic conception recognize both that the term “explanation” is used this way and that
their theory needs to address these questions (Craver 2014; Craver and Kaplan unpublished).
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target system (Weisberg 2013). Although I am ignoring Weisberg's (2013) distinction between
models and model descriptions, this should not affect the points that follow.
It might be thought that information is too weak a basis for explanation (Carl Craver
personal communication). Part of the motivation for causal-mechanical accounts was to avoid
the verdicts on which the covering law model floundered. One kind of case was where merely
informational relations were counted as explanatory. For example, the barometer provides
information about the storm, but does not explain the storm (Salmon 1989)64. However, ITE
does not entail that the barometer explains65 the storm, because, although a barometer reading
reduces uncertainty about the occurrence of a storm, it does not reduce uncertainty about the
causes of the storm. Nor does the fact that barometer readings and storms are correlated reduce
uncertainty about the causes of the storm (barring application of Reichenbach's controversial
Common Cause Principle). The closest fact in this area that does provide explanatory
information is this: that the barometer reading and the storm have a common cause. This reduces
uncertainty about the causes responsible for the storm; it says that whatever the cause of the
storm, it must be such that it also causes certain barometer readings. It excludes from the space
of possible causes those that don't also cause certain barometer readings. I concede that this is
explanatory information according to ITE, although obviously very limited.
An informational theory of explanation has been advocated by, e.g., Jackson and Pettit
(1990), Lewis (1986), Railton (1981), and Skow (2014). Obviously there are differences between
64

65

The informational version of the epistemic conception that Salmon (1984) attacked says that scientific
explanations are “ways of increasing our information about phenomena of the sort we are trying to explain” (97),
whereas ITE says that scientific explanations are ways of increasing our information about the causes of
explananda. Salmon objected to the lack of causation in the former, not its reliance on the concept of information
(1984, 101).
I switch between talk of facts or events providing information and talk of representations of facts or events
providing information.
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these philosophers' theories. For my purposes, the relevant similarity is their emphasis on
information. It is clear from their texts that they are not merely using the term “information”
informally, but have in mind a notion like uncertainty- or possibility-reduction that generates the
dilemma. For example, Lewis (1986: 217) writes that “to explain an event is to provide some
information about its causal history”. Although he also writes that an explanation is “a
proposition about the causal history of the explanandum event” (218), thereby dropping the term
“information,” it is clear from his examples that a proposition about the causal history of the
explanandum is one that provides information in the relevant sense (i.e. uncertainty- or
possibility-reduction) about it. For example, explanatory information consists not only of
positive information about what was in the causal history of the explanandum, but also negative
information about what was not in the causal history of the explanandum (220). Lewis explicitly
states that “the test” of whether something provides explanatory information “is that it suffices to
rule out at least some hypotheses about the causal history of the explanandum” (221). This is
precisely the sense of information as uncertainty- or possibility-reduction that generates the
dilemma. Jackson and Pettit (1992) refer back to Lewis when they write, “We endorse the view
that the job of explanation is to provide information on causal history” (13; Lewis is cited
approvingly at p.12). The same idea is expressed when Skow (2014), explicitly following Lewis,
writes that explanatory information “narrows down the list of possible causes (or possible causal
histories) of the event being explained” (448) or “rule[s] out some hypotheses about what caused
E [i.e. the explanandum]” (450). Finally, Railton (1981) also has uncertainty- or possibilityreduction in mind when he writes, “On the analysis given here, a proffered explanation supplies
explanatory information (whether we recognize it as such or not) to the extent that it does in fact
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(whether we know it or not) correctly answer questions about the relevant ideal text” (243).
Here, though, it is not uncertainty about the causal history of the explanandum that is reduced in
explanations, but uncertainty about the ideal explanatory text. This is especially clear when
Railton writes, concerning the sense of information that he has in mind, that “the amount of
information carried by a 'message' is proportional to the degree to which it reduces uncertainty.
[...] Hence, information is a kind of selection power over possibilities” (244; original emphasis).
I have described an example of an informational theory of explanation and provided
textual evidence that theories relying on the relevant notion of information have been prominent
in the philosophy of explanation. Next I show how an informational theory is arguably implicit
in core arguments of the mechanistic research program.
5.3. Information in the mechanistic research program
As far as I know, no prominent mechanists have endorsed an informational theory of
mechanistic explanation66. However, one is arguably implicit in some of their core arguments. I
illustrate this with Piccinini and Craver's (2011) argument that functional analyses are
mechanism sketches and Zednik's (2011, 2015) argument that dynamical systems models can be
mechanistic explanations.
5.3.1 Functional analyses as mechanism sketches
Piccinini and Craver (2011) argue that functional analyses are mechanism sketches. A
functional analysis explains a system's ability or capacity in terms of the functional properties of
the whole system or of its parts. Functional analysis is thought to proceed relatively
autonomously of consideration of the structural components that realize the functional properties,
66

Note that according to such a theory, two kinds of information could be explanatory: (causal) information about
the mechanistic causal process that produces an explanandum result and (constitutive) information about the
components, activities, and organization that constitute the mechanism that maintains, underlies, or produces the
explanandum.
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or play the functional roles, given the multiple realizability of such properties (Fodor 1968;
Weiskopf 2011a,b). This provides prima facie reason for thinking that functional analyses are not
mechanistic explanations of any kind. A mechanism sketch is an incomplete mechanistic
explanation (Craver 2007). Mechanism sketches lack relevant details because they contain black
boxes and filler terms.
Piccinini and Craver (2011) distinguish three types of functional analysis: task analysis,
functional analysis by internal states, and boxology. I only briefly describe these, since Piccinini
and Craver's argument is basically the same in each case. A task analysis decomposes a capacity
into subcapacities and their organization (Cummins 1975). A functional analysis by internal
states explains a capacity in terms of a system's internal states and their interaction (Fodor 1968).
Boxology analyzes a system in terms of functional components or black boxes and their (often
informational) interactions (Fodor 1968).
The reason Piccinini and Craver (2011) claim that all three kinds of functional analysis
are mechanism sketches is that each puts constraints on the possible mechanisms that implement
the functions (or subcapacities) identified in the analysis. Similarly, structure constrains function:
not just any structural component can perform any function. For example, to perform the
functions of belief and desire boxes, a mechanism(s) must be able to distinguish between those
two types of representation and transform them in relevant ways (Piccinini and Craver 2011:
303). Although this is consistent with the multiple realizability of functions, it does put some
limits on what could possibly implement belief and desire boxes.
When a functional analysis constrains mechanisms, it limits the space of possible
mechanisms that could implement the identified functions.67 But to reduce the space of possible
67

It is possible that Piccinini and Craver could be working with a more robust notion of constraint that is
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mechanisms just is to convey information about mechanisms. Therefore, Piccinini and Craver's
argument is that functional analyses are mechanism sketches because they provide information
about mechanisms. Piccinini and Craver appear to be relying on an informational theory of
mechanistic explanation.68
5.3.2. Representational form as irrelevant to explanation
An informational theory is also implicit in, or at least implies the crucial premise of,
Zednik's (2011, 2015) argument that dynamical systems models can provide mechanistic
explanations.69 Dynamical systems models employ the mathematical concepts of dynamical
systems theory, such as differential or difference equations (Chemero 2009; Izhikevich 2007).
These equations allow the modeling of the evolution of the target system's variables over time,
which can be represented graphically as a trajectory through state space (or phase space). The
state space of a system is a high dimensional space that represents all its possible states, i.e. all
possible values of all the system's variables. Such graphical representations allow intuitive

68

69

inconsistent with an informational theory, but nothing in their paper suggests this.
Piccinini and Craver's (2011) argument might not follow if Kaplan and Craver's (2011) model-to-mechanismmapping (3M) requirement is true. According to 3M, the variables in an explanatory model map onto specific
structural components and activities of the explanandum phenomenon's mechanism, but you can constrain a
mechanism without referring to it or its components and their activities, for example, by describing what the
mechanism is not like. (Unless, of course, one has a liberal conception of properties according to which
everything has an infinite number of negative properties.) Like mapping and reference, similarity is similarly too
strong (Weisberg 2013) – accounts of explanation in those terms would not count as explanatory models that in
fact are. This is because the information a model conveys – what can be learned from a model – and, so, its
explanatory power, can outstrip what it explicitly represents. Yet, importantly, information about that on which
an explanandum depends is all that is necessary to answer explanation-constituting w-questions. This contradicts
3M even if it is consistent Piccinini and Craver's argument.
Also, that an informational theory is implicit in Piccinini and Craver (2011) could be especially problematic for
Craver, according to whose interpretation of the ontic conception (2014), commitments about ontic structures are
required to demarcate explanation from other scientific achievements. Part of Craver's motivation for this view is
to avoid psychologistic accounts of explanation that require understanding. This may imply that whether or not a
model explains is independent of the mental states of individual agents. If so, this seems to conflict with the fact
that information is relative to an agent's background knowledge. My solution in Section 5 can resolve this
apparent conflict.
For arguments that dynamical models are not mechanistic explanations, see, e.g., Chemero 2009, Chemero and
Silberstein 2011 and Stepp, Chemero, and Turvey 2011.
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analysis of state space topology and reveal abstract, dynamical features such as attractors (states
into which the system tends from surrounding states) (Izhikevich 2007).
Zednik's (2011) argument70 distinguishes between mechanistic explanations, on the one
hand, and the tools used for constructing and representing them, on the other. As a mathematical
and conceptual framework, dynamical systems theory can be used to represent anything to which
its concepts apply. If dynamical concepts can apply to the components, activities, and
organization of mechanisms, then, according to Zednik, dynamical systems theory can provide
mechanistic explanations. Zednik (2015) has extended this point, using evolutionary robotics and
network science to show how new tools for mechanism description and discovery can go beyond
the traditional mechanistic explanatory methods of decomposition and localization (Bechtel and
Richardson 1993). What matters for an explanation to be mechanistic, according to Zednik, is not
how it was constructed or its representational form – what matters is only that it represents a
mechanism.
Although Zednik's argument may not directly imply an informational theory of
mechanistic explanation, because representing a mechanism may be different than conveying
information about it71, it is consistent with and implied by an informational theory. This is
because models of many different forms, constructed by many different methods, can provide
information about mechanisms. Therefore, an informational theory of mechanistic explanation
would imply that neither the form of a model nor the methods used to build it are relevant to
whether it is a mechanistic explanation.
5.4. A dilemma for informational theories
70

71

Unfortunately, going over Zednik's example would take too much space. I hope the tenor of the argument is clear
without an example. For discussion, see Povich forthcoming b.
See Dretske (1988) for an informational, teleological theory of representation.
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Informational theories of explanation have often been proposed and are implicit in core
arguments of the mechanistic research program. However, they seem to have some heretofore
unseen counterintuitive consequences because information is most commonly thought to be
relative to an agent's background knowledge. The relativity of information to background
knowledge can be illustrated using Dretske's example of the shell game (1981, 78). In this
example, there are four shells and a peanut is under one of them. Alice, but not Bob, knows that
the peanut is not under shells 1 and 2. Alice and Bob then both turn over shell 3 and see that it is
empty. This gives different information to Alice and Bob: Alice learns that the peanut is under
shell 4, while Bob only learns that it is not under shell 372.73
Background knowledge, then, affects not only how much information is received, but
what information is received (Dretske 1981, 81). In the most obvious and extreme case, an agent
may not be able to extract any explanatory information from a model because she does not have
the background knowledge to be able to interpret what the model says. Informational theories
make it possible that a model could be explanatory to Alice, but not Bob, because it conveys
information to Alice that it does not convey to Bob, due to differences in their background
knowledge. It seems that the explanatoriness of a model can only be assessed relative to
particular agents, contradicting commonsense judgments and traditional philosophical goals of
the theory of explanation. In lay and scientific practice, we often assess the explanatoriness of a
model simpliciter, not just relative to some particular agent. Similarly, one of the things a
72
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The difference in information conveyed to Alice and Bob can be precisely quantified (see Dretske 1981, 78). For
Alice, 2 possibilities are reduced to 1, so she receives 1 bit of information; for Bob, 4 possibilities are reduced to
3, so he receives .42 bits of information.
Julia Staffel (personal communication) objects that Alice and Bob receive the same information, but can draw
different inferences because of their different background knowledge. I think this intuition is an artifact of this
particular case, because the initial possibility space seems to come objectively pre-divided into four relevant
possibilities. However, this is rare. Compare Dretske's discussion of the information generated by Edith's playing
tennis (53) or the elimination of relevant possibilities (128).
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philosophical theory of explanation should do is tell us when a model is an explanation
simpliciter, not just when a model is an explanation relative to some particular agent. One
desideratum of a theory of explanation should be to capture this “objectivity” of explanation.74
5.5. A solution to the dilemma
Informational theorists can avoid the above unwelcome consequences by relativizing to
different sets of propositions and distinguishing scientific explanation simpliciter from
explanation-to (i.e. explanation to a particular agent). For scientific explanation simpliciter, I
propose to relativize information to “total scientific background knowledge” (TSBK), the current
total store of propositions that are known the scientific community (cf. Kitcher [1989] on the
explanatory store over K).
To determine the content of TSBK, I prefer Bird's (2010; 2014) account of scientific
social knowledge. Bird conceives of social knowledge as performing social functions analogous
to the functions of individual knowledge. So, for p to be socially known, p must be true,
accessible to relevant members of the community (e.g., other scientists, but not necessarily the
lay public), propositional in nature, the product of social mechanisms whose function promotes
truth, and available as an input into social action or social cognitive structures (Bird 2010, 42–4).
Unlike Bird, I remain agnostic as to whether there exists a single social agent that knows all the
propositions that make up TSBK. Notice that while I have been speaking of information as
relative to background knowledge, information is simply relative to a set of propositions – it
need not be the case that that set of propositions is known by an agent.
When a model explains to an agent, I relativize to that particular agent's background
knowledge. Explanation-to is where most pragmatic concerns are likely to arise. A model needs
74

Of course, pragmatists such as van Fraassen (1980) may disagree. I will not here try to convince them otherwise.

88

to be presented in a particular way, tailored to the intended audience's presumed background
knowledge, in order to maximize the probability that they will extract the appropriate
information from it.
This distinction allows for it to be the case that a model is a scientific explanation
simpliciter, but not an explanation to an individual agent, because their background knowledge
does not allow them to extract the appropriate information from the model75. Metaphorically, we
might say that even if a model does not inform an individual agent, it could inform the scientific
community as a whole. If Bird (2010; 2014) is right, this would not just be metaphor –
explanation simpliciter would be a form of explanation-to where the agent involved is a social
agent.
Let me motivate why I am using Bird's account to determine the relevant set of
propositions to which information is relativized in explanations simpliciter and not some other
set of propositions, for example, the set of all true propositions or the set of propositions known
at the “end of inquiry”. To understand why I propose relativizing to TSBK, consider why it
makes sense to relativize to background knowledge KA, rather than, say, the set of all true
propositions, in explanations to an agent A. It is only relative to A's own background knowledge
that she is able to learn something from the information conveyed by a signal. On any particular
occasion, A might not actually extract information from a model but she would be able to. An
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Eric Hochstein (personal communication) objects that a model can contain explanatory information for A without
being an explanation to A, because A might not understand the model. To accommodate this intuition, I could
distinguish between a model's being an explanation to A and a model's actually explaining to A. In the former, a
model contains the relevant information relative to A, but A might not extract it. In the latter, A actually extracts
the information. An analogous distinction seems possible with respect to scientific explanation simpliciter. For
the scientific community to actually extract some information from a model means that that information becomes
part of its knowledge, TSBK. Obviously, how a piece of information becomes part of TSBK is a controversial
question. Bird (2010, 32) suggests publication as the relevant process by which a piece of knowledge becomes
scientific knowledge.

89

analogous thought is at work in my TSBK proposal. It is helpful to think of the scientific
community as something like a group agent with group knowledge, though, again, I do not want
to commit to any robust notion of group agency. Although no single individual knows TSBK and
although the scientific community might not actually extract information, and so learn
something, from a model on any particular occasion, it would be able to, via the division of
cognitive labor (Bird 2014). Bird's functional account of social knowledge ensures that social
knowledge is useful to, and actually able to be used by, the scientific community. Explanatory
simpliciter models inform the scientific community about, or increase the scientific community's
knowledge of, causes (or mechanisms or the ideal explanatory text or whatever). If information
were relativized to the set of all true propositions or the set of propositions known at the end of
inquiry, we would be left with a conception of explanation that would never be of use to us,
individually or collectively. Relativizing to TSBK captures just enough objectivity of
explanation; any more would be inappropriate, given that models are interpreted representational
structures used by us for our purposes.76 I am willing to concede, therefore, that, for example, the
Hodgkin-Huxley model of the action potential was not explanatory in the Middle Ages because
no one, individually or collectively, had the ability to extract any information from it. We must
either make this concession or, if we relativize to all true propositions or the end of inquiry,
concede that there are explanatory models from which it is impossible for us, individually or
collectively, to learn anything.
This solution can be expressed formally as follows. Think of the space of all possible
causal histories of an explanandum phenomenon as a disjunction or set of those causal histories.
76

Contessa (2007, 53 fn. 6) notes that one of the few agreements in the literature on scientific representation is that
representation is a triadic relation between a representational vehicle, a target system, and a user base. It should
be unsurprising that explanation is similarly implicitly triadic.
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Since this set contains all possibilities, its prior probability is 1. When a model M conveys
information about an explanandum phenomenon's causal history, it reduces the space of possible
causal histories, thereby excluding some possibilities, i.e. decreasing the probability of a subset
of initial possibilities to 0. This has the effect of increasing the probability of the subset of
remaining possibilities to 1, since we now know that the actual causal history is in this subset. If
we call a proper77 subset of possible causal histories CR, then a model M explains simpliciter
when and only when P(CR|M&TSBK)=1, but <1 given TSBK alone (minus M; see below)
(Dretske 1981). A model M explains to an agent A when and only when P(CR|M&KA)=1, but <1
given KA alone (minus M), where KA is the agent's background knowledge.
I include the “minus M” condition because without it, a model would cease to provide
information and, so, cease to be explanatory, once it becomes part of the current store of
scientific knowledge or an individual agent's background knowledge. We want to say that such a
model is still an explanation because it provides information relative to the relevant set of
propositions, the model itself excluded.
If the probability of unity above is worrisome because it implies certainty, note that CR is
a set of causal histories (or mechanisms or propositions in the ideal explanatory text or
whatever), not a particular causal history. The probability of unity here only implies that we can
reduce the probability of some other possibilities (CR's complement) to zero. If one is skeptical of
this, we could instead require that M only probably exclude CR's complement. This would reduce
the probability of CR's complement, but not to 0, increasing the probability of CR, but not to 1
(see Scarantino 2015). Then, a model M explains simpliciter when and only when P(CR|
M&TSBK)>P(CR|TSBK–M). A model M explains to an agent A when and only when P(CR|
77

CR must be a proper subset or no information is conveyed.
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M&KA)>P(CR|KA–M).
5.6. Conclusion
Informational theories have an impressive history in the philosophy of explanation (e.g.,
Jackson and Pettit 1990; Lewis 1986; Railton 1981; Skow 2014). I have shown how an
informational theory is also implicit in core arguments of the mechanistic research program. An
informational theory is implied by Piccinini and Craver's (2011) arguments that functional
analyses are mechanism sketches; an informational theory is at least consistent with and implies
the central premise in Zednik's (2011, 2015) argument that dynamical systems models can be
mechanistic explanations.
Informational theories, however, seem to have counterintuitive consequences, for they
seem to imply that assessments of explanatoriness can only be made relative to individual agents.
This conflicts with lay and scientific commonsense judgments about explanation and traditional
goals of the theory of explanation. By distinguishing scientific explanation simpliciter from
explanation-to and relativizing the former to TSBK, these counterintuitive consequences are
avoided.
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Chapter 6. Social Knowledge and Supervenience Revisited
Bird's (2010; 2014) account of social knowledge (SK) denies that scientific social
knowledge supervenes solely on the mental states of individuals. Lackey (2014) objects that SK
cannot accommodate 1) a knowledge-action principle and 2) the role of group defeaters. I argue
that Lackey's knowledge-action principle is ambiguous. On one disambiguation, it is false; on the
other, it is true but poses no threat to SK. Regarding group defeaters, I argue that there are at
least two options available to the defender of SK, both taken from literature on individual
defeaters and applied to group defeaters. Finally, I argue that Lackey's description of the case of
Dr. N. – as a case in which the scientific community does not know but is merely in a position to
know – is mistaken. It assumes that Dr. N.'s publication is not scientific knowledge. An analogy
to the individual case shows that it is plausible that the scientific community is not merely in a
position to know, although its members are. This leaves intact a conception of social knowledge
on which it does not supervene on the mental states of individuals.
6.1. Introduction
Bird (2010; 2014) has defended a radically extended account of scientific social
knowledge. It is radically extended in the sense that it denies that group knowledge supervenes
on the mental states of individuals. Let us, following Lackey (2014), call this account SK.
Lackey (2014) objects that SK cannot accommodate 1) a knowledge-action principle (when
combined with another plausible principle linking individual and group action) and 2) the role of
group defeaters. I argue that Lackey's knowledge-action principle is ambiguous. On one
disambiguation, it is false; on the other, it is true but poses no threat to SK. Regarding group
defeaters, I argue that there are at least two options available to the defender of SK, both taken
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from literature on individual defeaters and applied to group defeaters. Finally, I argue that
Lackey's description of the case of Dr. N – as a case in which the scientific community does not
know but is merely in a position to know – is mistaken. Lackey's analogy to the individual case
can be redescribed to show that it is plausible that the scientific community is not merely in a
position to know, although its members are.
In Section 6.2, I present more completely SK; this Section also spells out the central
example of non-supervenience under dispute – the case of Dr. N. In Sections 6.3 and 6.4, I
present and respond to Lackey's action and defeater objections, respectively. In Section 6.5, I
show how Lackey's distinction between knowing and merely being in a position to know, while
useful, is misapplied to the case of Dr. N.
6.2. Scientific Social Knowledge
When does a social epistemic subject such as the scientific community know?78
According to SK (Bird 2010; 2014), a social epistemic subject S knows that p if and only if p is
true, the information that p is accessible to relevant members of S (e.g., other scientists, but not
necessarily the lay public), and the following three conditions hold79:
(i) [S has] characteristic outputs that are propositional in nature (propositionality);
(ii) [S has] characteristic mechanisms whose function is to ensure or promote the chances
that the outputs in (i) are true (truth-filtering);
(iii) the outputs in (i) are the inputs for (a) social actions or for (b) social cognitive
structures (including the very same structure [the structure that produces the output])
(function of outputs). (Bird 2010, 42–4)
The three conditions are supposed to be social analogues of the functions of and conditions
required for individual knowledge. I will not defend them here. My focus instead will be on
78
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My focus will not be on the ontology of social epistemic subjects. See Bird (2010; 2014) for an argument that the
division of cognitive labor in science enforces an organic interdependence that constitutes it as a social subject.
Bird does not give necessary and sufficient conditions for social knowledge. This biconditional is Lackey's
(2014) reconstruction of Bird, which I endorse here, both as a reconstruction of Bird and as an account of social
knowledge.
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responding to Lackey's (2014) objections, which do not target these conditions.
Bird argues that SK implies that scientific knowledge does not supervene on the mental
states of individuals. This is illustrated by Bird's cases of Drs. Q. and N. These cases are identical
with respect to the mental states of individuals, but differ with respect to social knowledge. Dr.
Q. is a reclusive scientist who dies with her results tucked away from the scientific community.
Even though Dr. Q. knew that p, the scientific community did not, in virtue of her lack of
publication. This is because publication is what makes a proposition accessible to the scientific
community (Bird 2010, 32). Dr. N., on the other hand, is a scientist whose results, though
published in a reputable journal, everyone forgets once she dies. Bird (2010, 32) claims that, in
virtue of publication and, so, accessibility, the scientific community knows Dr. N.'s conclusion
that d, even though no individual scientist knows that d.80
The cases of Drs. Q. and N. suggest that the set of propositions known by the scientific
community is independent of what individuals know. Individual knowledge is insufficient, as
shown by the case of Dr. Q., and unnecessary, as shown by the case of Dr. N., for social
knowledge. I will defend Bird's treatment of the case of Dr. N. from objections in the next two
sections.
6.3. Lackey's Objections: Action
Lackey (2014) argues that the following two principles conflict with SK.81
(KAP) Knowledge/Action Principle: S knows that p only if S is epistemically rational to
act as if p or, equivalently, S is epistemically rational to act as if p if S knows that p.
(287)82
80
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As Bird (2010) describes the case, eventually Dr. N.'s publication is rediscovered, but its rediscovery is
unnecessary for social knowledge. All that is required is its rediscoverability (i.e. accessibility).
If Carter (2015) is right, then Lackey's objections extend beyond SK to some mainstream views on group
knowledge. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to my attention.
One might respond to Lackey's objection by denying KAP (Brown 2008; Lackey 2010), though I will not do so
here. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
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(GMAP) Group/Member Action Principle: For every group, G, and act, a, G performs a
only if at least one member of G performs some act or other that causally contributes to a.
(286)
According to Lackey (2014), these two principles are inconsistent with SK, as shown by
applying them to the above-mentioned case of Dr. N., whose results, though published in a
reputable journal, everyone forgets once she dies. In this case, Bird and Lackey agree that SK
implies that the scientific community knows that d even though no living individual does.
Applying GMAP, if the scientific community were to act, it would be through members unaware
of d. Lackey (2014) argues that it is therefore epistemically irrational for the scientific
community to act as if d, for example, by asserting83 d or approving drugs that depend on d84.
But, given KAP, the epistemic irrationality of acting as if d shows that the scientific community
does not know d. Hence, GMAP and KAP show that the scientific community does not know
that d; SK is false.
In response, I argue that KAP is ambiguous between two different sense of “act as if”. I
distinguish “acting on” knowledge that p from merely “acting in accordance with” knowledge
that p. On the latter disambiguation, KAP is false of individual and social agents. On the former
disambiguation, KAP is true, but does not show that SK is false.
The disambiguation has to do with knowledge's role in action production. Consider
Hawthorne and Stanley's reasoning when defending their version of KAP: “When someone acts
on a belief that does not amount to knowledge, she violates the norm, and hence is subject to
criticism” (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008, 577). The phrase “acts on” seems to me to imply that
83
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Lackey uses assertion as an example, but note that knowledge-action principles are usually distinguished from
knowledge norms of assertion. Thanks to Julia Staffel for bringing this to my attention.
Note that this says that it is irrational to act as if d while being unaware of d. I will assume this is true. It does not
say – what is likely false – that it is irrational to act as if d while being unaware of one's knowledge that d. See
Williamson's (2000) anti-luminosity arguments.
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the belief plays some causal role in producing the subject's action85. This is the plausible
disambiguation of “act as if”. The less plausible disambiguation treats acting as if p as merely
acting in accordance with p, where it could be sheer luck that one's action so accords. In merely
acting in accordance with p, one's knowledge that p plays no role in the action.86 Compare two
cases: 1) agent A knows that p and merely acts in accordance with p, for example, asserting that
p though her knowledge plays no causal role in the production of her assertion, and 2) agent A is
in an exactly similar situation, except her knowledge that p does play a causal role in the
production of her assertion. A's action in the former case is not epistemically rational, but her
action in the latter case is. This suggests that the proper formulation of KAP is something like: If
S knows that p, then S is epistemically rational to act on p (not merely in accordance with p). SK
is consistent with this.
Now we can apply this distinction to the case of a social epistemic subject. The latter,
epistemically irrational scenario above is analogous to Lackey's description of the case under
dispute. In Lackey's example, the reason the scientific community is irrational for asserting d or
approving drugs that depend on d is that, in my terms, the scientific community is merely acting
in accordance with d, rather than acting on d. In Lackey's example, the scientific community's
knowledge that d plays no role in the production of its actions. I agree that this is epistemically
irrational, but it is also irrational in the analogous case of individual knowledge, as shown above.
In both the social and individual cases, the irrationality stems from the fact that acting in mere
accordance with p would be a matter of epistemic luck (cf. Lackey 289).
I claim that in the case under dispute the scientific community is merely acting in
85
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This role is more explicit in other formulations of knowledge-action principles that stress knowledge's role in
practical reasoning (e.g., Hawthorne and Stanley 2008), where knowledge must interact with other mental states
in rational and causal processes. Lackey's formulation of KAP downplays this.
Cf. Turri (2011), who distinguishes having a reason and believing for a reason.
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accordance with d, rather than acting on d, because knowledge that d is not playing a role in
producing social action. What does it mean for knowledge that d to play a role in producing the
scientific community's action? Let us briefly look at the individual case first. For knowledge that
d to play a role in producing an agent A's action, A does not have to be aware of her knowledge
that d. What is required is that her knowledge that p play an appropriate (i.e. non-deviant)87
causal role in producing her action. Presumably, what this entails is something like that her
brain and motor system are wired up such that the brain state on which her knowledge
supervenes is non-deviantly causally relevant to her motor output. So, to apply this to the social
case, we must have some account of the supervenience base of scientific social knowledge, so
that we can see how it is causally relevant to social action. In social cases, the supervenience
base of knowledge can include the mental states of individuals, but it also includes social
institutions and objects like articles, laboratories, and the internet (Bird 2010; 2014).

For

knowledge that d to play a role in producing the community's action, then, is for the community
to make use of these knowledge-supervening social structures in its decision-making (see
condition iii of SK above). Since one of the relevant structures – perhaps the only structure – on
which the social knowledge that d supervenes is Dr. N.'s publication, the only way for the
community to act on d is for Dr. N.'s publication to play some role in the community's decisionmaking. This is exactly what is ruled out in Lackey's description of the case; Dr. N.'s publication
plays no role in the community's social actions. The way Lackey describes the case of Dr. N. is
therefore not a case of the scientific community acting on its knowledge that d, but merely acting
in accordance with it. I therefore conclude that SK is consistent with KAP properly construed to
87

I set aside worries about causal deviance, i.e. whether and how her knowledge must cause her action in the right
way. Whatever the right account is in the individual case, it can likely be extended to the social case (e.g. Turri
2011).
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include a causal role for knowledge in action production; it would be rational for the scientific
community to act on d, even if no individual is aware that d.
It would be rational for the scientific community to act on d, even if no individual is
aware that d, but how could it? That is, how could the social knowledge that d play a non-deviant
role in the community's social action without any of its members being aware that d? One of
Bird's (2010) examples of scientific knowledge without awareness could be contrived to allow
for this, especially if reliable automation is involved (35). For example, consider Lackey's
description of the case of Dr. N. again, where no one is aware of Dr. N.'s finding that d though
the community makes d-relevant decisions. Now, let us add that the scientific community has
created a reliable, automated system that checks past results for certain truth-conducive
properties like statistical significance, statistical power, effect size, etc. If the automated system
detects a result that passes the community's standards, it sends the result to another automated
system, reliable and trusted by the community, that uses the result to help the community make
social decisions. The first system detects Dr. N.'s results and sends them to the next system for
processing in social action. Here it is plausible that the knowledge that d plays a (non-deviant)
causal role in the production of social action without any member being aware that d.88 As Bird
(2010, 35) notes, cases like this are becoming increasingly likely as the scientific division of
labor becomes ever more divided and automated.
6.4. Lackey's Objections: Defeaters
Lackey's (2014) second objection to the case of Dr. N. has to do with defeaters. She
distinguishes psychological defeaters and normative defeaters89 (2014, 292). A psychological
88
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Carl Craver (personal communication) helpfully suggests that this case might be analogous to individual cases of
self-deception.
She does not mention externalistic defeaters. I return to this below.
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defeater is a mental state of S's that rebuts S's belief that p or undercuts her justification for
believing that p. A normative defeater is a psychological defeater that S should have, given
available evidence. The objection begins with an addition to the case of Dr. N. The addition is
that the vast majority of individual members of the scientific community, via some undescribed
process, come to believe that not-d. Lackey then argues that this implies that the scientific
community itself believes that not-d and its belief that not-d defeats its putative knowledge that
d.90
Lackey (293) draws two conclusion from this. First, social knowledge may be a lot less
common than we would like. For many scientific propositions, there could be a number of
scientists who hold conflicting beliefs that could function as psychological defeaters. Second, if
the belief that not-d defeats the knowledge that d, this implies an arbitrary asymmetry: group
beliefs cannot justify other group beliefs, but they can defeat other group beliefs, which, she
claims, is arbitrary without a story about why.
However, it is not clear why Lackey believes that in the case described, it is the belief that
not-d that must defeat the knowledge that d. She does not, for example, claim that the belief that
not-d is more justified than the belief that d. She does not explain why everyone believes that
not-d. It is open for the proponent of SK to claim that the knowledge that d defeats the belief that
not-d. After all, the knowledge that d is, we are supposing, true, reliably formed, and easily
accessible to all the relevant scientists, while the belief that not-d is a widespread falsehood.
There are accounts of defeat where easily accessible but unpossessed evidence can be a defeater
(e.g., Harman 1973) or where the availability of an alternative reliable process that, had it been
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Like Lackey, I will ignore the distinction between prima facie and ultima facie justification. This should not
affect the points that follow.
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used in addition to the actual process, would have led to a different belief can be a defeater (e.g.,
Goldman 1979).
Goldman (1979) explicitly excludes gathering new evidence from alternative reliable
processes. This might seem to preclude the application of Goldman's account of defeat to this
case. However, note that, according to SK, accessing Dr. N.'s result that d is not the scientific
community gathering new evidence; it is accessing knowledge it already has, though its members
might not have. The social situation is somewhat akin to introspection, an individual accessing a
memory of previously acquired evidence, which Goldman endorses as an alternative reliable
process. Of course, this process of “social introspection,” accessing previous scientific results,
must itself be a reliable process for the reliabilist account of defeat to work in this case.
However, I think it is plausible that it is, given the kinds of truth-filtering mechanism that ensure
condition ii of SK (Bird 2010, 43–4). There is therefore a reliabilist story that is not ad hoc about
why the knowledge that d defeats the belief that not-d.91 This is the first strategy for the defender
of SK.
Suppose we adjust the case of Dr. N. so that all the members of the scientific community
possess misleading evidence supporting their beliefs that not-d. Would not these individuals'
beliefs also constitute a defeater of the community's knowledge that d?92 I do not think that
claiming that there is mutual defeat per se in this case is a problem for SK. Recall that Lackey
presents her example to suggest that there is an arbitrary asymmetry for the defender of SK:
91
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I do not wish to claim that the existence of alternative reliable processes accounts for every case of group defeat.
There are well-known problems of method individuation (i.e. the generality problem) for reliabilism. See, for
example, Baker–Hytch and Benton (2015), Beddor (2015), and Lasonen–Aarnio (2010) for arguments that this
will not work in every case of defeat. I only claim that it is plausible that the defender of SK can use the
reliabilist story to respond to Lackey's example (see also Goldman 2014). See Grundmann (2009) for an
argument that reliabilism can accommodate defeaters.
I thank two anonymous reviewers for pressing this objection.
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group beliefs cannot justify other group beliefs, but they can defeat other group beliefs. Since
that is the conclusion I am trying to avoid, I think I can consistently accept that there is mutual
defeat in this example, as long as such defeat is not conceived internalistically as effected by
group (or individual) beliefs. Rather, the availability of Dr. N.'s publication serves as a defeater
for the group belief that not-d and the availability of other publications misleadingly supporting
not-d may serve as a defeater for the group belief that d. However, I am still open to Lackey's
objection that social knowledge may be less common than we would like. Maybe so, but it seems
to me that, given the extent of inconsistent evidence and controversy in scientific practice, this
may be a result of any plausible account of group knowledge in science. It is also not clear that
Lackey's (2016) positive account of justified group belief fares better than Bird's when it comes
to the amount of scientific social knowledge it allows. In particular, the prevalence of
disagreement in science seems to suggest that it will be rare that “a significant percentage of the
operative members” of the scientific community justifiedly believe that p and that full disclosure
of and rational deliberation about all the relevant evidence for p “would not result in further
evidence that when added to the bases of [the scientific community]’s members’ beliefs that p,
yields a total belief set that fails to make sufficiently probable that p” (381). However, an indepth discussion of Lackey's positive account is beyond the scope of this paper.
The second response to Lackey is to deny the existence of group defeat, not because there
is something wrong with group defeat, but because there is something wrong with defeat itself.
Lackey says that if there is no defeater in this case, then this would remove groups “from the
realm of the rational altogether” because “rebutting defeaters are precisely what rule out this
combination of states from being epistemically permissible” (294). However, the defender of SK
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can account for the irrationality of this case by appeal to a kind of knowledge norm of theoretical
reasoning similar to KAP above (Baker–Hytch and Benton 2015; see also Lasonen–Aarnio, M.
2010).93 The norm would be something like Baker–Hytch and Benton's knowledge norm of
belief (Williamson 2000):
(KNB) One must: not believe that p if one does not know that p. (Baker–Hytch and
Benton 2015, 56)
The upshot of this strategy is that the defender of SK need not say that the scientific community's
knowledge that d defeats its belief that not-d (or vice versa). The intuition that something has
gone wrong in this case is better explained by the community's failure to adhere to KNB. The
community possesses evidence that its belief that not-d is false, which means that it possesses
evidence that its belief that not-d is not knowledge. In such a situation, KNB rules that the
community must not believe that not-d. It is KNB, not rebutting defeaters, that rules out this
combination of states from being epistemically permissible.
Indeed, although the following claim is not necessary for a response to Lackey, the
scientific community appears to adhere to something like KNB. (Whether or not the scientific
community actually adheres to this norm is different from whether or not it applies.) However,
the scientific community seems consistently to engage in behavior that follows the norm, for
example, by issuing retractions of published results that come under dispute and by not letting
disputed beliefs guide its social actions.
6.5. Is the Scientific Community Merely in a Position to Know?
Having argued against the claim that the scientific community knows that d in the case of
93

Bird would likely approve of this response to Lackey since he explicitly compares his functionalist approach to
knowledge-first epistemology, writing that, “According to my view, the function of the cognitive faculties is just
that, to provide a link between the subject and the relevant facts so that they may be used as the inputs (reasons)
in practical and theoretical reasoning” (2010, 42).
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Dr. N., Lackey argues that the case is more accurately described as one in which the community
is merely in a position to know. According to Lackey, the distinction between knowing and
merely being in a position to know “is grounded, at least in part, in the difference between
information that has been accessed and information that is merely accessible” (2014, 294). She
gives the following example of an individual merely being in a position to know and claims that
it is analogous to the community in the case of Dr. N. On my desk there is an unopened letter my
friend's confession to a crime. I know nothing of the crime beforehand. In this case, I do not
know that my friend committed the crime, though I am in a position to know by opening it and
reading. The scientific community, Lackey claims, is in a similar position with respect to Dr. N.'s
publication.
The proponent of SK is likely to find Lackey's analogy question-begging, for it assumes
that the information in the letter – the analog of Dr. N.'s publication – is not known. But whether
Dr. N.'s publication is known by the community is what is under dispute. Let me end by offering
a reconceptualization of this analogy in light of my arguments above. The case of the unopened
latter is not analogous to the case of Dr. N. An individual analog to the case of Dr. N. would be a
case where the information in the unopened letter were part of the individual's knowledge. The
individual is not merely in a position to know that p, but knows that p, although he or she might
not be aware of that fact. The accessibility of Dr. N.'s publication makes it knowledge for the
scientific community. It is analogous to an individual's accessible but currently unaccessed
memory that p.94 The individual members of the scientific community are merely in a position to
know that d, but the scientific community itself already does know that d.
94

A reviewer notes another analogy to individual memory: just as an individual will scan her memory for relevant
evidence before embarking on important action, so will the scientific community scan what it knows (its
published articles).
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6.6. Conclusion
The cases of Drs. Q. and N. are intended by Bird (2010; 2014) to demonstrate the nonsupervenience of group knowledge on individual knowledge. Lackey (2014) argues that this nonsupervenience cannot accommodate KAP (plus GMAP) and the role of group defeaters. I argued
that “act as if” in KAP is ambiguous between “acting on” the knowledge that p and merely
“acting in accordance with” the knowledge that p. On the latter disambiguation, KAP is false for
individuals and groups. On the former disambiguation, KAP is true, but does not show that SK is
false. Regarding group defeaters, I argued that the defender of SK could either claim that there is
a reliabilist defeater in Lackey's example or that, appealing to KNB, there are no defeaters. If this
is right, then non-supervenience remains a viable position in the metaphysics of social
knowledge.
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Chapter 7. The Directionality of Distinctively Mathematical Explanations
with Carl F. Craver
In “What Makes a Scientific Explanation Distinctively Mathematical?” (2013b), Lange
uses several compelling examples to argue that certain explanations for natural phenomena
appeal primarily to mathematical, rather than natural, facts. In such explanations, the core
explanatory facts are modally stronger than facts about causation, regularity, and other natural
relations. We show that Lange's account of distinctively mathematical explanation is flawed in
that it fails to account for the implicit directionality in each of his examples. This inadequacy is
remediable in each case by appeal to ontic facts that account for why the explanation is
acceptable in one direction and unacceptable in the other direction. The mathematics involved in
these examples cannot play this crucial normative role. While Lange's examples fail to
demonstrate the existence of distinctively mathematical explanations, they help to emphasize that
many superficially natural scientific explanations rely for their explanatory force on relations of
stronger-than-natural necessity. These are not opposing kinds of scientific explanations; they are
different aspects of scientific explanation.
7.1. Introduction.
In “What Makes a Scientific Explanation Distinctively Mathematical?” (2013b; 2013a),
Lange uses several compelling examples to argue that certain natural phenomena are best
explained by appeal to mathematical, rather than natural, facts. In distinctively mathematical
explanations, the core explanatory facts are modally stronger than facts about, e.g., statistical
relevance, causation, or natural law. A distinctively mathematical explanation might describe
causes, Lange allows, but its explanatory force derives ultimately from appeal to facts that are
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“more necessary” than causal laws. Lange advances this thesis to argue for the importance of a
purely modal view of explanation (a view that emphasizes necessities, possibilities, and
impossibilities, showing that an event had to or could not have happened) in contrast to the
widely discussed ontic view (a view that associates explanation with describing the relevant
natural facts, e.g., about how the event was caused or how its underlying mechanisms work).95
Lange operates with a narrower understanding of the ontic conception. He describes it as
the view that all explanations are causal. He cites Salmon, who claimed that, “To give scientific
explanations is to show how events and statistical regularities fit into the causal structure of the
world” (Salmon 1984)96 and “To understand why certain things happen, we need to see how they
are produced by these mechanisms [processes, interactions, laws]” (Salmon 1984). He also cites
Lewis (“Here is my main thesis: to explain an event is to provide some information about its
causal history”; 1986) and Sober (“The explanation of an event describes the 'causal structure' in
which it is embedded”; 1984).97 In contrast to Lange, we adopt a more inclusive understanding of
the ontic that embraces any natural regularity (Salmon 1989; Craver 2014; Povich forthcoming
a), e.g., statistical relevance (Salmon 1977), natural laws (Hempel 1965), or contingent
95

96
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There is a growing body of literature on mathematical explanation (Baker 2005; Baker and Colyvan 2011;
Huneman 2010; Pincock 2011). We focus on Lange because his examples have become canonical and because
his commitments are so explicitly formulated. We suspect that the directionality problem will arise in these other
papers as well, but these authors are mostly concerned with indispensability and the ontology of mathematics, a
topic that we (like Lange) hope to sidestep to focus on explanation alone. See Craver (forthcoming) for a
discussion of directionality problems in network explanation. Andersen's (forthcoming) response to Lange is
complementary to ours, fleshing out a point about explananda at which we only gesture in the conclusion. Our
main focus is directionality.
See the passages quoted in Povich (forthcoming) for evidence that Salmon did not think the ontic conception was
strictly causal. As we note, Lange's conception of the ontic conception is narrower than one might allow. The
primary aim of the ontic conception is to insist that whether X explains Y is an objective matter of (natural) fact.
One can believe that mechanistic explanation is important without believing that all explanations are causal or
mechanical. We show why C = 2πr without describing mechanisms. We explain why Obama can sign treaties
without describing causes. Explanations in epistemology, logic, and metaphysics often work without describing
causes. The question here is not whether one should be a pluralist about explanation but about whether Lange's
account of distinctively mathematical explanation is complete and whether his contrast with the ontic conception
is substantiated by his examples.
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compositional relations might also figure fundamentally in explanation. This point will become
crucial below, given that the ontic relations that explain the directionality of some explanations
are not specifically causal relations; but they are ontic in this wider sense.98 Lange's arguments
should, however, work equally well against this broader understanding of the ontic conception,
given that he uses the examples to show that some explanations of natural facts depend
fundamentally on relations of necessity that are stronger than mere natural necessity.
We argue that Lange's account of distinctively mathematical explanation is flawed.
Specifically, it fails to account for the directionality implicit in his examples of distinctively
mathematical explanation. This failure threatens Lange's argument because it shows that his
examples do not, in fact, derive their explanatory force from mathematical relations alone
(independent of ontic considerations). The inadequacy is in each case easily remediable by
appeal to ontic facts that account for why the explanation is acceptable in one direction and
unacceptable in the other. That is, Lange's exemplars of distinctively mathematical explanation
appear to require for their adequacy appeal to natural, ontic facts about, e.g., causation,
constitution, and regularity. More positively, we suggest that all mechanistic explanations are
constrained, and so explained, by both ontic and modal facts. Rather than seeing an opposition
between distinctively mathematical explanations and causal (or more broadly ontic)
explanations, Lange's examples, as we reinterpret them, direct us to understand how these
distinct aspects of explanation, these distinct sources of explanatory power, intermingle and
interact with one another in most scientific explanations.
98

For purposes of focus, we leave aside the question of whether the existence of distinctively mathematical
explanations in fact commits one to the denial of the ontic conception or even to the idea that there is a modal
form of explanation independent of ontic considerations. The fact that mathematics is important to explanation
doesn't necessarily commit one to the idea that the modal conception has a role to play independently of ontic
considerations absent further commitments about the relationship between mathematics and ontology. Like
Lange, we remain silent on the ontology of mathematics (492).
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7.2. Lange's Account of Distinctively Mathematical Explanation.
Lange's goal is to show “how distinctively mathematical explanations work” by revealing
the “source of their explanatory power” (486). He accepts as a basic constraint on his account
that it should “fit scientific practice,” that is, that it should judge as “explanatory only hypotheses
that would (if true) constitute genuine scientific explanations” (486). In short, the account should
not contradict too many scientific common-sense judgments about whether an explanation is
good or bad. Lange's goal and his guiding constraint are conceptually related: to identify the
source of an explanation's power requires identifying the key features that sort acceptable
explanations from unacceptable explanations of that type. In causal explanations, for example,
much of the explanatory power comes from knowledge of the causal relations among
components in a mechanism. Bad causal explanations of this kind fail when they misrepresent
the relevant causal structure (in ways that matter). In mathematical explanations, on Lange's
view, the explanatory force comes from mathematical relations that are 'more necessary' than
mere causal or correlational regularities.
Given this set-up, Lange's account of the explanatory force of distinctively mathematical
explanations can be undermined by examples that fit Lange's account but that would be rejected
as bad explanations as a matter of scientific common-sense. The account would fail to identify
fully the explanatory force in such explanations and so would fail to account for the norms
governing such explanations.
Lange does not address the canonical form of mathematical explanations. However, his
examples are readily reconstructed as arguments in which a description of an explanandum
phenomenon follows from an empirical premise (EP) describing the relevant natural facts, and a

109

mathematical premise (MP) describing one or more more-than-merely-naturally-necessary facts.
To begin with Lange's simplest example:
Strawberries: Why can't Mary divide her strawberries among her three kids?99 Because
she has 23 strawberries, and 23 is not divisible by three.
This explanation can be reconstructed as an argument:
1. Mary has 23 strawberries (EP)
2. 23 is indivisible by 3 (MP)
C. Mary can't divide the strawberries equally among her three kids.100
We would have to tighten the bolts to make the argument valid (e.g., no cutting of strawberries is
allowed), but the general idea is clear enough. The empirical premise works by describing the
natural features of a system. They specify, for example, the relevant magnitudes (Mary starts
with 23 strawberries), and the causal or otherwise relevant dependencies among them. All
mathematical explanations of natural phenomena require at least some empirical premises to
show how the mathematics will be applied and to specify the natural (empirically discovered)
constraints under which the mathematical premises do their work. The question is whether those
mathematical premises are supplying the bulk of the 'force' of the explanation, as appears to be
the case in Strawberries.101
Lange's other examples can similarly be reconstructed as arguments mixing empirical and
mathematical premises.
99

100

101

Or “Why didn't she on some particular occasion?” or “Why didn't or couldn't anyone ever?” Lange intends all
these explananda to be explained by the same explanans; a similar multiplicity of explananda can be generated
for the examples below.
This example is reconstructed as a sketch of a deductive argument, but distinctively mathematical explanations
might be inductive. For example, one might explain why fair dice will most likely not roll a string of ten
consecutive double-sixes on mathematical grounds, using logical probability and some math.
Lange might object to the inclusion of the empirical premise in this formulation. Instead, he might treat the
empirical premise as a presupposition of the why question: “Why can't Mom divide her 23 strawberries among
her three kids?” Answer: “Because 23 is indivisible by 3.” In what follows, all of our examples can be so
translated without affecting the principled incompleteness in the cases, but this reformulation comes at
considerable cost to the clarity with which the incompleteness can be displayed (see Section 7.4).
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Trefoil Knot: Why can't Terry untie his shoes? Because Terry has a trefoil knot in his
shoelace (EP). The trefoil knot is not isotopic to the unknot in three dimensions (EP), and
only knots isotopic to the unknot in three dimensions can be untied (MP) (489).
Königsberg: Why did Marta fail to walk a path through Königsberg in 1735, crossing
each of its bridges exactly once (an Eulerian walk)? Because, that year, Königsberg's
bridges formed a connected network with four nodes (landmasses); three nodes had three
edges (bridges); one had five (EP). But only networks that contain either zero or two
nodes with an odd number of edges permit an Eulerian walk (MP) (489).
Chopsticks: Why is it likely that more tossed chopsticks will be oriented horizontally
rather than vertically? Because the they were tossed randomly (EP) and there are more
ways for a chopstick to be horizontal than to be vertical (MP). If we focus on the sphere
produced by rotating the chopstick through three dimensions, a chopstick can be
horizontal anywhere near the equator; it is vertical only near the poles (490).
Cicadas: Why do cicadas with prime life-cycle periods tend to suffer less from predation
by predators with periodic life cycles than do cicadas with composite periods? Because it
minimizes predation to have a life cycle that intersects only infrequently with that of your
periodic predators (EP) and because prime periods minimize the frequency of intersection
(MP) (498).
Honeycombs: Why do honeybees use at least the amount of wax they would use to
divide their combs into hexagons of equal area? Because honeybees divide their combs
(which are planar regions with dividing walls of negligible thickness) into regions of
equal area (EP) and a hexagonal grid uses the least total perimeter in dividing a planar
region into regions of equal area (MP) (499).102
Pendulum: Why does Patty's pendulum have at least four equilibrium configurations?
Because Patty's pendulum is a double pendulum (EP) and any double pendulum's
configuration space is a torus with at least four stationary points (MP) (501).
Central to Lange's broader purposes is the claim that these distinctively mathematical
explanations gain their explanatory force from non-causal, and more broadly, non-ontic sources:
i.e., stronger-than-naturally-necessary relations. Explanatory priority flows downward from the
more necessary to the less necessary:
In my view, the order of causal priority is not responsible for the order of explanatory
102

Lange “narrows” the explananda in these last two cases. Note that the explananda are not, respectively, that
cicadas have prime periods and that honeycombs are hexagonal. Those explananda have causal (etiological and
constitutive) explanations. The narrower explanations, Lange argues, have distinctively mathematical
explanations.

111

priority in distinctively mathematical explanations in science. Rather, the facts doing the
explaining are eligible to explain by virtue of being modally more necessary even than
ordinary causal laws (as both mathematical facts and Newton's second law are) or being
understood in the why question's context as constitutive of the physical task or
arrangement at issue. (506)
For Lange, distinctively mathematical explanations gain their explanatory force from the fact
that they rely fundamentally on mathematical relations that are more necessary than are relations
of causation and natural law. The norms by which good mathematical explanations are sorted
from bad mathematical explanations would, according to this account, turn on the relevant
mathematics and facts about how that mathematics is being applied. In the following section we
argue that Lange's analysis is inadequate.
7.3. The Inadequacy of Lange's Model.
Lange's account currently leaves unspecified a crucial feature for sorting the
mathematical arguments that have explanatory power from those that fail as explanations. Our
argument for this thesis is inspired by Bromberger's example of the flagpole and the shadow
(1966). At least according to scientific common-sense, one can explain the shadow's length by
appealing to the flagpole's height, the sun's angle of elevation, and the natural fact that light
propagates in straight lines. One cannot, in accord with scientific common-sense, explain the
flagpole's height in terms of its shadow's length, the angle of the sun's elevation, and the natural
fact that light propagates in straight lines (in non-intentional contexts; cf. van Fraassen 1980,
132–4). In complete accordance with the norms of the once-received, covering-law model of
explanation (Hempel 1965), one can write a deductive argument relating law statements and true
descriptions of 'initial' conditions to either conclusion. For Bromberger (and Salmon 1984), the
example demonstrates an asymmetry in natural explanations that the covering-law model could

112

not accommodate. The covering-law model is thereby shown to be an inadequate account of the
norms of scientific explanation.
More generally, the example demonstrates that at least some (and in fact, many)
explanations have a preferred direction. Salmon, for example, used this example (among others)
to argue that scientific explanations work by tracing the antecedent causal structure of an event:
Light leaves the sun, passes the flagpole, and lands on the ground. Causation enforces this
temporal direction. No such causal sequence proceeds from the shadow to the height of the
flagpole (outside intentional contexts). Considerations of just this sort underlie both Lewis' and
Sober's emphasis on causation as the fundament of scientific explanation. In what follows, we
emphasize the directionality of explanations, not their asymmetry. It does not matter for our
purposes whether all the same statements in one explanation are reordered in the other. In some
cases this is possible; in others it is not. What matters, instead, is that one can generate an
explanation that fits the form of a distinctively mathematical explanation that appears to violate
our common-sense norms about the acceptable and unacceptable directions of scientific
explanation.
If one is committed to the existence of distinctively mathematical explanations of natural
phenomena, then one must find a way to reconcile the directionlessness of many applications of
mathematics with the directionality of natural explanations. The kinds of relation described in
algebra, geometry, and calculus are directionless; with addition or division, a variable on one
side of the equation can be moved to the other side. They have no intrinsic left-right directions;
rather, these must be imposed from the outside. This is why Lange's examples of putative
distinctively mathematical explanation face a directionality challenge. Each of Lange's examples

113

can be 'reversed' to yield an argument that appeals to the same mathematical premise and that has
the same form as Lange's examples but that would not be counted as an acceptable explanation
(absent considerable revision in scientific common-sense). Consider, for example:
Reversed Strawberries. Why doesn't Mary have 23 strawberries? Because she divided
her strawberries equally among her three kids (EP) and 23 is indivisible by 3 (MP).
Like Strawberries, Reversed Strawberries can be represented as a deductive argument with both
an empirical and a mathematical premise:
1. Mary evenly distributed her strawberries among her three kids (EP).
2. 23 is indivisible by 3 (MP).
C. Mom doesn't have 23 strawberries.
From a common-sense perspective, at least, Mary's even-numbered pile of strawberries explains
but is not explained by her dividing the pile equally among the children.103 (And surely the
number of children mom had is not explained by her distribution of strawberries today, though a
mathematical argument of that sort could be constructed as well.) Note further that the implicit
directionality in this explanation is plausibly accounted for by ontic assumptions about the kinds
of relations that properly carry explanatory force: i.e., that mom's pile is the cause (the source) of
the portions each kid gets. In contrast, the portions do not cause the number of strawberries or
the number of children. The trefoil knot example faces a similar reversal:
Reversed Trefoil Knot: Why doesn't Terry have a trefoil knot in his shoelace? Because
Terry untied the knot (EP) and the trefoil knot is not isotopic to the unknot in three
dimensions, and only knots isotopic to the unknot in three dimensions can be untied
(MP).
But it would seem more in line with scientific common-sense to explain why Terry has a
particular kind of knot by describing how he tied it and not by describing his ability or inability
103

Catherine Stinson (personal communication) emphasizes that this claim must be bracketed to nonintentional
contexts. Mary might decide, for example, to bake a certain number of cookies knowing they will have to be
evenly divided among her kids, or she might decide to have three kids because she decides that three is the
maximum number of children she can support on her income. These are intentional, causal explanations.
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to untie it.
Reversed Königsberg: Why did either zero or two of Königsberg's landmasses have an
odd number of bridges in 1756? Because Marta walked through town, hitting each bridge
exactly once (EP) and only networks containing zero or two nodes with an odd degree
contain an Eulerian path (MP).
As in the other examples, Königsberg's layout is arguably better explained by the decisions of the
Burgermeister than by Marta's walk, yet facts about Königsberg's layout follow reliably from
descriptions of either.
Reversed Chopsticks: Why were the chopsticks tossed non-randomly? Because more of
the tossed chopsticks were oriented vertically than horizontally (EP) and there are more
ways for a chopstick to be horizontal than to be vertical (MP).
In this “reversal,” the unexpected number of vertically oriented chopsticks provides evidence
that some biasing force must be acting upon them (much as deviations from the Hardy-Weinberg
equilibrium detect selective forces). As in Lange's forward-directed version of the example, the
argument here is inductive. But while we are apt to count Lange's original example as
explanatory, it seems more fitting with scientific common-sense to describe Reversed Chopsticks
as describing an evidential, not explanatory, relation. In the case of Cicadas, suppose that a field
scientist discovers a species of Cicadas that thrives despite the fact that its life cycle overlaps
considerably with that of its periodic predators:
Reversed Cicadas: Why doesn't it minimize predation in these Cicadas to have a life
cycle that intersects only infrequently with that of your periodic predators? Because
cicadas with prime life-cycle periods don't tend to suffer less from predation by predators
with periodic life cycles than do cicadas with composite periods (EP) and because prime
periods minimize the frequency of intersection (MP).
To modify the example and give a more intuitive appeal, suppose that the life-cycles of a species
of Cicada and its periodic predator overlap only every 21 years. This places constraints on the
space of possible periods for the life-cycles in these species: 1, 3, 7, and 21 years are the
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available options. If we know on empirical grounds that 1 and 21 are not live options and that the
life-cycle of the cicada is 7 years, and we package that into the the request for explanation, we
can infer with mathematical certainty that the predator cycle is 3 years. But it would seem that
the frequency of intersection is explained by the life-cycles, not that the life-cycles are explained
by the frequency of their intersection.
Reversed Honeycombs: Why does this species of honeybee divide its combs into
regions of unequal area? Because honeybees use less than the amount of wax they would
use to divide their combs into hexagons of equal area (EP) and a hexagonal grid uses the
least total perimeter in dividing a planar region into regions of equal area (MP).
But it is a stretch from common-sense to think of the bee's hive-construction as explained by the
fact that it uses less wax than a hexagonal grid. (If there were such an explanation, it would be a
selectionist, and so causal, explanation on Lange's view [498].) The mathematical premise is
directionless, but the explanatory force runs in a preferred direction. And finally:
Reversed Pendulum: Why isn't Patty's pendulum a double pendulum? Because Patty's
pendulum doesn't have at least four equilibrium configurations (EP) and any double
pendulum's configuration space is a torus with at least four stationary points (MP).
But surely Patty's engineering explains the kind of pendulum she has or does not have better than
does fact that the pendulum has more or fewer than four equilibrium points (again, outside
intentional contexts).
Each of Lange's examples can be used to generate a putative distinctively mathematical
explanation, with the same mathematical premise and the same form, that few scientists would
accept as a genuine explanation. Given that Lange is not aiming to revise radically our scientific
common-sense ideas about the nature of scientific explanation, it would appear that Lange's
model of distinctively mathematical explanation is inadequate.
To amplify this point, note that each example of reversal seems to confuse justification
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and explanation (see Hempel's [1965] distinction between reason-seeking and explanationseeking why-questions). An argument justifies believing thesis P (at least partially) when it
provides evidence that P. The pristine form of the covering-law model, i.e., one conjoined to the
strongest form of the explanation-prediction symmetry thesis, can be seen as attempting to erase
this boundary. The goal was to cast explanation as fundamentally an epistemic achievement:
explanation is reduced to rational expectation. The problem, of course, is that one can have
reason to believe P without explaining P. An Archaeopteryx fossil gives one reason to believe
that Archaeopteryx once existed, but it does not explain Archaeopteryx's existence. The same
point has been made time and again: with barometers and storms, spots and measles, yellow
fingers and lung cancer, and roosters and sunrises. Indicators are not always explainers. It was in
recognition of this problem that defenders of the covering-law model quickly backed away from
strong forms of the explanation-prediction symmetry thesis and sought other means to account
for the directionality of scientific explanations. It was in the face of these challenges that Salmon
raised his flag in favor of the ontic conception.
Yet precisely the same problem appears to arise for Lange's examples: We learn
something about Terry's knot when we learn he's untied it; we learn something about Königsberg
from Marta's stroll; we learn something about our chopsticks when we observe their contranormal behavior; we learn something about the structure of honeycombs from the amount of wax
used; we learn something about the life-cycles of cicadas when we observe predation patterns;
and we learn something about a pendulum from how many equilibrium configurations it has. But
learning something about the system is not in all cases tantamount to explaining that feature of
the system.
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Lange argues that the order of explanatory priority in his examples follows the degree of
modal necessity, with more necessary things explaining less necessary things. Yet this restriction
on distinctively mathematical explanations cannot block the above examples. After all, the same
mathematical laws are involved in the forward and reversed cases. We have simply changed the
empirical facts. The problem appears to be that the mathematics in these examples is sufficiently
flexible about what goes on the right and left hand side of an equation that it doesn't seem to
have the resources internal to it to account for the directionality enforced in scientific commonsense. Some extra ingredient is required to sort genuine mathematical explanations from
pretenders and, specifically, to sort explanation from justification. In other words, these putative
cases of distinctively modal, mathematical explanations of natural phenomena appear to retain an
ineliminable ontic component, perhaps working implicitly in the background, but required to
account for the preferred direction to the explanation. Mom's pile explains the kids' allotment,
and not vice versa, because the allotment is produced from pile. The trefoil knot explains the
failure to untie it, and not vice versa, perhaps because structures constrain functions and not vice
versa. Similarly, the structure of Königsberg explains which walks are possible around town, but
the walks do not explain the structure of the town. Perhaps the movement of the sticks does not
explain the forces acting on the sticks because the pattern in the sticks is not causally relevant to
the forces acting upon them. Perhaps life-cycle periods explain predation patterns, and not vice
versa, because the length of a life-cycle period is causally relevant to the amount of predation.
Perhaps the structure of honeycombs explains the amount of wax used, but not vice versa,
because the structure of a honeycomb determines the amount of wax needed to build it. And
perhaps the shape of Patty's pendulum is explained by her desires in choosing it and not by the
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fact that it does or does not have four stable equilibrium points precisely because Patty's desires
are causally relevant and (in most non-intentional contexts) the four equilibrium points are not.
In other words, in each case, it would appear that various ontic assumptions about what can
explain what are called upon to sort out the appropriate direction of the explanation and to weed
out inappropriate applications of the same argumentative forms appealing to the same
mathematical laws.104
The dialectical situation might be put expressed as a tension between three propositions:
first, that there are distinctively mathematical explanations of natural phenomena; second; that
mathematical explanations are directionless; and third, that explanations of natural phenomena
are not directionless.
To resolve this tension, one might deny the first of these propositions, holding that all
distinctively mathematical explanations of natural phenomena have at least implicit within them
a set of ontic commitments that account for the directionality of the explanations and so for the
norms that sort good from bad mathematical explanations. Perhaps once the explanandum has
been narrowed to the point that it is susceptible of a distinctively mathematical explanation, the
explanandum has been transformed into a mathematical rather than a natural fact. Our above
discussion is consistent with this view but in no way forces it upon us. One might also deny that
mathematics is directionless. Perhaps some areas of mathematics enforce a direction that
corresponds to the explanatory norms in a given domain. This appears not to be the case in
Lange's examples, but it does not follow that there are no such cases. Perhaps, that is, there are
104

Aggregative explanations apply to constitutive relations but exhibit a preferred direction. The mass of the pile of
sand is explained by summing the masses of the individual grains. But one can infer the mass of an individual
grain from the mass of the whole and the mass of the other grains. This aggregative explanation appears to have
the same simple mathematical structure as Strawberries. In this case, it is a constitutive (not causal) relation that
apparently accounts for the preferred direction. Perhaps parts explain wholes and not vice versa: an ontic
commitment.
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distinctively mathematical explanations of natural phenomena that do not face a directionality
problem (Huneman, personal communication).
Finally, one might reject the third proposition and allow that explanations of natural
phenomena are directionless. This is the extreme caricature of the covering-law model we
mentioned above, one that holds to the strong form of the prediction-explanation symmetry
thesis. This option involves biting the bullet and accepting that shadows explain flagpoles, that
spots explain measles, and that yellow fingers explain lung cancer. (Railton [1981], for example,
includes such things in his 'ideal explanatory text'.)
Even if one is tempted to give up on the first proposition and to deny that there truly are
distinctively mathematical explanations of natural phenomena, Lange's discussion highlights an
important feature of causal and mechanistic explanation that has thus far received very little
attention: namely, that all mechanisms are constrained to work within the space of logical and
mathematical possibility. If how something works is explained by revealing constraints on its
operation (as Craver and Darden [2013], for example, appear to suggest), then one cannot
neglect these modal constraints in a complete understanding of mechanistic explanation. In our
view, that thesis is interesting enough even if there are not distinctively mathematical
explanations of natural phenomena.
7.4. Presuppositions and Constitutive Contexts.
Although we have modeled our reconstructions on Lange's discussion, in which he
explicitly states that contingent, empirical facts are part of the explanantia (506), he may object
to the form of our examples. He considers and rejects the following pseudo-explanation:
Why are all planetary orbits elliptical (approximately)? Because each planetary orbit is
(approximately) the locus of points for which the sum of the distances from two fixed
120

points is a constant [EP], and that locus is (as a matter of mathematical fact) an ellipse
[MP]. (508)
Like the previous examples, this one has an empirical premise and a mathematical premise. This
is not a distinctively mathematical explanation, according to Lange, because “the first fact to
which it appeals [i.e. EP] is neither modally more necessary than ordinary causal laws nor
understood in the why question's context to be constitutive of being a planetary orbit (the
physical arrangement in question)” (508). However, if we presuppose that the planetary orbits in
question are just those that are loci of points for which the sum of the distances from two fixed
points is a constant, then that fact is understood in the why question's context to be constitutive
of being a planetary orbit. The why-question then becomes: Why are all planetary orbits that are
loci of points for which the sum of the distances from two fixed points is a constant, elliptical? It
is constitutive of the planetary orbits in question that they are loci of points for which the sum of
the distances from two fixed points is a constant. The distinctively mathematical explanation is
that those loci are necessarily ellipses. Should Lange object to our “reversed” examples on
similar grounds, their empirical premises can also be presupposed and shifted into their
associated why-questions. For example, in Reversed Trefoil Knot, instead of asking, “Why
doesn't Terry have a trefoil knot in his shoelace?” and stating as an empirical premise that Terry
untied the knot, we could instead ask, “Why doesn't Terry have a trefoil knot in the shoelace he
untied?” Now the former empirical premise is part of the constitutive context of the whyquestion. We presuppose that Terry untied his shoelace, rather than stating it as an empirical
premise. This seems to fit Lange's criteria for distinctively mathematical explanation.
Lange could respond to this move by distinguishing between what is understood to be
constitutive of the physical task or arrangement at issue and what is actually constitutive of the
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physical task or arrangement at issue.105 Lange could then argue that, for example, in Trefoil
Knot it is actually constitutive of the physical task or arrangement at issue that Terry's shoelace is
a trefoil knot. However, Lange could continue, in the version of Reversed Trefoil Knot where we
presuppose that Terry untied his shoelace, that fact is not actually constitutive of the physical
task or arrangement at issue. We are unsure how this distinction between what is “understood” to
be and “actually” constitutive could be drawn. When we request an explanation for the fact that
Terry failed to untie his shoelace, we grant that context determines that it is actually (and not
merely understood to be) constitutive of that fact that his shoelace is a trefoil knot. However,
when we request an explanation for the fact that Terry doesn't have a trefoil knot in the shoelace
he untied, it seems to us constitutive of that very fact that Terry untied his shoelace. It wouldn't
be the same explanandum had Terry not untied his shoelace. We do not see how one can claim
that Terry's untying the knot is merely understood to be constitutive of this explanandum, while
claiming that the shoelace's being a trefoil knot is actually constitutive of the former
explanandum.
We don't think there's anything objectionable about so restricting the range of our
explananda/why-question (e.g., to just those planetary orbits that are loci of points for which the
sum of the distances from two fixed points is a constant). Notice that such a restriction is
required of Lange's examples as well. For example, it is not constitutive of all shoelaces that they
contain trefoil knots; it is constitutive only of the shoelace under consideration, which actually
contains a trefoil knot. Nor is it constitutive of all pendula that they are double pendula; nor of all
arrangements of strawberries and children that there are 23 of the former and 3 of the latter; nor
105

We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion and careful discussion of the points in this section. Note that
Lange (2013b) always speaks of what is “understood” to be constitutive in the context of the why-question (e.g.,
491, 497, 506, 507, 508).
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of all bridges that they have a non-Eulerian structure. This response to our challenge, in other
words, requires an account of how context determines what is constitutive of the physical task or
arrangement in question106, especially if it relies on a distinction between what is actually and
merely understood to be constitutive in a given context.
7.5. Conclusion: Modal and Ontic Aspects of Mechanistic Explanations.
Return again to the flagpole and the shadow. As discussed above, Bromberger and
Salmon used this example to demonstrate the directionality of scientific explanations. They enlist
this point to argue for an ineliminable causal (or more broadly, ontic) component in our
normative analysis of scientific explanation. We have used the same strategy to argue for an
ineliminable ontic component in Lange's examples of distinctively mathematical explanation.
But the example can be yoked for another duty.
One might, in fact, describe the flagpole example as a distinctively mathematical (or at
least trigonometric) explanation of a natural phenomenon, one that calls out for a distinctively
modal interpretation. Presupposing that the angle of elevation of the sun is θ and that the height
of the flagpole is h (and the flagpole and ground are straight and form a right angle, and that the
system is Euclidean, etc.; EP), why is the length of the flagpole's shadow l? Once the contingent
causal facts are presupposed in our empirical premise, the only relevant fact left to do the
explaining seems to be the trigonometric fact that tan θ = h/l (MP). Moreover, once these natural
facts are presupposed, the length of the flagpole's shadow seems to follow by trigonometric
necessity. So if we package all the natural facts into an empirical premise and highlight the
relation tan θ = h/l, which is crucial for the argument to work, then we might see this as a case in
which the bulk of the explanatory force is carried by a trigonometric function. The example thus
106

This worry is raised by Pincock (2015: 875). We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to our attention.
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seems to provide a recipe for turning at least some mechanistic explanations into distinctively
mathematical explanations: simply package all of the empirical conditions, such as the rectilinear
propagation of light, or the Euclidean nature of spacetime, into the empirical premise or the
context of the request for explanation, and leave a mathematical remainder or a tautology to
serve as the premise with stronger-than-natural necessity.107
The importance of geometry to mechanistic explanation is readily apparent in artifacts,
such as the coupling between an engine and the drive crank shaft of a car. Machamer, Darden
and Craver (2000) describe the organization of such mechanisms as geometrico-mechanical in
nature. Vertical motion produced by explosions in the piston chambers drive the pistons out. The
center of each piston is connected via a rod to the crankshaft at some distance (r) from the center
of the crankshaft so that when the piston is driven out, the crankshaft is rotated in a circle. This
mechanism very efficiently transfers the vertical force of the pistons into a circular motion that
drives the car forward. These engine parts are organized geometrically in circles and triangles.
The angle of the connecting rod, for example, determines the position of the piston, though the
explanation would appear to work the other way around. Yet these mathematical facts surely are
relevant to why the car accelerates as it does and not faster or slower.108
107
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This could presumably be done with any kind of necessity. For example, take an explanation one of whose
premises is a conceptual necessity. Fix or presuppose all the premises other than the conceptual necessity. You
then have a distinctively conceptual explanation. Lange appears to recognize this possibility (504).
Baron, Colyvan, and Ripley (forthcoming; see also Chirimuuta forthcoming) propose assimilating this
mathematical dependence to a “counterfactualist” account of explanation (i.e. an account according to which
explanatory power consists in the ability to answer what-if-things-had-been-different questions or w-questions)
and they show how to assess the relevant counterpossible counterfactuals within a structural equation modeling
framework. We find this assimilation plausible but as yet inadequate, because Baron et al. (and Chirimuuta) do
not address the question of which true counterfactuals are explanatorily relevant and which are not. For example,
there are contexts in which it is true that had the flagpole's shadow been length l then the flagpole's height would
have been h. There are also contexts in which it is true that had Mary divided her strawberries evenly among her
children, then 23 would have been divisible by 3. Thus there is a similar problem of directionality with respect to
counterfactuals: in one direction, a counterfactual can seem explanatory; in the other direction, it does not seem
explanatory. We think that the distinction between explanatorily relevant and irrelevant counterfactuals must be
made by appeal to ontic considerations (Salmon 1984; Povich forthcoming a).
Note that if the counterfactualists are right, this will go some way to dissolving the distinction between
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But as Lange's examples aptly illustrate, mathematics appears to play an essential role in
mechanistic explanations in at least many areas of science. After all, the space of possible
mechanisms is constrained by the space of mathematical (and logical) possibility. If one
considers the mechanisms of sound transduction in the inner ear, one finds an arrangement most
similar to the engine and the crankshaft, except in this case the mechanism converts vibrations in
the air into vibrations in fluid. Still, parts are arranged geometrically. Likewise, when we look
into the intricate mechanisms gating ion channels, we seem to find structures that are understood
geometrically, in terms of sheets and helices, which structures allow or prohibit certain activities
(Kandel et al. 2013). Structural information has been essential to understanding the mechanisms
of protein synthesis and inheritance and to understanding features of macro evolution (Craver
and Darden 2013). Perhaps not all of these explanations are distinctively mathematical, but the
mathematics does ineliminable work in revealing how the mechanism operates, how it can
operate, and how it cannot.
This blend of the mathematical and the mechanical (or more broadly, the ontic) is, in fact,
precisely what one would expect based on the history of the mechanical philosophy. Aristotle's
mechanics (De Groot 2008) works fundamentally by reducing practical problems to facts about
circles. Hero of Alexandria and Archimedes, though celebrated for the practical utility of their
ontic and modal conceptions of explanation. According to counterfactualists, causal, mechanistic, distinctively
mathematical, and all other kinds of explanation derive their explanatory power from their ability to answer wquestions about their explananda. No one, as far as we know, takes the distinction between causal and
mechanistic explanation to be significant enough to warrant relegating each to a different conception of
explanation. The distinction between them is real and there is disagreement about how to make it, but, even
noting the real differences between causal and constitutive relevance, no one takes the distinction to mark two
wholly different conceptions of what it means to explain. If the counterfactualists are right, the distinction
between distinctively mathematical explanations and causal/mechanistic explanations seems as insignificant for
the theory of explanation as the distinction between causal and mechanistic explanation. There is no
philosophically significant reason to lump a few kinds of explanation together and say that they explain in
accordance with an “ontic conception” and the others in accordance with a “modal conception”. For the
counterfactualist, all are simply species of a genus, and all explain by providing answers to w-questions.
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simple machines, viewed those machines equally as geometrical puzzles to be solved. Descartes'
conception of the mechanistic structure of the world was directly connected with his planar
representation of geometrical space, in which extended things interact through contact. Galileo
demonstrated his results with thought experiments, such as the Tower of Pisa, that rely on basic
mathematical truths (i.e., an object cannot both accelerate and decelerate at the same time).
Newton wrote the Principia, like the great physicists before him, in the language of geometry.
Dijksterhuis (1986) closes his masterly Mechanization of the Scientific World Picture with the
cautionary note that, “serious misconceptions would be created if mechanization and
mathematization were presented as antitheses” (500). It is a misconception because the
mathematization of nature and the search for basic mechanistic explanatory principles have been
treated historically as distinct aspects of the same explanatory enterprise. The very idea of
mechanism, and the idea of the world as a causal nexus, has always been expressed in tandem,
rather than in opposition, to the idea that the book of nature is written in the language of
mathematics and the belief that a primary aim of science is to leave nothing in words.
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Chapter 8. Conclusion and Future Work
8.1 Conclusion
A number of philosophers have agreed that there are models that provide noncausal
explanations and that this noncausal explanatoriness has something to do with a model's ability
to capture counterfactual dependencies that cannot plausibly be interpreted causally (Batterman
2002a; 2002b; Bokulich 2011; Huneman 2010; Reutlinger 2014; 2016; Rice 2012; 2013; Saatsi
and Pexton 2013; Woodward 2013). However, I have argued that this merely provides the germ
of a full theory of explanation. To account adequately for explanatory asymmetries, this account
requires ontic supplementation. The resulting theory I have called the “generalized ontic
conception” (GOC), according to which explanatory models provide information about the ontic
structures on which the explanandum phenomenon depends.
While an ontic conception, GOC recognizes an ineliminable epistemic aspect of
explanation: GOC makes use of the concept of information, which is relative to background
knowledge. However, I have also argued that lay and scientific usage of the concept of
explanation suggests that such information should not be relativized to any individual agent. This
opens up a novel intersection of philosophy of explanation and social epistemology, though I
remain agnostic as to whether there is a social agent that knows the propositions to which
information is relativized.
8.2 Future Work
There are at least three areas where Model and World needs to be further developed. The
first is on the explanation/model distinction. I make this distinction in Chapter 2 and Kaplan and
Craver (unpublished) make it in their account of norms of explanatory completeness. They
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consider the explanation of some phenomenon to be the total store of knowledge about its causes
and mechanisms. This knowledge is not embodied in any single model. Rather, it appears to be
contained in something akin to Railton's (1981) hypothetical ideal explanatory text. Individual
models capture or express part of this knowledge. If “capture” or “express” means provide
information about the contents of the ideal explanatory text (which was Railton's view), then
Kaplan and Craver's view seems to be akin to that defended here.
The second is on model semantics. Although GOC does not use terms like “reference” or
“mapping,” this does not imply that model semantics has no place in the theory of explanation.
To assess the information conveyed by a model, we see what possibilities are excluded given its
truth, and model truth will likely involve a concept like reference or similarity.
The third is on the explanatory power of distinctively mathematical explanations and
whether or not such explanatory power can be accommodated by GOC. When all the contingent,
empirical premises of an explanation are presupposed, leaving only a purely mathematical
premise, it seems that the only thing on which the explanandum depends is a mathematical fact.
Is this a novel kind of ontic dependence between a natural fact and a mathematical fact, perhaps
construed along mathematical structuralist lines (Resnik 1997)? Lange's (2017, 42–4) account of
explanation by constraint might suggest a kind of ontic dependence – mathematical facts
constrain or limit the space of possible causal mechanisms. Or perhaps in such a case the
mathematics only reveals negative information – information that the explanandum does not
depend on anything other than the presupposed contingent facts? Mathematical trivialism may be
helpful for this latter suggestion (Rayo 2010; 2013). According to trivialism, purely
mathematical statements make no demands of the world – they require no truthmakers – so their
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truth-conditions are trivially satisfied. The modal force of distinctively mathematical
explanations may result from their providing information to the effect that the explanandum does
not depend on anything.
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